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Abstract 
This study is engaged with the examination of an apparent ambiguity in the 
musical aesthetics of German avant-garde composer Helmut Lachenmann. 
Lachenmann's thinking moves between the staunchly dialectical, Adornian 
stance with which he is generally associated as a composer of musica negativa 
and a less familiar, affirmative concept of 'liberated perception'. The latter 
concept seems on the face of it to be closely related to the so-called 'libidinal 
philosophy' of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze. The above discrepancy 
is located around the central philosophical notions of subjectivity, history and 
musical material. 
The question is examined through an analysis of two key Lachenmann essays, 
'Klangtypen der Neuen Musik' (1966) and 'Bedingungen des Materials' (1978); 
an extended discussion of his concept of 'instrumental musique concrete'; the 
study of the orchestral works Accanto (1976) and Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied 
(1980); and by drawing on the work of Theodor Adomo, Jean-Francois Lyotard 
and Gilles Deleuze. 
xiii 
Introduction 
Given that Helmut Lachenmann has stood at the forefront of the German avant-
garde music scene since the late 1960s, the tardiness of his reception onto the 
British new music scene is somewhat surprising. Performances are rare, and, to 
date, there have been only a handful of articles in English devoted to the 
composer. These include 'Helmut Lachenmann's Concept of Rejection' (1995) by 
Elke Hockings which deals with the development of Lachenmann's aesthetic, and 
'Positive or Negative?' (1998), an important, two-part article by Ian Pace 
surveying Lachenmann's music. Several interviews with the composer - by David 
Ryan in particular but also by Philip Clark - have been published, and, to my 
knowledge, only three of Lachenmann's many theoretical essays have been 
translated into English. These are supplemented by numerous smaller pieces in 
CD booklets. A substantial collection comprising over fifty of Lachenmann's 
writings and interviews - Musik als existentielle Erfahrung ('Music as an 
Existential Experience') - was published in 1996, but has yet to be fully translated 
into English. 
Hockings' article introduces some philosophical concepts but contains very little 
discussion of the music itself. Pace's two-part article, on the other hand, presents 
an overview of Lachenmann's musical oeuvre with little reference to his writings. 
My intention here is to bring the philosophical and the musical together. Adornian 
aesthetics and Critical Theory are brought to bear on Lachenmann's music and 
writings in Parts One and Two, whilst Parts Three to Five offer a series of 
additional philosophical perspectives drawn principally from poststructuralist and 
postmodernist positions. 
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Lachenmann's development of a new paradigm of structuring musical material 
through the acoustic properties of sounds is explored. An examination of two 
central aesthetic manifestos, 'Klangtypen der Neuen Musik' (1966) and 
'Bedingungen des Materials' (1978) charts the development of Lachenmann's 
concept of musical material. After a brief consideration of Adorno's immanent 
critique of Western reason, Part One explores the claims of 'Klangtypen der 
Neuen Musik' in the context of the Adomian notion of 'musique informelle'. 
Adorno's concept of 'mimesis' is also examined as a means of understanding 
Lachenmann's espousal of the timbral properties of sounds. By locating affinities 
between sound objects that fall outside the boundaries of discursive rationality, 
Lachenmann's timbral compositions aim to create immanent structures that 
nevertheless give voice to internal differences. The concept of 'instrumental 
musique concrete' is understood as a challenge to develop techniques of sound 
production through a 'defamiliarization' of instrumental technique, so that 
traditional instruments are experienced afresh, in a new, unfamiliar light. 
Part Two examines Lachenmann's confrontation with the 'aesthetic apparatus' of 
musical material. His essay, 'Bedingungen des Materials' is explored, alongside 
his concept of beauty as the rejection of habit. The strong socio-critical flavour of 
Lachenmann's aesthetic is explored in relation to what he sees as the dilemma 
facing the composer today: on the one hand, the 'false fluency' manifested in 
public life and culture, and on the other, the 'speechlessness' in the recognition of 
the real fears and threats facing the individual in late capitalist society. All these 
issues are grounded in an analysis of the concerto for clarinet and orchestra, 
Accanto (1976). 
In Part Three, Lachenmann's repudiation of organic unity is addressed in relation 
to his work for orchestra and amplified string quartet, Tanzsuite mit 
Deutschlandlied (1980). Concerns expressed in the writings of French 
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philosopher Jacques Derrida, regarding the unsustainability of notions of work 
and frame, inside and outside, are examined in relation to the composer's use of 
'past' musical models in the Tanzsuite. Finally, the work's allusions to and 
quotations of German popular tunes are examined in terms of the notion of 
allegory. 
The light that the music of John Cage and the American experimental tradition 
casts on Lachenmann's thinking, particularly his distinction between Horen and 
Zuhoren, is considered in Parts Four and Five. By drawing in addition on the non-
dialectical thought from the 1970s of French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and 
Jean-Francois Lyotard, a discrepancy is examined in Lachenmann's writings 
surrounding the central philosophical issues of subjectivity and history, and, as a 
consequence, of the idea of musical material. 
Part Four examines the shared aims of poststructuralist thought and Adorno's 
negative dialectics, and distinguishes between their approaches to the concepts 
of subjectivity, history and material. Part Five concludes, after a comparison of 
Lachenmann's music to Cage, La Monte Young and Gavin Bryars, that 
Lachenmann's 'liberated perception' is after all, despite the rhetoric of his 
theoretical writings, a dialectical conception. 
The study concludes by arguing for a more considered understanding of 
Lachenmann's confrontational approach than the label of musica negativa given 
to him by Hans Werner Henze would imply. The 'rejectionist' stance for which 
Lachenmann is generally associated is on closer inspection tempered by an 
almost Utopian optimism; an untiring desire to enrich and expand the listener's 
perceptions and awareness in a context which is generally resistant to such 
change. As Lachenmann has asserted repeatedly: 'Music only has a sense 
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"insofar as its structures point beyond themselves to structures - i.e. realities and 
possibilities - around us and in ourselves.'"1 
Part One: 1966-1968 
Lachenmann's Sound Structures and 
Adorno's musique informelle 
1. Adorno: A Logic of disintegration 
Adorno's Critical Theory 6 
The Paradox of Subjectivity 10 
Constellation, an 'alternative logical structure' 12 
2. Lachenmann's manifesto: 'Klangtypen der 
Neuen Musik'(1966) 
A Sound Typology 19 
Structure as a 'Polyphony of Ordered Juxtapositions' 29 
3. une musique informelle 
Adorno's Essay 36 
1 Lachenmann 1995:102. 
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Lachenmann's Action Scores 
Instrumental musique concrete 
39 
52 
4. History, Nature and Mimesis in Adorno and 
early Lachenmann 
Instrumental musique concrete and the 'sound of nature' 58 
Adorno's Dialectic of History and Nature 60 
Mimesis and instrumental musique concrete 61 
5. Lachenmann's temA (1968) 
'Auftakt der instrumentalen musique concrete1 63 
Instrumental musique concrete, the grain of the voice and 'geno-song' 72 
The Myth of Breath 74 
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1. Adorno: A Logic of disintegration 
Adorno's Critical Theory 
The project of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, and Adorno's own version of it, 
negative dialectics, was concerned above all with the survival of the autonomous 
individual, the self-reflecting Subject, in the face of false forms of consciousness, as 
ideology. The aim of Critical Theory was emancipation from false consciousness, the 
abolition of alienation, and the recovery of wholeness.1 
Max Paddison. Adomo's Aesthetics of Music (1993) 
One of the central targets of Adorno's negative dialectics is transcendental 
idealism, the great classical German tradition of philosophy associated with 
figures such as Kant and Hegel. Crudely put, identity thinking, as idealism is also 
known, insists that the world in its totality can be cognized by the subject, that its 
concepts are identical to the objectivity which it attempts to grasp. Underpinning 
this belief is the idea that it is possible for mind to 'transcend' the world, to gaze 
upon it from a detached position of exteriority. The constitutive illusion of 
metaphysical thought for Adorno is the belief that the object, that 'something' that 
is cognized or experienced, can be harnessed through concepts. He argues that 
Philosophy has made a virtue out of the difficulty that, as soon as it wishes to give validity to 
experience, in general it always only ever has a concept of experience, and not experience itself, 
and has deduced from this that experience, since it can only ever be expressed in a concept of 
experience, is itself only a concept, an essence. 2 
For Adorno, this is a false assumption, the ideological content of which must be 
uncovered. The privileging of mind over matter, he claims, has amnesia as its 
1 Paddison 1993: 12. 
2 Adorno cited in Dews 1987: 38. 
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condition of possibility. When the subject claims independence from its object, it 
'reduces it to its own measure; the subject swallows the object, forgetting how 
much it is an object itself'.3 
Fundamental to Adomo's philosophical endeavour is a rethinking of the way in 
which the central philosophical categories of subject and object relate. The 
relation is, according to Adorno, 'neither an ultimate duality nor a screen hiding 
an ultimate unity.'4 Adomo's critique of this problem entails the inversion of the 
traditional mind/matter hierarchy and the privileging of objectivity over 
subjectivity. Nevertheless, he insists that the universal is not to be thought in 
simple opposition to the particular. Rather, the two are mutually constitutive and 
thus inseparable. The concept of mediation is essential to this reformulation of 
the subject-object relation: 
The antithesis of universal and particular... is both necessary and deceptive. Neither one exists 
without the other - the particular only as defined and thus universal; the universal only as the 
definition of something particular, and thus itself particular. Both of them are and are not. This is 
one of the strongest motives on nonidealist dialectics.5 
The philosophical attempt to know the world in its totality is, Adorno argues, the 
result of a primitive fear. Fear of the unknown and the resultant desire to control 
it, to objectify nature, as the aggressor, was, argues Adomo, the impetus behind 
the project of the Enlightenment. Thus Adomo and Horkheimer locate the roots of 
enlightenment reason way beyond the eighteenth-century in primitive man, 'in the 
pre-mental, the animal life of the species': 6 
Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown. This determined 
the course of demythologization, of enlightenment. ... Enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical. 
The pure immanence of positivism, its ultimate product, is no more than a so to speak universal 
3 Adorno 2000: 140. 
4 Adorno 1973b: 174. 
5 Adorno 2000:149. 
6 Ibid: 70. 
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taboo. Nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of outsideness is the source of 
fear.7 
Further, in Negative Dialectics Adorno writes 
The system in which the sovereign mind imagined itself transfigured, has its primal history in the 
pre-mental, the animal life of the species. ... The animal to be devoured must be evil. The 
sublimation of this anthropological schema extends all the way to epistemology. Idealism ... gives 
unconscious sway to the ideology that the not-l, I'autrui, and finally all that reminds us of nature is 
inferior, so the unity of the self-preserving thought may devour it without misgivings. This justifies 
the principle of the thought as much as it increases the appetite. The system is the belly turned 
mind, and rage is the mark of each and every idealism.8 
The freedom which the elimination of the unknown as non-identical supposedly 
entails, is, claims Adorno, highly contradictory. It is this paradox around which the 
argument of Dialectic of Enlightenmentturns. The study is a critique of the notion 
of history as progress. The process of enlightenment has, paradoxically, brought 
about progress and liberation on the one hand, and regression on the other. 
Adorno's philosophy of history is a conflict theory, allowing no ultimate 
reconciliation in the Hegelian sense. As Paddison has written, 
... the emphasis in what Adorno takes from Hegel's logic is not on the reconciliation of 
contradictions, but is rather as the fact that they are antagonistic. Indeed, the point of Adorno 
calling his dialectical method 'negative' is precisely that it admits no 'reconciliation'.9 
The increasing rationalization of the world, with its goal of the eradication of 
barbarism, the growth of knowledge and the abolition of domination has, in the 
'administered world' of capitalism, mutated into its very opposite, as Adorno and 
Horkheimer argue. Western reason and myth are not true opposites, but, rather, 
are two sides of the same coin, dialectically related. Dialectic of Enlightenment 
7 Adomo and Horkheimer 1972:16. 
8 Adorno 1973b: 22-23. 
9 Paddison 1993: 120. 
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paints a sinister picture: 'With the extension of the bourgeois commodity 
economy, the dark horizon of myth is illumined by the sun of calculating reason, 
beneath whose cold rays the seed of the new barbarism grows to fruition.'10 
The primacy of the object is testified within Adomo's thought by means of the 
concept of non-identity. Since there is always 'something' - a particular, which 
thought attempts, in its abstraction, to grasp, and which resists that abstraction -
so the object resists being reduced to the subject. 'As truly non-identical', writes 
Adorno, 'the object moves the farther from the subject the more the subject 
"constitutes" the object'.11At the core of Adorno's philosophical project is the 
notion that thought must bear witness to that which it excludes, to the non-
identical. He argues, however, that this cannot be achieved by dispensing with 
the traditional systems of thought altogether. Rather, philosophy should proceed 
via a process of self-reflection, or 'immanent critique' of the old concepts and 
categories, a critique which casts them in a new light. Traditional concepts such 
as unity, universality and subjectivity must be simultaneously construed and 
denied. '[T]o determine their meanings takes reflection on the very thing which 
definition cuts off for the sake of conceptual flexibility'.12 As Dews has put it, 
attempts by philosophy to refute this paradox 'continually result in self-
undermining dialectical reversals'.1 3 
Thus, in his inaugural lecture at the University of Frankfurt Adomo claimed that 
... only an essentially undialectical philosophy, one which aims at ahistorical truth, could maintain 
that the old problems could simply be removed by forgetting them and starting afresh from the 
beginning. Only in the strictest dialectical communication with the most recent ... philosophy ... 
can a real change of philosophical consciousness prevail.14 
1 0 Adorno and Horkheimer 1972: 32.. 
" Adorno 2000: 147. 
12 Ibid: 139. 
, 3 Dews 1987: 39. 
1 4 Adorno cited in Held 1980: 200. 
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The Paradox of Subjectivity 
The instrument by means of which the bourgeoisie came to power, the liberation of forces, 
universal freedom, self-determination, in short - the Enlightenment, itself turned against the 
bourgeoisie once, as a system of domination, it had recourse to suppression.1 5 
The contradiction of identity and non-identity extends to the principle of 
individuation, to the formation of the subject. Adorno retains the concept of the 
subject, yet he recognizes its problematical nature. The 'dialectic of 
enlightenment', as a simultaneous process of liberation and repression, not only 
entails the domination of external nature but also of inner nature, as the principle 
of subjective autonomy. Reason turns against itself: 'In an antagonistic society 
each individual is non-identical with himself, both social and psychological in 
character at once, and, because of the split, maimed from the outset.'16 Adomo 
and Horkheimer encapsulate this process in the Odysseus chapter of the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment 
In the Sirens episode of Homer's Odyssey, Odysseus, in order to preserve 
himself from 'losing [himself] in the past', 1 7 from succumbing to the lure of pure 
impulse, prior to the formation of the ego, must repress his own inner nature. 
'Self-preservation succeeds only to the extent that, as a result of self-imposed 
regression, self-development fails.' 1 8 This is the double-edged nature of 
constitutive subjectivity: the cost of such self-preservation is the loss of 
spontaneity. The absolute subject cannot get out of its entanglements', writes 
Adorno in Negative Dialectics. '[T]he bonds it would have to tear, the bonds of 
dominion, are as one with the principle of absolute subjectivity.'19 
, s Adorno and Horkheimer 1972: 93. 
1 6 Adorno 1968: 85. 
, 7 Adorno and Horkheimer 1972: 32. 
1 8 Adorno 1968: 86. 
1 9 Adorno 1973b: 50. 
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In the essay 'Sociology and Psychology', he writes, 
Although itself psychic in origin [the ego] is supposed to arrest the play of inner forces and check 
it against reality: this is one of the chief criteria for determining its "health". The concept of the ego 
is dialectical, both psychic and extrapsychic, a quantum of libido and the representative of outside 
reality.20 
The subject, then, is not for Adorno an absolute entity, but is split at its very core, 
imprisoned within its apparatus of survival. Odysseus, faced with the dangerous, 
intoxicating allure of the sirens' song knows of just two ways by which to ensure 
the survival of himself and his crew. He orders each member of the crew to block 
his ears with wax, and demands that he should be tied to the mast of the ship so 
that, whilst he will be able to hear the song and its irresistible attraction, he will be 
unable to act upon his desire. 
Measures such as those taken on Odysseus' ship in regard to the Sirens form presentient 
allegory of the dialectic of enlightenment. Just as the capacity to represent is the measure of 
domination, and domination is the most powerful thing that can be represented in most 
performances, so the capacity of representation is the vehicle of progress and regression at one 
and the same time.21 
As Peter Dews points out, Jochen Hbrisch argues that Adorno's conception of 
subjectivity - as internally incoherent- can be traced back to the thought of the 
early German Romantics. Horisch, writes Dews, 'has shown that the original 
antecedents for Adorno's acute awareness of the loss of spontaneity imposed by 
the formation of the modern autonomous individual, his sense that the identity of 
the self must be coercively maintained against the centrifugal tendencies of 
2 0 Adorno 1968: 86. 
2 1 Adorno and Horkheimer 1972: 34-35. 
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impulse, can be traced back beyond Nietzsche to the critical engagement with 
Fichte's philosophy of Schlegel and Novalis'.22 
Thus, for Adomo, as for the early German Romantics, suffering is an inevitable 
aspect of individual experience. And it is art, claims Adorno, which is the 
language of this suffering. In Aesthetic Theory, he writes 'Expression cannot be 
conceived except as expression of suffering'.23 
Constellation, an 'Alternative Logical Structure' 
As a materialist philosopher, Adorno sets himself against philosophical idealism, 
as embodied in the work of figures such as Kant. Whilst, broadly speaking, 
idealism holds that our forms of thinking determine the way we experience, 
materialism upholds the belief that the structures of society are constitutive of 
experience. The influence of Marx on Adorno's thinking, then, is very much in 
evidence. Yet Adorno does not subscribe to a form of scientific positivism or 
vulgar Marxism, which disregards the mediation of subjectivity in our knowledge 
of the world. He is concerned, rather, with bringing the object to speech, through 
the immanent critique of subjective categories. As Susan Buck-Morss observes, 
Mimetic transformation can be seen as a reversal of Kantian subjectivity. The creativity of the 
latter consisted in the subject's projecting onto experience its own, a priori forms and categories, 
absorbing the object into itself. But Adorno's subject let the object take the lead; it formed the 
object only in the sense of transforming it into a new modality. The language of philosophical 
expression was thus neither subjective intention or an object to be manipulated, but 'a third thing;' 
it expressed truth through configurations 'as a dialectically entwined and explicatively 
undecipherable unity of concept and matter.' Truth as mimetic, linguistic representation meant 
calling things by their right names. 2 4 
2 2 Dews 1995:27. For an in-depth discussion of the philosophy of Novalis, see Bowie 2003:88-102. 
2 3 Adorno 1984:161. 
2 4 Buck-Morss 1977: 88. 
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For Adorno, 'it was the preformed, historically developed structure of society 
which made things what they were, including Kant's reified categories of 
consciousness'. 2 5 Indeed, rather than rendering reality static by viewing it as 
separate from mind, the subject, argues Adorno, must immerse itself within the 
object's particularity. The aim of this is not to collapse subject into object, 
duplicating the object in thought and thus removing the tension between the two, 
but to unveil the 'forgotten subjectivity'26 within the object; its socio-historical 
constructedness. Through representation in language, the subject, argues 
Adorno, can 'bring to speech' the mute, social particularity of the phenomenon. 
This 'translation' of the object into the linguistic medium of the subject is mimetic. 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno argues that it is not conceptuality per se that must 
be abandoned, but what he calls 'concept fetishism',27 the concept considered as 
a 'thing in itself, unchanging through the course of time and abstracted from its 
socio-historical origin. Awareness of the inadequacy of language does not 
indicate that the medium should be abandoned altogether in the name of pure 
'experience'; any attempt to access the non-identical in this way leads only to the 
resurrection of a new 'first philosophy', as we shall see later on. Rather, Adomo 
argues, the tension between identity and non-identity, concept and facticity, must 
be kept in play. 
Definitions are not the be-all and end-all of cognition, as popular scientivism holds; but neither are 
they to be banished. A thinking whose course made us incapable of definition, unable even for 
moments to have a succinct language represent the thing, would be as sterile, probably, as a 
thinking gorged with verbal definitions'28 
Rather than attempting to invent a new philosophical language, 'cleansed' of 
traditional idealism and the logical errors associated with it, Adorno (after 
2 5 Buck-Morss 1977: 85. 
2 6 Paddison 1993: 35. 
"Adorno 1973b: 12. 
28 Ibid: 165. 
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Benjamin), sought the 'redemption' of the history of philosophy, 'in the dialectical 
sense, as "sublation" {Aufhebung), Hegel's notoriously untranslatable term which 
means simultaneously "preservation" and "negation".'29 Adorno sought to 
challenge the 'givens' of traditional philosophy and to move beyond them from 
within its previously ascertained boundaries. 
Adorno's method of articulating the non-identical through concepts was to 
arrange them in ever-changing clusters, which he called, after Benjamin in his 
study The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 'constellations'. Paradoxically, 
according to Adorno's schema, 'Concepts alone can achieve what the concept 
prevents. ... The determinable flaw in every concept makes it necessary to cite 
others; this is the font of the only constellations which inherited some hope of the 
name'. 3 0 The decentred constellation bears witness to the dimension of difference 
repressed by identity thinking, in a dialectic of 'inside' and 'outside'. The term 
'signifies] a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that 
resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first 
principle', to cite Martin Jay. 3 1 In Adorno's words, 'The constellation illuminates 
the specific side of the object, the side which to a classifying procedure is either a 
matter of indifference or a burden'.32 
In The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin draws a distinction between 
the terms Erkenntnis and Erfahrung. The former denotes a form of experience as 
'knowledge'; the subject comes to 'know' reality by means of conceptual 
abstraction. Erfahrung, on the other hand, designates the experience of truth and 
entails the constitution of objective 'Ideas' by the subject. Erfahrung is, for 
Benjamin, the form of experience particular to philosophy, as opposed to 
Erkenntnis, which he considers belongs to the realm of science. As Buck-Morss 
Buck-Morss 1977:94. 
Adorrto 1973b: 53. 
Jay 1984:14-15. 
Adorno 1973b: 162. 
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explains, Erkenntnis 'was achieved by means of abstraction: the particular 
entered into the concept and disappeared. But in truth's representation, the 
particulars, although conceptually mediated reemerged in the idea; or more 
accurately, they became the idea in the conceptual arrangement of their 
elements'.33 Benjamin writes, '[Pjhenomena are not incorporated in ideas. They 
are not contained in them. Ideas are, rather, their objective, virtual arrangement, 
their objective interpretation.' For Benjamin, then, the constellation involves a 
two-fold manoeuvre. His project is a reworking of Hegelian sublation 
(Aufhebung), via which phenomena are simultaneously destroyed and saved: 3 4 
'[i]t is the function of concepts to group phenomena together, and the division 
which is brought about within them thanks to the distinguishing power of the 
intellect is all the more significant in that it brings about two things at a simple 
stroke: the salvation of phenomena and the representation of ideas'. 3 5 
Crucially, language and therefore the constellation is, for Adorno, always 
historically mediated. To apprehend the constellation of an object is to perceive 
the history embedded within it. Through the employment of the technique of 
constellation, Adorno's aim 'was to discover the truth of the social totality ... as it 
quite literally appeared within the object in a particular configuration'.36 Herein lies 
a key difference between Adorno's use of the term and that of Benjamin. For 
Adorno, T h e constellation ... represents an encoded text on the historical 
essence of reality'.37 For Benjamin, on the other hand, ideas are 'timeless 
3 3 Buck-Morss 1977: 92. 
3 4 Nagele: 1982-3: 60. 
3 5 Benjamin 1977: 34-35. 
3 8 Buck-Morss 1977: 96. 
3 7 Cf. Adorno 1984: 399, where he writes: 'Art is no more a replica of an object than it is an object of 
cognition. Otherwise it would debase itself by becoming a mere duplicate of something. ... Actually, what 
happens is that art makes a gesture-like grab for reality, only to draw back violently as it touches that reality. 
Its letters are hieroglyphs of this kind of dual motion. The constellation they form in an art work represents an 
encoded text on the historical essence of reality, not some replica of it. This orientation is related to mimetic 
behaviour.' 
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constellations'. Adorno reinterpreted Benjamin's mystic-influenced theory within a 
dialectical, materialist framework.38 
An important difference between Erkenntnis and Erfahrung is that the latter is 
mimetic: The images [as constellations] illuminated contradictions rather than 
negating or sublating them; the procedure was one of mimetic representation 
rather than synthesis'. 3 9 Instead of seeking to represent the concepts in an 
abstract or metaphorical way, the constellation seeks to open itself up to the 
physical world, forging a tangible, mimetic image of the world, abounding with 
contradictions. Thus Buck-Morss writes, 'constellations were not unlike 
hieroglyphs, uniting the perceptual and conceptual; the phenomena became 
rebuses, riddles whose qualitative elements, juxtaposed, were the concepts 
translated into picture form.'40 
The paradigm for Adomo's constellations is linguistic. Meaning in language is not 
self-present or given, argues Adorno, it is an effect of relationships: 
The model for [the constellation] is the conduct of language. Language offers no mere system of 
signs for cognitive functions. Where it appears essentially a s a language, where it becomes a 
form of representation, it will not define its concepts. It lends objectivity to them by the relation 
into which it puts the concepts, centred around a thing [object]. 4 1 
Seen in this way, the linguistic chain is concentric and paratactical as opposed to 
a deductive logic in which universal and particular exist in a hierarchical relation: 
it is a non-hierarchical cluster of juxtaposed elements. Theoretical thought as 
3 8 'Adorno secularizes Benjamin's messianic project, without however giving up the pathos of salvation 
which is the moving force of the radical negativity of his aesthetics as well as his Negative Dialectic? (Nagele 
1982-3: 60). 
3 9 Buck-Morss 1977: 102. 
40 Ibid. 
" Adorno 1973b: 162. 
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constellation thus seeks to bear witness to the particular which identity thinking 
masks and subordinates under general concepts or abstractions.42 
The image of the constellation evokes the dissolution of boundaries of inside and 
outside characteristic of allegory.43 Like Derrida's notion of difference, the object 
refers endlessly to what is outside itself: it carries the non-identical, the 'external', 
within itself44. As Adomo puts it, 
What is, is more than it is. This 'more' is not imposed upon it but remains immanent to it, as that 
which has been pushed out of it. In that sense, the non-identical would be the thing's own identity 
against its identifications. The innermost core of the object proves to be simultaneously 
extraneous to it ... This is where insistent thinking leads us in regard to the individual: to his 
essence rather than to the universal he is said to represent.45 
The disseminative aspect of language is referred to by Adorno as a moment of 
play. It is an unavoidable feature of thought and yet this does not, for Adorno, 
liberate it from its obligation to truth. This insistence on maintaining a tension 
between the disseminative effects of language and language's claim to truth 
forms a major difference between Adorno's thought and that of French 
philosophers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard. The thinker, claims Adorno, 'must 
not deny his clownish traits, least of all since they alone can give him hope for 
what is denied him. 4 6 
4 2 Another way of looking at this would be to state that the particular is now viewed as part of a 'constellation' 
which it forms with other particulars. This constellation is historical and its position within the constellation, 
not any concrete definition, is what defines its identity. Adorno writes, 'The inside of nonidentity is its relation 
to that which it is not, and which managed, frozen self-identity withholds from it (Adorno 1973b: 163). 
Further, T h e constellation illuminates the specific side of the object, the side which to a classifying 
procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden ' (Adorno 1973b: 162). 'Cognition of the object in its 
constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object. As a constellation, theoretical thought circles 
the concept it would like to unseal, hoping that it may fly open like the lock of a well-guarded safe-deposit 
box: in response, not to a single key or a single number, but to a combination of numbers' (Adomo 1973b: 
163). 
4 3 For a discussion of allegory in relation to Lachenmann's Tanzsuite mit Deulschlandlied see Part Three, 
Section 6. 
4 4 For an extended discussion of the concepts of allegory and difference see Part Three Sections 3-6 below. 
4 5 Adorno 1973b: 161-162. 
48 Ibid.: 14. 
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For Adorno, the epitome of this non-coercive image of totality is the work of art. 
'Great works', he writes, '... have life because they speak in ways nature and 
man cannot'.47 In the words of Alastair Williams 
... [Art] depends on philosophy to judge its truth content, but can follow the inner life of particular 
impulses in a way prohibited to discursive logic in its present form. Artistic form s h a r e s with 
conceptual thought the capacity to synthesize particulars, but can also countenance resistance to 
this subsumptive p r o c e s s . Art articulates social tensions and indicates that they might be 
transformed; philosophy is able to reflect upon the significance of this illumination - though not to 
translate it - and consequently to turn its own discursive logic towards the pull of the particular a s 
demonstrated by art. 4 9 
According to Adorno, the 'authentic' art work is faced with the paradoxical task of 
bearing witness to a disintegrating material within a work which nevertheless 
aims at an outward appearance of unity, albeit fragile. Adomo claims that 
In art, the criterion of s u c c e s s is twofold: first, works of art must be able to integrate materials and 
details into their immanent law of form; and, second, they must not try to e rase the fractures left 
by the process of integration, preserving instead in the aesthetic whole the t races of those 
elements which resisted integration. 4 9 
... the formal problem for composers today: is disintegration possible through integration? The 
position reached by compositional c o n s c i o u s n e s s is s u c h that it is only through the critical 
dissolution [Aufldsung] of the meaning-giving aspects of the composition, of that context which 
al lows meaning any positive ex is tence, that the synthesiz ing, meaning-giving elements of 
composition hold their own. Integration and disintegration are entwined. 5 0 
For Adorno, the art work must embody a 'force field' (Kraftfela); a dynamic unity 
created through the non-hierarchical relationships between juxtaposed elements. 
Fragment and aesthetic whole must exist in a dynamic tension. 
4 7 Adorno 1984: 6. 
4 8 Williams 1997: 12. 
4 9 Cited in Paddison 2001. 
9 0 Adomo, 'Form in der neuen Musik' cited in Paddison 1993:158. 
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'Art', Adorno writes, 'is ... what metaphysics always wanted to be'. 
5 'Adorno 1984: 471. 
2. Lachenmann's manifesto: 'Klangtypen der 
Neuen Musik' (1966) 
A Sound Typology 
In an article entitled 'Helmut Lachenmann's Pathways', Jiirg Stenzl highlights the 
centrality of Lachenmann's article 'Klangtypen der Neuen Musik' (Timbral 
Categories in Contemporary Music'), written in 1966, to the composer's 
subsequent compositional and theoretical output. As Stenzl has put it, the article 
'amounted to a radically new understanding of composition.'52 'Klangtypen der 
Neuen Musik' marks a clear departure by Lachenmann from the musical climate 
in which he found himself - that of post-1950s serialism and the timbral thinking 
as exemplified by the work of composers such as Ligeti and Nono in the early 
1960s.53 The manifesto, as Stenzl puts it, 'laid the cornerstone for a new form of 
composing and thinking about music that took up the latest developments of the 
avant-garde and connected them in a wholly new way into an independent 
synthesis'.54 
The fundamental idea behind Lachenmann's aesthetic manifesto is the raising of 
the experiential aspect of music to the same level as structure, without 
renouncing the tension between the two. Lachenmann expresses this dialectical 
tension by means of the concept of Strukturklang, or 'sound structure'. As Stenzl 
puts it, 
Lachenmann's concept of a structural sonority explicitly carried on the serialist notion of creating 
extremely tight and deliberate connections between a work's nethermost detail and its overall 
5 2 Stenzl 2002. 
5 3 Alastair Williams states that 'Apparitions and Atmospheres use some controls similar to those associated 
with serialism (there is a quasi serial scheme for durations is Apparitions), but they transform the character 
of the technique, moving away from complex permutations to a basic, gestural feel of space' (Williams 1997: 
82). 
5 4 Stenzl 2002. 
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formal design. At the same time, however, it also embraced the essential elements of the new 
'timbral music' that celebrated its breakthrough in the early 1960s, a breakthrough that partially 
superceded serialism and was welcomed as a liberation . . . s s 
Sounds are viewed as part of a process, or dynamic system of interrelationships. 
Lachenmann expresses the dual nature of sounds as follows: 
[Sounds] develop an immediately perceptible wealth of similarities and gradated contrasts to 
each other, and they emerge and project themselves from this context in an entirely new way. It is 
the consciously manipulated interaction of such timbral relations that produces the unique and 
unmistakable total character of a structural sonority.56 
The concept of a 'sound structure' is the last of five categories set out in 
'Klangtypen der Neuen Musik'. Each category seeks to define a distinct timbral or 
acoustic type to be found within a work. These 'Klangtypen' range from a single 
sound to more complex forms of sound structure. The focus is upon the 
perceptual character of these sound types. As Lachenmann has described 
elsewhere, 
In the early 1960s I had developed a sort of typology of sounds which took as its point of 
departure the purely physically determined (however unrealistic this may be) acoustic perception 
of individual sounds - and culminated in 'structural sound' or, conversely, 'sound structure'. 
Structure as a dialectical object of perception, inasmuch as the musical meaning and aural 
experience of individual sounds or their elements were not determined just by themselves - i.e. 
by their own direct physical characteristics - but by their relationship to their immediate and wider 
environment, their affinities, the various roles they played in a context or hierarchy - whatever 
form it might take - created by the composer and for which he assumed responsibility.57 
It will be necessary for the ensuing discussion of Lachenmann's music to explore 
in greater detail the sound typology set out in 'Klangtypen der Neuen Musik'. As I 
5 5 Stenzl 2002. 
6 6 Lachenmann, in Stenzl, ibid. 
5 7 Lachenmann 1995: 97. 
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will argue, this notion of a musical structure based upon timbral rather than pitch 
relationships is an important feature of Lachenmann's musical thought and a 
constant underlying thread in his work. 
The first sound category listed by Lachenmann is termed the 'sound cadence' 
(Kadenzklang). This category is concerned with the emergence and decay of a 
single sound, as the following diagram shows: 
Ex. 1 
Beispiel 6 
v a u l t . 
Lachenmann's example of a Kadenzklang 
Beispiel 6 from Lachenmann 1996: 3. 
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It is important to realize that these categories do not necessarily correspond to 
distinct instrumental lines. Lachenmann's attention is placed on the abstract 
acoustic characteristics of different sounds which go beyond the boundaries of 
individual instruments. The envelope of a Kadenzklang may therefore be created 
by an orchestral group, such as in the following example from Stockhausen's 
Gruppen fur drei Orchester, which Lachenmann describes as having an 'artificial 
added resonance' (in this case through the way the celesta colours the horn 
note): 
Ex.2 
Beispiel 8 
2 I/*>»-.-
m f i l e 
Karlheinz Stockhausen, Gruppen fur drei Orchester, 
zwei Takte vor Ziffer 9 
Schematische Darstellung 
Stockhausen, Grupporf9 
59 Beispiel 8 from Lachenmann 1996: 4. 
19 
The second sound type Lachenmann labels Farbklang, or 'sound colour'. In 
Lachenmann's schema, Farbklang designates a stable, sustained sound, here 
represented by a rectangle: 
Ex.3 
Beispiel 13 
Lachenmann's example of a Farbklang*' 
Whilst in type one the salient idea is a decay envelope (with its intrinsic temporal 
dimension), here the emphasis is on a single colour, the sonic equivalent 
perhaps of the unchanging glow of a stained glass window. There is a significant 
connection between this and the notion of Klangfarbenmelodie, derived from the 
third of Schoenberg's Five Orchestral Pieces, although the latter introduces very 
gradual changes of timbral colour in the unfolding of its 'melody'. The influence of 
Ligeti is also apparent here. Indeed one example used by Lachenmann to 
illustrate this category is a section from Ligeti's Atmospheres. The clusters in this 
piece invoke a seemingly static wall of sound, pure 'presence': 
Beispiel 13 from Lachenmann 1996:8. 
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Ex.4 
Beispiel 15: Gyorgy Ligeti, Atmospheres, Anfang 
r? 
11 i l l ! il.1 
f r fenl 5 
Ligeti, Atmosphdre^ 
Category three is essentially an extension or variation of Farbklang, and 
Lachenmann labels this Fluktuationsklang or 'fluctuation sound'. The central 
difference between this type and type three is the presence of internal 
movement, a regular, periodic pattern which is characteristic of a sound that is 
essentially static. Paradigms of this could be a trill or vibrato, or more highly 
wrought passages of unchanging texture such as in the case of repetitive music 
by Steve Reich. 
Beispiel 15 from Lachenmann 1996: 9. 
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Ex .5 
Beispiel 16 
O 
O 
Lachenmann's example of a Fluktuationsklang^ 
Once more Lachenmann illustrates this with an example from Atmospheres. 
Ex. 6 (see overleaf) 
The fourth sound type is termed Texturklang and describes a complex, sound 
perceived primarily as texture. Unlike Fluktuationsklang, with this category there 
is no clear pattern of oscillation. Instead, many different instruments sustain a 
complex 'cloud' of sound characterized by an internal irregularity of rhythm. The 
effect is akin to being in a room in which many people are speaking at once. 
Beispiel 16 from Lachenmann 1996:10. 
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The relationship between the instrumental lines is initially unclear and 
unpredictable. After a while, however, the overall design of the sound emerges. 
Yet the overall shaping is erratic, and the 'texture' does not resolve into a 
complex form of Farbklang or Fluktuationsklang. The individual lines of Ligeti's 
Apparitions, given in 'Klangtypen der Neuen Musik' as an example of 
Texturklang, are conceived in terms of pitch as a canon. 
Ex.7 
Gyorgy Ligeti, Apparitions, Partitur Seite 19, Ausschnitt 
WL 
Schematische Darstellung 
Ligeti, Apparitions1 
Beispiel 27, ibid.: 15. 
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Yet the listener finds it difficult to hear the ordering principle behind them. This is 
due to the mensurally free way Ligeti has chosen to express the canon, the large 
leaps in register which give the impression of more than one voice per part, and 
the fact the overall shape of the sound mass changes with time like a 
Kadenzklang. Consider, for instance, the fourth and fifth bars of this example 
where rhythmic activity seems to slow down like a ball rolling up the crest of a 
hill, only to speed up which it reaches the other side (in this case the sixth bar.) 
These factors account for the relatively long length of time required for the 
listener to perceive it as a single sound 'type' as opposed to a group of 
heterogeneous voices. This period of time is described by Lachenmann as the 
sound's Eigenzeit, the time required for the listener to cognize the pattern of its 
behaviour. 
It would be possible to come to the conclusion that this sound category's 'Eigenzeit ' lasted 
forever, were it not finally for a distinct moment when one's attention on detail that is constantly 
changing shifts into a static experience of a statistically defined overall quality. A s a result, this 
sound category is also overtaken by the s a m e fate a s its predecessors , the Farbklang and the 
Fluktuationsklang: after a specif ic, indeterminate (because this differs for every individual) 
'Eigenzeit' it is no longer experienced a s an unfolding process but a s a steady state that can be 
extended a s long a s you l i ke . 2 
The fourth sound category, Texturklang, throws interesting light on the opening of 
Ligeti's Melodien. As Alastair Williams writes, in Melodien 
... the composer ask[s] for every part to be played with an 'inner vitality and a dynamic agogic 
shape of its own' (score 1971). This instruction affirms the identity of e a c h line, which must, 
nevertheless, coexist with other similarly independent l ines, all moving out of phase with one 
2 'So kdnnte man die Eigenzeit dieses Typs fur unendlich ansehen, wenn nicht schlieBlich doch irgendwann 
die Aufmerksamkeit auf das permanent neue Detail wieder umschlagen wurde in ein statisches Erlebnis 
statischer Gesamteigenschaften So ereilt auch diesen Klangtyp dasselbe Schicksal wie seine Vorlaufer, den 
Farbklang und den Fluktuationsklang: Er wird - nach einer gewissen, unbestimmbaren, weil individuell 
verschiedenen, Eigenzeit nicht mehr als Prozess, sondern als beliebig verlangerbaren Zustand erlebt' 
(Lachenmann 1996: 14-15). 
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another. ... T h e whole opening statement is a play of s a m e n e s s and difference: 3 the flourishes 
are almost chromatic but include tones and minor 3rds, they closely resemble one another but 
are distinguished by small deviations, and the overall identity is blurred by polyrhythmic layering. 4 
However the fascination of Melodien is precisely this avoidance of stability, the 
constant 'play of sameness and difference' as Williams suggests. The piece 
therefore never completely fulfills the category of Texturklang. 
Categories one to four in Lachenmann's typology are related insofar as with each 
of them there is a certain point in the course of the process when the sound is 
perceived as an entity. Texturklang requires the longest period of time (its 
'Eigenzeit') for this to occur and, correspondingly, has the greatest 'wealth of 
similarities and gradated contrasts'.5 One could argue that its structure or form 
does not become apparent until these affinities and differences have been 
recognized by the listener. 
Sound Structure as a 'Polyphony of Ordered Juxtapositions' 
The structure of the final sound category, Strukturklang ('sound structure'), does 
not however become apparent until the sound process has run its course. Only 
when the whole has been heard is its identity discernible: experiential and 
cognitive time are exactly equal. There is no structuring principle with a 
Strukturklang that prevents the moment-to-moment form of the process from 
changing in unpredictable ways.6 Lachenmann accompanies his description of a 
Strukturklang with a schematic representation of the category: 
3 cf. Lachenmann's 'similarities and gradated contrasts', 1996:15. 
4 Williams 1997: 84-85. 
5 Lachenmann cited in Stenzi 2002. 
6 In an interview with David Ryan, Lachenmann states that models or paradigms for this concept of structure 
'were probably Stockhausen's Gruppen, Alban Berg's Three Orchestral Pieces, and quite definitely the 
development sections in Beethoven's sonata forms' (Lachenmann in Ryan 1999: 23). 
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Ex.8 
Lachenmann's example of a Strukturklang7 
Lachenmann argues that the perception of the entire form of this category from 
beginning to end, as represented here, is necessary for the full appreciation of 
the sound structure, and indeed that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. I 
would argue that the image can be understood like a graphic score, and read 
from left to right. It comprises three shapes or elements - lines, triangles and 
points - each of which represents a different sound or perhaps an action. (Each is 
like a Kadenzklang or sound gesture with an emergence and decay.) 
These elements occur with varying frequency: there are three triangles, four lines 
and five points or circles. They are repeated in varied, but recognizable, form 
across the image, in a play of 'sameness and difference', of identity and non-
7 Lachenmann 1996:18. 
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identity. The interplay of the different elements, however, does not appear to 
result from the workings of any particular formula or schema. Indeed, 
Lachenmann defines this structure as a 'polyphony of ordered juxtapositions'.8 
This would seem to suggest that the development of each element is traceable 
by the listener (or viewer in the case of the image) like the Schoenbergian 'Idea'. 
However, the key difference between Schoenberg's organic conception and 
Lachenmann's 'polyphony of ordered juxtapositions' is that there is no single 
idea, but a linking together of several: three in the case of the diagram under 
consideration. Such a structure, as a sort of montage of different structures, 
actively dispels any sense of hierarchy or priority - each, to evoke a 
poststructuralist notion, is merely one 'language game' amongst others. The 
'order' within each is down to the possibility of actively tracing the development of 
the component element in the process of listening. 
This visual representation of the sound structure as dialectical object recalls 
Buck-Morss's description of the constellation: 'constellations were not unlike 
hieroglyphs, uniting the perceptual and conceptual; the phenomena became 
rebuses, riddles whose qualitative elements, juxtaposed, were the concepts 
translated into picture form.'9 
In conjunction with this visual representation, Lachenmann discusses the 
opening bars of Stockhausen's Gruppen, referring to the latter's article 'How 
Time Passes'. It is interesting that Adorno too refers to this article in 'Vers une 
Musique informelle' as 'easily the most important one' on the topic of a musique 
informelle.™ The notion of une musique informelle will be discussed later, but it is 
worth noting the connection to Lachenmann's 'sound structure' at this stage. 
From bars 2-16 in Stockhausen's piece the listener is presented with a number of 
coexisting details, each of which is the beginning of its own structural process. 
8 ' "Struktur" laBt sich so definieren als Polyphonie von Anordnungen' (ibid.). 
9Buck-Morss 1977: 102. 
1 0 Adorno 1992b: 271. 
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Each detail takes its own direction as Gruppen unfolds - each is an 'ordered 
juxtaposition'. The image illustrates Lachenmann's argument that 
...the link between two sudden sounds cannot lie in that plane of experience which is measurable 
in micro- or macro-time. An acoustic straight line in music is not a lways the shortest distance 
between two sounds. Frequently the common denominator, the bridge, is on a different plane and 
is often not recognized as such, or is not articulated, but is felt all the more clearly. 1 1 
In the essay 'On Structuralism', Lachenmann employs the term 'family' to 
describe a structure such as the one represented above. The family, he argues, 
... allows apparently incompatible sounds and objects to be brought under one roof and made 
into a musical sense-unit - i.e. category of experience - which is thus defined for the first time. It 
allows incommensurable elements to be projected on to a common temporal plane' . 1 2 
It is clear from a survey of Lachenmann's music and theoretical writings that the 
sound typology presented in 'Klangtypen der Neuen Musik' acts as a paradigm 
for the composer's own subsequent consideration of musical structures. He 
conceives new music in general, including his own, primarily in terms of timbral-
rather than pitch-relationships. The first published version of Lachenmann's own 
analysis of his work, Accanto (1975-1976), from 1982, contains a timbral analysis 
of the first 19 bars of the piece and illustrates this structural paradigm. 
Performance actions (such as scraping, breathing, rubbing, and so on) are 
confined to specific families of instruments, but constitute instrumental 'family 
members' in their own right. 
(See Ex. 9, overleaf) 
1 1 Lachenmann 1995:99 (my italics). 
1 2 Lachenmann 1998:98. 
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The concept of structural sound represents a challenge to the division of form 
and content characteristic of traditional aesthetics. It expresses the idea that 
neither structure as form, nor sound as expressive content, can be separated 
except in abstract conceptual terms, just as Adorno insists in his Aesthetic 
Theory on the dialectical interrelation of mimesis and ratio. Lachenmann writes: 
Structure as a dialectical object of perception [sic], inasmuch as the musical meaning and aural 
experience ot individual sounds or their elements were not determined just by themselves - i.e. 
by their own direct physical characteristics - but by their relationship to their immediate and wider 
environment, their affinities, the various roles they played in a context or hierarchy - whatever 
form it might take - created by the composer and for which he assumed responsibility. The result 
was that in the concept of 'structural sound' the old dualism of sound and form disappeared 
because the idea of sound ultimately resulted from the tentative concept of form, and conversely 
the idea of form inevitably resulted from the concept of sound.1 
The sound actions of Ex. 9 each correspond to a separate acoustic structure (as 
with the triangles, lines and circles of the diagram). Unlike the individual elements 
or parameters of integral serialism - or indeed keys in a work - these 'family 
members' are 'incommensurable'. They cannot be 'transposed' or mapped onto 
each other. They are not brought together under the banner of an overarching 
identity: rather, the composer attempts to bear witness to internal differences, 
which defy integration. 
It is important to emphasize that form in this conception does not dissolve into 
heterogeneity or indifference: the idea of sounds being both self-contained and 
pointing beyond themselves recalls Adorno's description of constellation: 
LLachenmann 1995: 97. 
33 
By themselves, constellations represent from without what the concept has cut away within: the 
'more' which the concept is equally desirous and incapable of being. By gathering around the 
object of cognition, the concepts potentially determine the object's interior. They attain, in 
thinking, what was necessarily excised from thinking2 
There is also a clear affinity between Lachenmann's sound structures and Rihm's 
technique of 'wrapping'. Alastair Williams describes this technique as follows: 
... wrapping registers a form of affinity between potentially very different objects: they take the 
shape of each other without surrendering their internal differences, in a version of what Adorno 
identifies as pseudomorphic transformation in Mahler. More than that, the procedure is an attempt 
to work consciously with something that Adorno regards as an inherent capacity of art: the ability 
to preserve or to find affinities between sensibilities that are not apparent to discursive rationality. 
The future of art may well lie in its ability to discover such similarities and associations.3 
Both Lachenmann and Rihm work with an experiential logic which, as Williams 
and Lachenmann suggest above, defies a rational logic seeking to quantify and 
bring its objects under an all-encompassing identity. This logic can indeed be 
seen in Adornian terms as a direct critique of the instrumental rationality which, 
particularly in Dialectic of Enlightenment, is seen to predominate in modernity. 
As we have seen, the idea of creating a unity out of the incommensurable 
reflects Adorno's ideal of a musique informelle and recalls Adomo's constellation, 
as a unity of diverse particulars. The relation between musique informelle and the 
music of Lachenmann will be examined in further detail below. 
2 Adorno 1973b: 162. 
3 Williams 1997:144. 
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3 . une musique informelle 
Musique informelle resists definition in the botanical terms of the positivists. If there is a 
tendency, an actual trend, which the word serves to bring into focus, it is one which 
mocks all efforts at definition... 
Adorno, 'Vers une musique informelle' (1961, English tr. 1992)'* 
Adorno's essay 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes, 'One must not philosophize about the 
concrete, but out of it'.5 This image of thought forges an opening which defies 
transcendental closure. The notion of une musique informelle, expounded by 
Adorno in the essay from 1961 entitled 'Vers une musique informelle', is a 
materialist attempt to relate the fragmentation of thought structures in modernity 
to modem music. The paradigm, which is more of an ideal than a description of 
any specific works, nevertheless takes its inspiration from Schoenberg's atonal 
period, when works such as Erwartung, Die gluckliche Hand, and Herzgewachse 
were written. Order in these pieces, claims Adorno, is derived from the inner truth 
of the musical material, not from any superimposed, predetermined formal 
norms. The 'surplus of objectivity,'6 of the material itself over and above 
subjective categories recalls Lachenmann's 'blinkedly material-oriented 
compositional process.'7 It relates to Adorno's insistence, in Negative Dialectics 
and in the essay 'Subject and Object', upon the preponderance of the object in 
thought, represented through the concept of non-identity. In aesthetic terms, this 
surplus refers back to Beckett's statement, 'Dire cela, sans savoir quoi', cited at 
the head of 'Vers une musique informelle'.8 Adorno writes, 
4 Adorno 1992b: 272. 
5 Adorno 1973b: 33. 
8 Ibid.: 272. 
7 Lachenmann 1994. 
8Adomo 1992b: 272. 
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The avant-garde calls for a music which takes the composer by surprise, much as a chemist can 
be surprised by the new substance in his test-tube. In future, experimental music should not just 
confine itself to refusing to deal in the current coin; it should also be music whose end cannot be 
foreseen in the course of production. In genuine experiments there has always been something of 
a surplus of that objectivity over the production process. 9 
The concept of une musique informelle arises from the contradictory situation in 
which the self-reflecting composing subject is confronted with the disintegration 
of an internally consistent musical material. The art work in modernity must 
achieve a balancing act - it must maintain a level of formal unity and autonomy 
(forging a critical distance between itself and the status quo) whilst remaining 
true to the disintegration of musical material: 'the "form" of the integrated work, to 
be authentic (that is, true to the demands of its material), must now incorporate 
its apparent opposite - disintegration, fragmentation, chaos ...*.10 Paradoxically, 
disintegration and integration must entwine. 
Despite his declared aversion to fixed definitions, Adorno does nevertheless 
endeavour to characterize the concept of une musique informelle in general 
terms: 
... I should like at least to attempt to stake out the parameters of the concept. What is meant is a 
type of music which has discarded all forms which are external or abstract or which confront it in 
an inflexible way. At the same time, although such music should be completely free of anything 
irreducibly alien to itself or superimposed on it, it should nevertheless constitute itself in an 
objectively compelling way, in the musical substance itself, and not in terms of external laws. ... 
such an emancipation should also strive to do away with the system of musical co-ordinates 
which have crystallized out in the innermost recesses of the musical substance itself.11 
Paddison suggests that, although Adorno's conception of une musique informelle 
is derived from Schoenberg's freely atonal music, it is the literary work of Samuel 
9 Ibid.: 302-303. 
1 0 Paddison 1993: 275. 
" Ibid: 272. 
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Beckett which provides perhaps the most convincing example of the concept, at 
least outside of music (as is indeed suggested by the positioning of Beckett's 
statement at the head of Adorno's essay). Paddison argues that in referring to his 
novel, How It Is, 'Beckett probably comes closer than anyone to articulating the 
problem of form in relation to a disintegrating material and, in the process, to 
illuminating Adorno's concept of une musique informelle ...'He cites the following 
passage from a discussion between Beckett and Deirdre Bair, which is worth 
quoting in full: 
What I am saying does not mean that there will henceforth be no form in art. It only means that 
there will be new form, and that this form will be of such a type that it admits the chaos and does 
not try to say that the chaos is really something else. The form and the chaos remain separate. 
The latter is not reduced to the former. That is why the form itself becomes a preoccupation, 
because it exists as a problem separate from the material it accommodates. To find the form that 
accommodates the mess, that is the task of the artist now.1 2 
One could say that Lachenmann's concept of a 'sound structure' is one such 
attempt to 'accommodate the mess' or the particularity of the material, without 
resorting to formlessness. 
The concept of musique informelle can also be thought in temporal terms. 
According to Adorno's description, the relation between part and whole should be 
clearly audible in the process of listening. A musique informelle must 'unfold' 
from the parts to the whole, in other words, there should be a 'parallel between 
the temporal succession of musical events and the pure flow of time itself.'13 Like 
Lachenmann, Adorno champions an aesthetic which foregrounds perception. He 
contrasts his ideal with Stockhausen's ZeitmaBe, describing it as 'a static music 
which arises from a universal dynamics'14 rather than a fluid music which 
develops over time. 
1 2 Beckett cited in Paddison 1993:276. 
"Adorno 1992b: 271. 
14 Ibid. 
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Lachenmann's Action Scores 
The potential for a composer to map sound shape (Lachenmann's first sound 
category, Kadenzklang) to sound structure (Lachenmann's fifth, Strukturklang) 
recalls this ideal in its absence of any externally-derived formal norms. Indeed, 
Hockings has commented that Lachenmann 'avoids clearly articulated form "from 
above" (Adorno)'.15 
Lachenmann's 'almost blinkeredly material-oriented compositional process', as 
the composer himself has described it, 1 6 results in a high degree of 
unpredictability and ambiguity characteristic of musique informelle. 
Unpredictability is a crucial aspect of Lachenmann's action-based approach to 
composition, in evidence across his work, but epitomized by works such as 
Pression (1969), for 'cello. Here, the score is notated as a series of actions 
without determining their precise pitch content or even their precise sounding 
result. 
This represents a further important shift of paradigm from serialism, in which 
score and sounding result are mapped precisely onto each other. The result of 
this shift is the inherent unpredictability of sounds in performance. The 
composer's action scores result in a discrepancy between the expected sound of 
the traditional instrument and the sound that is actually created; a 'tension' 
between the 'imagined' and the entirely new (that which 'cannot be foreseen'). 
Ex. 10 (see overleaf)17 
1 5 Hockings 1995: 13. In 'Vers une musique informelle Adorno writes argues for a form which is constructed 
from top to bottom rather than from bottom to top' (Adorno 1992b: 271). 
1 6 Lachenmann 1994. 
17B6ttinger1988: 93-94. 
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Lachenmann, Pression, 
page 3'8 
Ian Pace has said the following about Pression: 
[The] cellist is called upon to play the instrument in almost every conceivable manner except the 
standard one; the bow is applied both below and on the bridge, on the frog, and to parts of the 
shell, the fingers of the left hand are rubbed against the strings, the strings are overbowed, and 
so on. 1 9 
1 8 Cited in Pace 1998a: 12 
1 9 Pace 1998a: 12. 
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Pression demands of the player a heightened physicality with respect to the 
instrument. It is important to realize that for a player some of the actions in 
themselves constitute a form of transgression of the instrument's essential 
'nature'. Because the sounds generated are often 'noises' that could come from 
other sources, this sense of violation can best be sensed either by the player 
himself or by an audience watching a performance of a Lachenmann piece 
where the player's physical engagement with the instrument (and the way it 
departs from standard instrumental technique!) is immediately apparent. Guero 
(1970, rev. 1988), for solo piano, is founded on similar ideas, yet, as Pace 
suggests, is even more concerned than Pression with the physicality of 
performance: 
The piece does not contain a single note played on the keys: instead, Lachenmann has the 
pianist scrape along the keys with the fingernails, and pluck in the gaps. Whereas the interactions 
and progressions in Pression and Dal Niente were between sound types, Guero is thoroughly 
physical and theatrical... The closest the piece approaches to pitched notes is at the end, where 
a couple of strings are plucked, but in front of the dampers in such a manner as to produce a 
part-muted, part-ponticello effect.20 
The following examples, which feature the playing actions alongside extracts 
from Lachenmann's manuscripts are taken from the CD booklet to Lachenmann's 
Gran Torso, a work completed in 1971:2 1 
20 Ibid. 
" Lachenmann 1991. 
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Ex. 11a) Gran Torso, bars 2-3 
('Knirschen auf Ruckwand') 
Grinding the Bow along the Back of the Instrument 
l a a * to 
*3 1 ^ 
—a 
TaktZ/3 
Knirschen auf Ruckwand 
Ex. 11b) Gran Torso, bar 18a 
(Tonlos auf Steg") 
Bowing tonelessly on the bridge 
5.-. su 
v. 
••'If «rr"* —^ fit 
i 
I I 
TaktWa 
tonlos auf Stag 
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Ex. 11 c) Gran Torso, bar 29 
('Pizzicato an rechter Stegkante') 
Pizzicato on the right edge of the bridge 
Ex. 11 d) Gran Torso, bar 29 
('Arco auf Schnecke') 
Arco on the tailpiece 
Tod 29 
Pizzicato an rechter Stegkante 
OA<tf 
OE 
Arco auf Schnecke 
Ex. 11 e) Gran Torso, bar 46 
(Pizzicato fluido, 'Spannschraube auf Saite') 
Pizzicato fluido 
Tension screw of the bow played on the string 
Ex. 11 f) Gran Torso, bar 50 
('Bogen weit herauf ins Griffbrett') 
Bowing very far up the fingerboard 
Takt46 
Pizzicato fluido 
Spannschraube auf Saite 
111 
I 
Bogen weit herauf ins Griffbrett 
Ex.11 g) Gran Torso, bar 57 
('Arco gepreBt, "quasi Sage"') 
Arco pressed down firmly, "quasi Saw" 
\ 
TakS67 
4/co geprefft, -quasi Sage' 
Ex. 11 h) Gran Torso, bar 90-91 
('Flautato hinterm Steg, immer naher zum Saitenhalter") 
Flautato behind the bridge 
Approaching closer to string holder 
Takt 9IV91 
Flautato Nnterm Steg, 
immer naher zum Sartenhalter 
•m 
• 
Ex. 11 i) Gran Torso, bar 97 
('Arco auf Saitenhalter') 
Arco on string holder 
I t *r*"'-l 
Hi-
raw 96 
/4rco at// Saitenhalter 
Ex. 11 j) Gran Torso, bar 129 
('Arco auf linker Stegkante, unter der Saiten') 
Arco on the left edge of the bridge, under the strings 
E2BKSE mux 
Arco auf linker Stegkante 
(unter den Sarten) 
Gran Torso, bars 216-217 
('Bogen am Frosch Richtung Griffbrettmitte) 
Bowing at the heel in the direction of the middle of the 
fingerboard 
Gran Torso, bars 216-217 
('Bogen gepreBt, mit abgeteilten Haarbreiten) 
Bow pressed down firmly, using a segment of hair width 
Takl216/217 
Bogen am Frosch Richtung Griffbrettmitte 
Bogen gepreBt, mlt abgeteilten Haarbreiten 
The notion of defining a sound's place in a work through the manner by which it 
is produced rather than its actual sounds also defies traditional concepts of 
structure. Form becomes a polyphony of juxtaposed sounding materials, where 
the sound source is made subject to its own 'arpeggiation* - an internal 
outgrowth from the concrete particular - throughout the piece. Like the attempt to 
create fluid form in Boulez's Third Piano Sonata, Lachenmann endeavours to 
construct forms that are not static or closed, but open and dynamically mobile. 
In an analysis of Boulez's Third Piano Sonata,22 Alastair Williams writes that, in 
true Adornian fashion, Boulez 'wishes to protect autonomy from collapsing into 
heteronomy' (and thus to avoid what he sees as the error of Cage's 
indeterminate compositions). However, he 'rejects the notion of art as a fixed 
and immutable object and hopes to align the disintegration of illusion with an 
attribute of another culture.'23 
Williams argues, however, that Boulez ultimately fails in his attempt to create a 
mobile form, a form permeable to the mimetic or non-identical. This is because 
he endeavours to incorporate mobility as the tension between identity and non-
identity into the musical material itself, thus removing any real aleatoric element. 
As Williams argues, 'Boulez, like Heidegger, attempts to stand outside the 
antitheses of identity and nonidentity: material is understood, almost 
transcendentally, as something capable of containing its own tension.'2 4 He 
attempts, paradoxically, to control non-identity in the way that Heidegger 
attempts to conceptualize pure facticity through the invention of concepts such as 
'Being'. In the process, both Heidegger and Boulez collapse the tension between 
subject and object, form and content. 
2 2 See the analysis of the Boulez in Williams 1997: 50-64. 
2 3 Williams 1997: 50. 
2 4rt?/d.:51. 
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Lachenmann's action scores are, I would argue, closer to the Adornian ideal. 
There is a component of chance in such scores and yet, as we shall see in the 
case of Accanto,25 unlike Cage, Lachenmann is careful to avoid dissolving form 
into an indeterminate collection of unrelated elements. Unpredictability of 
sounding result in Lachenmann's action scores injects a chance element into the 
work, the outcome of which is not fully written into the score, as it is in Boulez's 
Third Piano Sonata. 
Instrumental musique concrete 
[Pierre Schaeffer] noted: the precondition to concrete music is that the samples be 
isolated not only from dramatic or anecdotal context, but from their original musical 
context too. Paradoxically, the works that followed were undeniably dramatic. 2 8 
Carlos Palombini, Pierre Schaeffer's Typo-Morphology of Sonic Objects (1993) 
V a r e s e makes the orchestra say something different from what people have usually 
made it say . He extracts 'wild sounds' from old-fashioned instruments. 2 7 
Pierre Schaeffer (1969) 
In Pression and Guero, sounds are, to adopt Lachenmann's term, 'defamiliarized' 
and rendered ambiguous. Adorno, in all probability, would consider this process 
of obfuscation as a gesture of opposition to a rationalized world which prizes 
clarity and transparency of understanding.28 Furthermore, he might see it as a 
stance against the 'addiction' to the familiar upon which the 'culture industry 
thrives. As Elke Hockings writes 
Lachenmann 's struggle for credibility in a commercially-oriented music industry e x p r e s s e s itself 
a s an avoidance of unequivocality, even if his theoretical writings apparently disguise precisely 
this degree of imprecision. The resulting ' s p e e c h l e s s gesticulation' (Konrad Boehmer) of his 
2 5 See Part One Section 4 below 
2 6 Palombini 1993: 7. 
2 7 Schaeffer cited in Palombini 1993:180. 
2 8 cf. Adorno and Horkheimer's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment' project as discussed by Wellmer 1991: 80, for 
example. 
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music cannot rely on an establ ished system of communicational s igns but operates on other 
cognitive levels of game and perceptual ambiguity/mobility. One of Lachenmann's achievements 
rests in the subtle shadings that can be made out in this zone between the definitely familiar and 
referential chaos . 
Lachenmann employs the concept of 'instrumental musique concrete' to describe 
the ambiguous characteristic of his music with respect to traditional musical 
performance. 
The defining concept, musique concrete, is associated in particular with the work 
of composer Pierre Schaeffer and the school of French electroacoustic 
composition which emerged in the 1940s and 1950s.30 The creation of musique 
concrete entailed the disassociation or dislocation of concrete sounds from their 
original real-world source through the manipulation of recorded samples. The 
process sought to strip sounds of their reference to reality: any referential 
elements would fragment the unity of form and content. 
Musique concrete is distinguished from musique abstraite, which in the realm of 
electronic composition refers to music formed not from recordings, but using 
synthetic processes. Schaeffer insisted that the sound object should be 
experienced acousmatically31 - abstracted from its original context or, as Andrew 
Hamilton has put it, 'detached from any association with its source or cause in 
"HockingslQQS: 13. 
3 0 In 1950 Schaeffer published the article 'Introduction a la musique concrete'. 
3 1 Palombini as written the following on Schaeffer and acousmatic listening: 'Schaeffer unearthed this 
"ancient neologism" in order to elaborate on an experience which is characteristic of our times, and whose 
full consequences he proposes to extract: listening (on the radio, record, the telephone or tape) to sounds 
whose cause is invisible' (Palombini 1993: 30). He adds, 'The repeated audition of sounds whose 
instrumental sources are masked leads one to neglect source identification, and to get interested in sounds 
themselves. Another kind of listening emerges: the listening to sonic shapes, which aims at hearing them 
better, and at describing them by means of an analysis of perceptions. ... It is ... a question of new and 
precise (conscious or unconscious) orientations of listening, which reveal new aspects of sound. ... The 
notion of acousmatic listening clearly points to reduced listening, the listening to a sound in itself, without 
any reference to its source and significance in a code' (Ibid:. 31). The link between this description and the 
type of listening aspired to with Lachenmann's instrumental musique concrete is evident. 
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the world - and thus non-mimetic'.32 Schaeffer asserted that 'From the moment 
you accumulate sounds and noises, deprived of their dramatic (i.e. mimetic, 
anecdotal) connotations, you cannot help but make music'.33 
Carlos Palombini discusses how, as early as the Etude aux chemins de fer 
('Impose'e') (a work broadcast in 1948 and derived from recordings of six 
locomotives at the station of Batignolles) Schaeffer 'discovered how to obliterate 
the referent': 
. . .sound recordings were raised to the status of compositional raw material, and Schaeffer 
focused on their transformation (variation of playback speed, backwards playing, cutting, looping 
of a single groove). T h e s e manipulations tended to make the original source of the sounds 
unidentifiable . . . 3 4 
...manipulations created shapes which were radically different from those of traditional sounds . 3 5 
More than that simple use of sampled sounds as musical material, concrete music represented 
an inversion in relation to the traditional musical demarche. According to Schaeffer, the traditional 
(or 'abstract') composer followed a path which led him from abstraction to concretion: the 
traditional piece w a s mentally conceived, symbolically notated, and finally performed. In concrete 
music , the effects created by different manners of exciting sound-producing bodies, and by 
electro-acoustic manipulations of recordings of these sounds, could not be conceived a priori...26 
Schaeffer's Etude aux tourniquets ('Deconcertante') involved the manipulation 
not of everyday noises as in the Etude aux chemins de fer, but of a pre-recorded 
composition by Gaston Litaize. Schaeffer describes the result of the montage 
technique, in which fragments underwent transformation before being 
reassembled, as follows: 
3 2 Hamilton 2001-2: 3. Note that the term 'mimetic' is used here in the sense of imitation, rather than in the 
more complex Adornian sense. 
3 3 Schaeffer cited in Hamilton, ibid.: 4. 
3 4 Palombini 1993: 4. 
35 Ibid.: 5. 
38 Ibid: 6-7. 
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The musical ideas of the original score almost entirely disappeared, for the cuts engendered new 
structures which had no relation with the former compositional intention. If initial elements could 
be recognized in these new structures, it w a s rather like fossi ls, whose chemical composition 
alone interests u s . 3 7 
In 1965 Lachenmann composed his only tape piece, Scenario, shortly before he 
conceived the idea of 'action scores' for the first time. He thus acquired first-hand 
experience of musique concrete at a crucial stage of his composing career. 
Subsequently, Lachenmann made the radical move to introduce this notion of 
'defamiliarization' into the world of acoustic composition. The idea of instrumental 
musique concrete suggests precisely this rupture or deconstruction of the 
'natural' or transparent link between sound and source (signified and signtfier, in 
semiotic terms) through attention to that which it excludes. As Lachenmann has 
commented 
T h e term [instrumental musique concrete] refers to that of Pierre Schaeffer 's musique concrete. 
Instead of instrumental^ using mechanical everyday actions a s musical elements I go about it by 
understanding the instrumental sound a s information about its production, therefore rather the 
other way round - by illuminating instrumental sounds a s mechanical p r o c e s s e s . 3 8 
It could argued that composers as diverse as Mahler, Varese, Antheil and 
Schaeffer had already set about injecting the everyday and ordinary into the 
hallowed sphere of art in various ways. Yet Lachenmann, like Adorno, proceeds 
immanently, seeking out and drawing attention' to the ordinary and the incidental 
which is already submerged within that supposedly pure realm itself. Rather than 
injecting the everyday into the aesthetic, Lachenmann could be said to be 
locating the everyday within the musical elements themselves. 
37 Ibid.: 5. This quotation offers a useful description of Lachenmann's technique of instrumental musique 
concrete. It is particularly pertinent for an understanding of the revisiting of tonal materials in Ausklang 
(1984-5), Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied (1980) and Accanto (1975-6). Furthermore, the latter work, in a 
similar way to Schaeffer's 'D6concertante\ exposes a recording of a pre-existing musical work to 
transformation (though without employing the electroacoustic devices used by the French composer). 
Accanto and the Tanzsuite will be discussed in Parts Two and Three respectively. 
3 8 Lachenmann 1996: 211-212. 
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Writing twenty years later in a sleeve note to Schwangkungen am Rand (1998) 
Lachenmann defines instrumental musique concrete as 'the idea of a music that 
discovers its own physicality'.39 Elsewhere, he has stated that 
The idea of instrumental musique concrete - i.e. sound a s a m e s s a g e conveyed from its own 
mechanical origin, 4 0 and so sound a s experience of energy, marked the compositional material of 
my p ieces between 1968 {TernA) and 1976 {Accanto). It remains part of my thinking a s a 
composer to this day. It signifies an extensive defamiliarization of instrumental technique: the 
musical sound may be bowed, p ressed , beaten, torn, maybe choked, rubbed, perforated and so 
on. At the s a m e time the new sound must satisfy the requirements of the old familiar concert-hall 
sound which, in this context, loses any familiarity and becomes (once again) freshly illuminated, 
even 'unknown'. S u c h a perspective demands changes in compositional technique, s o that the 
c lass ica l case-parameters , such a s pitch, duration, timbre, volume, and their derivatives retain 
their significance only a s subordinate aspects of the compositional category which deals with the 
manifestation of energy. 4 1 
It is interesting that Lachenmann does indeed perceive this aspect of his music 
as being already present in works from the classical tradition, yet usually present 
only in a subordinate role: 
T h e energetic aspect is not at all new, but in c lassical music it h a s a more or l ess articulative 
function. E v e n so we can hear the harp in Mahler a s a distorted drum, the brass of Bruckner a s 
imaginary supernatural lungs, and it w a s Richard Strauss who compared the high pizzicato G on 
the violin in the King Lear Overture by Berlioz, to one of the burst veins in the head of the king. 4 2 
Lachenmann describes the introduction of this new 'parameter' into musical 
composition as follows. With the technique of instrumental musique concrete, 
3 9 Lachenmann 1994. 
4 0 i.e. the sound in its raw state is the message. 
4 1 Lachenmann cited in Ryan 1999: 20-21. 
4 2 Lachenmann 1996: 211. 
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Sound w a s no longer modified from the perceptive angle of interval, harmony, rhythm, colour, etc. 
but a s a result of the application of mechanical power under physical conditions, which were 
defined and modified in the course of composition. A violin note, observed and regulated a s the 
result of a characteristic scrubbing (rubbing - Reiben) between two characteristic objects and 
understood a s an exception amongst other scrubbing (rubbing) variants, that is to say actions that 
meanwhile have nothing to do with the practice of philharmonic playing, attach themselves in this 
way to a characteristic continuum of integrated sounds of more or l ess distorted or reshaped 
s o u n d s . 4 3 
Just as Adorno insists on accessing the non-identical from within identity, 
Lachenmann uses traditional instruments in radical ways in order to access 
unknown areas of experience.44 Citing Antoine Golea, Palombini has written, 
The common trait of the exemplary pieces of concrete music is: "to express a 
complete world through a means of expression itself complete."'45 
Lachenmann seeks, like Schaeffer, to expose sounds 'for what they are', to allow 
them to speak for themselves without being subordinated to representational 
schemes. I will address Lachenmann's highly ambivalent relationship to tradition 
in my discussions of Lachenmann's temA and Accanto below (see Part One, 
Section 5 and Part Two, Section 4 respectively). First of all, however, I would like 
to explore the notion of historical consciousness with respect to 'natural' material 
and how this could relate to seeking out the 'everyday* within the aesthetic realm. 
43 Ibid.: 211, cf. the notion of 'virtual dynamics' in the string quartet Gran Torso as discussed in Pace 1998a: 
13. 
4 4 Here I am choosing to interpret this idea with recourse to writings of Adorno. However, Lachenmann's 
insistence on the physicality of sounds - their materiality - could equally be compared to the concepts of 
'intensity' in Lyotard and in Deleuze and Guattari. For an extended discussion of this idea, see Parts 4 and 5 
below. 
< s Palombini 1993: 11. 
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4. History, Nature and Mimesis in Adorno and 
early Lachenmann 
instrumental Musique Concrete and the 'sound of nature' 
Schaeffer w a s perfectly able to exploit contradictions between material and structure and 
to create musical structures appropriate to the dramatic character of the material. 4 8 
Carlos Palombini, Pierre Schaeffer's Typo-Morphology of Sonic Objects (1993) 
Lachenmann's comments on the relation between his music and Mahler's 
symphonic works shed further light on the former composer's technique of 
instrumental musique concrete and on the role of 'nature' in his work. In 
discussing the 'sound of nature' in Mahler's music ('... birdcalls, bells, signals, 
songs, the major-minor sensibility, the march figures: a world of the familiar, 
exalted in the homogeneous medium of his symphonic language'47) Lachenmann 
refers to a 'drive towards "artless" treatment' and the 'conscious lack of art for the 
sake of art'.48 It is to these passages in Mahler, characterized by the popular or 
the everyday to which Adorno referred when he commented on Mahler's 'alliance 
with the trivial.'49 
In Mahler, the 'sounds of nature' are phenomena which are not usually perceived 
as possessing aesthetic qualities (compare the idealized re-presentations of 
nature in Dvorak to the presentations of Mahler). Yet, by including these sounds 
within his works, Mahler invites us to hear them as such (as does Cage, although 
in a less mediated way), re-styling and redefining, as does Lachenmann, the 
4 6 Palombini 1993: 178. 
4 7 "... der Vogelruf, die Glocken, die Signale, die Lieder, die Dur-Moll-Empfindsamkeit, die Marschfiguren: 
eine Welt des Vertrauten, im homogenen Medium seiner symphonischen Sprache QberhOht' (Lachenmann 
1996: 268-269). 
4 8 A translation of 'Mahler - Eine Herausforderung: Antwort auf funf Fragen' (Lachenmann 1996:268-9). 
4 9 Adorno 1992a: 8-9 ff. 
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boundaries of the category of the Beautiful.50 Art up-to-now, implies Mahler, has 
been predicated upon various types of illusion, and he offers a 'truer* picture. 
Such an aestheticization of the 'artless' finds, I would argue, a direct 
correspondence in Lachenmann's instrumental musique concrete. Lachenmann 
has said 
In my music the withdrawal of the emphatic gesture, its incorporation a s a mechanical process, 
the making aware of the energetic requirements and the exposing of the expression bound up 
with it: the wooden pieces which split on the stroke of the big hammer, the string which breaks on 
the "emerging" (zufahrenden) upbeat in the third row of strings, the involuntary vibrato of the tuba 
player, who at the end of [Mahler's] Sixth flutters his lips from the exertion: they interest and 
shatter me, and precisely in connection with the process from which they originate. They are the 
reverse side of a socially enacted pattern: to make one aware m e a n s exposing pressure , a 
process which may remain laughable and childish just a s the Mahlerian broken emphasis may 
remain laughable and childish: if it does not impinge like this in conflict with the taboos of 
society's communicated self-image. In both c a s e s it is aesthetically walking the tightrope . . . 5 1 
Instrumental musique concrete, I would suggest, is a curious inversion of this 
demystifying process. As he suggests, the presence of the gestural and the 
physical (such as the fluttering lips of the tuba player) - incidental to the 
performance of Mahler's music - are now the 'everyday' elements rescued by 
Lachenmann. His incorporation of gesture as a mechanical process, a 
celebration of those marginalized aspects of the physical production of music, 
represents a stripping away of illusion, a focusing on the directness of 
performance technique, dispensing with conceptual, idealistic schemes. Such a 
5 0 See my discussion of Lachenmann's concept of Beauty in Part Two, Section 2. 
5 1 'In meiner Musik die Zurucknahme des emphatischen Gestus, seine Eingliederung als mechanischer 
ProzeB, die BewuBtmachung der energetischen Bedingungen und die Freilegung des darin gebundenen 
Ausdrucks: das Holzstuckchen, das beim Schlag des groBen Hammers wegsplittert, die Saite, die beim 
"zufahrenden" Auftakt in der dritten Streicherreihe reiBt, das unfreiwillige Vibrato des Tubaspielers, dem am 
Ende der Sechsten vor Anstrengung die Lippen flattern: Sie interessieren und erschQttern mich, und zwar 
gerade in Beziehung zu dem ProzeB, dem sie entstammen. Sie sind die Kehrseite eines gesellschaftlich und 
kindisch bliebe, so wie die Mahlersche Emphase als gebrochene lacherlich und kindisch bliebe, wenn er 
nicht wie diese im Widerspruch zum kommunikativen Selbstverstandnis derGesellschaft deren Tabus 
anruhrte. In beiden Fallen eine asthetische Gratwanderung (Lachenmann 1996:269). 
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presentation, as opposed to a representation, of those aspects which are natural 
and very much a part of musical performance but which up to now have been 
seen as incidental, can thus be understood in the light of Adorno's attempt to turn 
identity thinking towards the non-identical.52 Yet the presence of these same 
elements - unnoticed - in the performance of a work by Mahler suggests 
engagement not just with artless 'nature', but also a knowing 'defamiliarization' of 
the 'handed down'. 
Adorno's Dialectic of History and Nature 
As Paddison shows, Adorno's theory of the dialectical interaction of history and 
nature is indebted to Lukacs and Walter Benjamin.53 This theory is expressed 
most comprehensively in the paper 'The Idea of Natural History', which was 
given in Frankfurt in July 1932 (as 'Die Idee der Naturgeschichte').54 Starting as a 
critique of Heideggerian ontology, Adorno argues in the paper that the 'natural', 
as that which appears to transcend history, is in fact synonymous with myth: 
T h e concept of nature that is to be dissolved is one that, if I translated it into standard 
philosophical terminology, would come closest to the concept of myth. This concept is also vague 
and its exact s e n s e can not be given in preliminary definitions but only in the course of analysis. 
By it is meant what has a lways been, what a s fatefully arranged predetermined being underlies 
history and appears in history; it is substance in history. What is delimited by these expressions is 
what I mean here by 'nature'. 5 5 
The concept 'nature' is thus, according to Adorno, a historical construct or idea, 
and consequently visions of what constitutes the 'natural' alter throughout history. 
Nature is not static and timeless, but in fact mobile and dynamic: in other words, 
paradoxically, nature cannot be separated from its apparent opposite, history. 
5 2 Its possible relationship to the work of Deleuze (particularly Deleuze's insistence that one should ask of art 
not what it represents, but how it works) will be addressed in Part Four of this thesis. 
5 3 See Paddison 1993: 31-37 for a discussion of the precise nature of this influence. 
54 Ibid:. 30. An English translation of the paper appeared in Telos 60, June 1984. 
5 5 Adorno cited in Paddison ibid. 
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History for Adorno, as Paddison puts it, is the 'interaction of "consciousness" [as 
subject] and "nature" [as object], as "culture" (in the sociological and 
anthropological senses of the term)'.56 
All appeals to 'nature' are seen by Adorno as ideological and highly suspect. As 
Paddison asserts: 
The appeal to nature' - usually under the guise of the ontological notion of 'pure being' (Sein) in 
Heidegger, or ' immediacy' in Husser l , and manifested by composers like Stravinsky a s the 
folkloric, archaic or hieratic and in Hindemith a s 'natural material' 5 7 and 'community' - is regarded 
by Adorno a s the attempt to evade history, and has ideological implications in terms of a 
reactionary impulse to preserve the status quo and to conceal the real relations of power within 
modern society (implications which were to be taken up in later writings like Philosophie der 
neuen Musik).56 
Thus Adorno's dialectical theory focuses upon the interaction of history and 
nature, the process whereby that which is historical comes to be falsely 
interpreted as natural, and nature in turn comes to be viewed as historical. This 
has significant implications for an understanding of music. 
Mimesis and instrumental musique concrete 
Adorno's concept of 'mimesis', as the counterpart in his aesthetics to the 
philosophical concept of non-identity, provides a useful additional concept with 
which to contemplate Lachenmann's sound structures and their expressive 
effect. Williams broadly defines Adorno's usage of mimesis as 'the non-
conceptual, particular and sensuous qualities of the object, those aspects 
suppressed by the coercive force of instrumental reason.'59 Adorno himself 
58 Ibid. 
5 7 As Stoff. This concept will be explored later in connection with American experimental music and for the 
light it throws on Lachenmann's music. 
5 8 Paddison 1993: 30. 
5 9 Williams 1997:13. 
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defines it as the 'non-conceptual affinity of a subjective creation with its objective 
and unposited other.'60 
There is a further meaning of the term 'mimesis' as Adomo uses it, and this is the 
non-coercive reconciliation of rationality with nature. Nature, as Paddison puts it, 
'is understood as non-identity, that which is left out, discarded, repressed or 
occluded by the dominant mode of rationality, and which escapes being 
"functionalized" by it. ... It is that region to which are consigned those things 
rejected or repressed by society in its dominant form'.61 Nature for Adomo refers 
both to the material environment and also, importantly, to pre-rational, subjective, 
inner nature or impulses. 
Adorno however stresses that mimesis can only be understood dialectically, 
through its interaction with the constructive pole of the artwork (as the dialectic of 
subjectivity and objectivity). For him, authentic art consists in the 'bringing to 
speech' of nature. Indeed art, he considers, is one of its last places of refuge: 
Fac ing the constant threat of its own reification, the subject limits that reification through the 
mimetic vestige, the plenipotentiary of an integral life amid a damaged life where the subject is 
being reduced to an ideology. 6 2 
Lachenmann's method of 'defamiliarization' can be seen as an attempt to bear 
witness to a repressed nature. His focus on timbre denotes precisely the 
foregrounding of the expressive, sensuous aspects and associations of sounds 
over and above functional pitch relations. Even the subversion of traditional 
instrumental techniques can be seen as having a mimetic aspect. 
6 0 Adorno 1984: 80. 
6 1 Paddison 1993: 157. 
6 2 Adorno 1984:171 (original translation modified). 
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5. Lachenmann's temA (1968) 
'Auftakt der instrumentalen musique concrete' 
TemA (1968), scored for mezzo soprano, flute and 'cello, has been analyzed by 
Karl Rainer Nonnenmann in conjunction with the notion of instrumental musique 
concrete.*31 would like to propose here that Nonnenmann's analysis of the work 
can also be understood with reference to Adorno's concept of 'mimesis'. TemA is 
comprised of sounds which, whilst 'defamiliarized' in terms of their technique of 
sound production, nevertheless refer to 'natural' sounds such as hissing and 
breathing. Furthermore, the piece anticipates what is subsequently to become a 
central feature of Lachenmann's work - the notion of a reference point outside 
the sounding structure of the work. 
In temA, mimetic sounds and the presence of text in the vocal part append a 
referential dimension which is absent from Lachenmann's sound categories 
theory. These do not refer to musical forms, but to sounds from the 'outside 
world'.64 
TemA can be understood as an essay in the art of 'speechless gesticulation' 
described by Konrad Boehmer.65 It 'cannot rely on an established system of 
communicational signs but operates on other cognitive levels of game and 
perceptual ambiguity/ mobility' (to adopt the words of Hockings). The music 
inhabits 'the subtle shadings that can be made out in this zone between the 
definitely familiar and referential chaos.'66 
6 3 See Nonnenmann 1997. 
6 4 What could be seen as an incidental feature of this piece becomes in works such as Accanto (1975-1976) 
a fully-fledged second formal level. In Accanto, as we shall see later, this formal-referential level pays 
homage to Adorno's concept of handed-down material. 
6 5 See Boehmer cited in Hockings 1995: 13. 
6 6 Hockings 1995:13. 
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Ex. 12(a) 
temA 
fur Flote, Stimme (Mezzosopran) und Violoncello/for Flute, Voice (Mezzo-Soprano) and Violoncello 
Hole 
Stimme 
Voice 
Hebma Lachenmann (1968) 
Violoncello 
HCuJHui SOICulN 
I.' ^ 
Lachenmann, temA, page 1e 
6 7 Cited in Pace 1988a: 11 
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Ex. 12(b) 
EES 
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iff- pp 
3k 
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15) 
tremolo 
4 
Iff ft* 
Knarred qv*t 
Lachenmann, femA, page 21 68 
68 Cited in Pace 1988a: 11 
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This obfuscation of the referential pole is reminiscent of deconstructionist 
philosophy's concern with the nature of inside and outside, with the way in which 
conceptual distinctions slide into one another. 
Lachenmann insists upon the use of traditional instruments in the creation or 
location of new sounds. This is in spite of all that the development of electronic 
devices for composition seemed to promise in this area. Electroacoustic devices 
may provide a wealth of possibilities for 'progressive' music, but, Lachenmann 
argues, they fail to engage directly with tradition and convention, with the 
historicity of musical material and its expressive associations: 
... to experience the familiar afresh in a new light was only possible by means of traditional 
instruments. Electronics are of little use here, since their free abundance of sound possibilities 
remains imprisoned by the limits of loudspeakers or perhaps their vibrating membranes. For all of 
its vast wealth, electronic sound is too 'safe' - it quickly oxidizes to become an exotic, surreal, 
expressionistic idyll.69 
'Composing means: to build an instrument,70 Lachenmann has stated. In temA, a 
series of 'meta instruments' or sound production categories are formed which 
span across the boundaries set by traditional instruments. These exist as 
internally consistent 'sound objects' with limitations as well as possibilities, yet in 
Lachenmann's case they also involve the creation of the new by means of the 
old.71 
Lachenmann's technique of defamiliarization extends both to the instrumental 
and the vocal: the singing voice is employed as an instrument, mimicking 
instrumental sound qualities, and the instruments are in turn used to mimic 
6 9 Lachenmann 1996: 211. 
7 0 'Komponieren heiflt: ein Instrument bauen' (Lachenmann cited in Nonnenmann 1997:106 - my italics). 
7 ' It is worth noting the correlation between Lachenmann's statement and Schaeffer's creation of 'pseudo-
instruments': 'Some sounds have, for instance, an attack that may be characterized by portamento, 
forcefulness, or opening out (that is, by moving swiftly from piano to forte). If these characteristics remain 
throughout the modulations the sounds undergo, such sound sources may play the role of orchestral 
instruments (Schaeffer cited in Palombini 1993: 8). 
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phonetic sounds. Like the later Ausklang for piano and orchestra, temA is 
constructed around resonances, the affinities to be discovered between sound 
objects. In line with the idea of timbral categories set out in 'Klangtypen', 
Lachenmann proceeds by means of creating new 'families' through the creation 
of timbral connections and affinities. 
Nonnenmann writes that temA 'aims to create a structure of meaningful 
connections through the choice of noise-dominated material, through the creation 
of affinities, similarities, and contrasts and through gradual transformations and 
sudden changes of material.'72 He adds that 
Instrumental and vocal techniques of sound production are brought into connection with each 
other not only through breath but through analogies between their mechanical-energetic 
production; so for instance the beating down of the tongue on the gums is analogous to the 
clattering of the keys on the flute, when the keys on the flute are pressed down. From bar 118 
onwards, three different characteristic playing techniques are brought into connection with each 
other through their mechanical sound production. The tremolo of the string instrument 
corresponds not only to the flutter tongue and double tongue techniques of the wind instrument, 
but also to the 'flutter-lips' of the vocalist.73 
There is a further level of perceptual ambiguity in temA, and this is in connection 
with the aforementioned presence of text. Although text is uttered or sung by the 
vocalist, it is articulated with extreme and rapid changes of articulation and 
dynamic, blocking any clear communication of meaning to the listener. 
7 2 'Die Vielfalt des von Lachenmann exploitierten Angulations- und Atemmaterials ist eine wesentliche 
Bedingung fur ein Komponieren, das mit derartig gerauschhaftem Material, mit der Herstellung von 
Ahnlichkeits-, Gleichheits- und Kontrastbeziehungen, durch prozessuale Wandlungen und pldtzliche 
Veranderungen des Materials auf die Bildung von strukturell sinnvollen Zusammenhangen zielt' 
(Nonnemann ibid.: 106). 
7 3 'Instrumental- und Vokalpraktiken werden in lemA" nicht nur durch den Atem selbst, sondern auch durch 
Analogien ihrer mechanisch-energetischen Hervorbringung in Berziehung gebracht; so entspricht 
beispielsweise das Herabschlagen der Zunge vom Gaumen den zuschlagenden Klappen der Flote. In einer 
mit "Agitato" bezeichneten Passage (ab Takt 118) werden drei charakteristische Spielweisen durch die Art 
ihrer mechanischen Hervorbringung von Klang miteinander in Beziehung gebracht. Dem Tremolo des 
Streichinstruments korrespondiert sowohl die Flatter- als auch die Doppelzungentechnik des 
Blasinstruments, die wiederum mit der Flatterlippe der Vokalstimme in Analogie gesetzt wird' (Nonnenman 
ibid: 107). 
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Consequently, sounds are 'energized', heard in and for themselves. Furthermore, 
the ends of sentences are frequently withheld. Meaning is hinted at, and yet it is 
never fully present, only ever in a fragmentary state. This is an example of the 
'game' aspect referred to by Hockings. Nonnenmann describes an example of 
this 'play' of textual meaning in temA: 
In bar 102 the singer takes over the "S"-hissing [Zischen] of the cello, which is instructed to play it 
on an E flat (!)74 This "S" increases from ppp to pp only to open out into a sentence that is 
dominated by sharp "S" sounds - 'wissen Sie, diese Texte lieBen siCH-' ('you know, these texts 
allow themselves-'). ... The listener can take the address 'you know' to be directly referring to 
himself, and the sentence 'these texts allow themselves-' to be the start of an explanation that the 
listener has long been expecting for this meaningless stuttering, an explanation that is then 
absent and cut off abruptly through the word "PST!" [in the flute].75 
(See Ex. 12c, overleaf) 
7 4 The word 'Es' is German for E flat. 
7 5 'In Takt 102 wird von der Vokalistin das "Es"-Zischen des Cellisten - der obendrein ein es (!) zu spielen 
hat - Qbernommen ... aus dem ppp ins pp gesteigert, urn dann in den von scharfen "S"-Lauten dominierten 
Satz "wissen Sie, diese Texte liefien siCH-" zu munden.... Der ZuhSrer kann die Anrede "wissen Sie" direct 
auf sich beziehen und den Satz "diese Texte lieBen sich" als AnkOndigung einer von ihm langst schon 
erwarteten Aufklarung uber dieses vermeintlich sinnlose Gestammel auffassen, einer Erklarung, die dann 
freilich ausbleibt und der durch das "PST" geradezu das Wort abgeschnitten wird. Die Generalpause 
verschweigt die Erklarung und mit ihr bricht der gesamte Dialog zwischen Fldte und Vokalistin ab' 
(Nonnenman ibid.: 109-110). 
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Lachenmann, femA, bars 102-10371 
In this section, there is a hint of a meta-explanation that is stopped abruptly in its 
tracks by the flute. Yet the flute is acoustically connected to the text by the "S" 
sound which it continues. Breathing sounds 'ha' and 'ah' also connect voice, cello 
and flute in a similar way: together the instruments form a 'breathing object', a 
'pseudo-instrument' (to adopt Schaeffer's term). 
7 6 Cited in Nonnenmann 1997: 109. 
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TemA can indeed be construed as a meta-comment on the condition of 
language, both musical and verbal. In a manner reminiscent of Adorno, 
Lachenmann allows the non-identical (as both 'defamiliarized' sound and textual 
ambiguity) to penetrate the very core of the piece, a force which constantly 
unravels the possibility of comprehension. TemA perpetually carves a sense of 
otherness, of semiosis in which no single meaning can be harnessed. 
The title itself embodies a play of meaning: with an 'h' after the T the word would 
read themA, or theme, and the capital A at the end of the word suggests that the 
term is an anagram of Atem (German for 'breath'). The title defies any attempt to 
read off a transparent meaning, mimicking the deferral of meaning which 
characterizes a text according to deconstruction, and indicating at the outset the 
work's underlying dynamic. 
The play of meaning in temA can be understood in relation to Adorno's concept 
of clowning. For Adorno, the 'aesthetic moment' as he calls it, is an inevitable 
aspect of philosophy due to the impossibility of grasping the object in full through 
the concept. '[C]ogency and play are the two poles of philosophy',77 he writes. 
The two should always be maintained in tension: 
As a corrective to the total rule of method, philosophy contains a playful element which the 
traditional view of it as a science would like to exorcise.... The un-na'fve thinker knows how far he 
remains from the object of his thinking, and yet he must always talk as if he had it entirely. This 
brings him to the point of clowning. He must not deny his clownish traits, least of all since they 
alone can give him hope for what is denied him.... To represent the mimesis it supplanted, the 
concept has no other way than to adopt something mimetic in its own conduct, without 
abandoning itself.78 
7 7 Adorno 1973b: 15. 
78 Ibid.: 14. In some of the more extreme examples of poststructuralist literature, this disseminative aspect of 
language is raised to a new absolute. 
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Musically, the above description is largely in keeping with the notion of 'sound 
structure'. Yet the hint of referential meaning in the text conjures up expectations; 
it can be understood as a formal element, despite its fragmented 'presence', 
However, the formal element of language remains forever 'outside' the piece 
itself, a reflection of the wholeness that, Adorno argues, has been lost in the 
modern era. 
There is an additional, highly subtle referential aspect to the piece. This, as 
suggested by one meaning of the title, is in relation to the theme of breathing. 
Lachenmann writes that 'temA - apart from Ligeti's Aventures - is one of the first 
ever compositions in which the theme of breathing is presented as an acoustic, 
energetic process'.79 In and out breaths form a structural principle or constant of 
the work, a 'formal' element which creates expectations. The suggestion is of a 
person sleeping throughout the course of the piece: Lachenmann indeed asks us 
to imagine this. Referring to bar 22 in the score he writes, 'All in-breath 
processes from here to bar 41 create a connecting series whose form should be 
determined by imagining a sleeping person.'80 This theme is to repeat itself in 
Lachenmann's later works, as we shall see.81 
7 9 'temA' dQrfte - trotz Ligetis 'Aventures' - eine der ersten Kompositionen sein, in denen das Atmen als 
akustich vermittelter energetischer Vorgang thematisiert wurde' Lachenmann in Nonnenman ibid.: 106. 
8 0"... Einatem-Prozesse von hier bis Takt 41 bilden eine zusammenhangende Serie, deren Gestaltung von 
der Vorstellung eines Schlafenden bestimmt sein soil' (Lachenmann in Nonnenmann ibid.: 111). 
8 1 As a suggestive manifestation of Lachenmann's concept of Sprachlosigkeit ('speechlessness') (addressed 
in Part Two), this image is re-kindled in some of the cadential episodes in Accanto, and in the use of the 
lullaby 'Schlaf, kindlein, Schlaf in Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied. As I suggest in Part Three, this image, 
particularly in the Tanzsuite, is perhaps intended to symbolize the sleeping political consciousness in 
Germany after World War II. 
70 
Instrumental musique concrete, The grain of the voice and 'geno-song' 
Roland Barflies' famous essay 'The Grain of the Voice' ('Le grain de la voix', 
1972), as Klaus-Michael Hinz has suggested, provides a further illuminating 
perspective from which to consider temA, a perspective that anticipates some of 
the issues taken up in Parts Four and Five of this thesis. 
The 'grain' of the voice as Barthes puts it (the essay is devoted to the voice, 
although it can be applied also to instruments, when the mechanics of technique 
are brought to the fore) is the 'materiality' of the sounding body, 'the muscles, the 
membranes, the cartilages',82 'the body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it 
writes, the limb as it performs'.83 It represents is all that is excluded from the 
values attached to the conventions of performance. 
Transposing Kristeva's distinction between 'pheno-' and 'geno-text', Barthes 
clarifies the distinction between his proposed musical aesthetic and the 
conventional, differentiating between what he terms 'pheno-song' and 'geno-
song'. It is worth citing his description of this important distinction in full given its 
relevance to Lachenmann's work: 
The pheno-song (if the transposition be allowed) covers all the phenomena, all the features which 
belong to the structure of the language being sung, the rules of the genre, the coded form of the 
melisma, the composer's idiolect, the style of the interpretation: in short, everything in the 
performance which is in the service of communication, representation, expression, everything 
which it is customary to talk about, which forms the tissue of cultural values (the matter of 
acknowledged tastes, of fashions, of critical commentaries), which takes its bearing directly on 
the ideological alibis of a period ('subjectivity', 'expressivity', 'dramaticism', 'personality' of the 
artist). The geno-song is the volume of the singing and speaking voice, the space where 
significations germinate 'from within language and in its very materiality'; it forms a signifying play 
"Barthes 1977: 181-2. 
83 Ibid.: 188. This is reminiscent of the disconnected zones of the body in Deleuze and Guattari's 'body 
without organs' (see Part Four). 
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having nothing to do with communication, representation (of feelings), expression; it is that apex 
(or that depth) of production where the melody really works at the language - not at what it says, 
but the voluptuousness of its sounds-signifiers, of its letters -where melody explores how the 
language works and identifies with that work. It is, in a very simple word which must be taken 
seriously, the diction of the language.84 
Culture is seen as a repression of expressive possibilities, as a reductive force 
(like identity logic), a limiting of infinite reality. Barthes rebels against the 'tyranny 
of meaning': 'isn't the entire space of the voice an infinite one?' he asks, echoing 
Saussure.85 
Crucially, the reception of the 'grain' of the voice necessitates a (momentary?) 
renunciation of structural or semantic listening. Barthes reflects upon what one 
might call 'bodily acoustic perception': 
If I perceive the 'grain' in a piece of music and accord this 'grain' a theoretical value (the 
emergence of the text in the work), I inevitably set up a new scheme of evaluation which will 
certainly be individual - I am determined to listen to my relation with the body of the man or 
woman singing or playing and that relation is erotic - but in no way 'subjective' (it is not the 
psychological 'subject' in me who is listening; the climactic pleasure hoped for is not going to 
reinforce - to express - that subject but, on the contrary, to lose it).88 
The link between Barthes' concept of 'grain' and Lachenmann's instrumental 
musique concrete, crucial to temA, is clear. Referring to the pheno-song/ geno-
song distinction, Hinz reports that, 'Helmut Lachenmann says he believes "only in 
the latter form of expression.'"87 
84 Ibid,: 182-3. 
85 Ibid.: 184. The 'geno-song' resonates with Lachenmann's Sprachlosigkeit. 
™lbid.: 188. 
8 7 Hinz 1994. 
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The Myth of Breath 
The theme of breath, as we have seen, is central to temA. In Barthesian terms, 
the piece is bound not to the soul but to diction. Lachenmann deconstructs what 
Hinz refers to as the 'myth of breath': instead of soul or inner emotions, the body 
itself as instrument encompasses the message (not reproduction, but 
production). The vocalist is prescribed not conventional singing techniques but 
techniques intended to 'defamiliarize' it, to alienate it from convention and 
subvert expectations. These techniques are similar to those Lachenmann 
prescribes to instruments, and inject the category of 'noise' into the realm of 
accepted sounds. 
Hinz argues that the fragments of text which appear in the piece 'do not need to 
be understood by the listener'. Citing Lachenmann, he writes, '"they only serve 
for characteristic modifications of exhalation of breath".'88 This, I would argue, is 
only partially true. On the one hand, text in the piece is indeed employed almost 
as a 'sound object', for its material qualities rather than semantic meaning. 
However, this is not simply a 'word salad' in the surrealist sense. Orderly 
sentences are present, although they are rarely finished. By following what he or 
she can of the discursive meaning, the listener picks up on what I have described 
as a level of meta-commentary in the piece, addressing the ultimate instability of 
meaning. 
By undermining the pheno-song in temA, Lachenmann opens up a space, to cite 
Barthes, 'of pleasure, of thrill, a site where language works for nothing, that is, a 
perversion'.89 Provocative, purposeless, anti-capitalist? This space deconstructs 
the invariant appearance of the pheno-song, its claim to universality, another 
space which subtends it, one suppressed by the dominant paradigm. 
88 Ibid. 
8 8 Barthes 1977: 187. 
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Crucially, Hinz makes mention a number of times of temA as an 'artistic natural 
event'. The parallels between Lachenmann's instrumental musique concrete and 
the work of John Cage, which this statement evokes, will be explored in Parts 
Four and Five. 
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1. The 'Aesthetic Apparatus' and Sprachlosigkeit 
Adorno's theory of the Objective Historical Tendency of Material 
[Material] is nothing less than the objectified and critically reflected state of the technical 
productive forces of an age with which any given composer is initially confronted. The 
physical and historical dimensions mutually interact.'1 
Adorno, 'Vers une musique informelle' (1961) 
The notion of an historical tendency inherent in musical material is essential to 
the line of reasoning adopted in Adorno's controversial work, Philosophy of New 
Music. This conception can be understood as a transposition of Hegel's 
somewhat mystical notion of 'objective spirit' {objectiver Geisf) into the sphere of 
music. As Adorno writes in Philosophy of New Music, his own, radical theory 
... contradicts the traditional conception of the material of music. This material is traditionally 
defined - in terms of physics, or possibly in terms of the psychology of sound - as the sum of all 
sounds at the disposal of the composer. The actual compositional material, however, is as 
different from this sum as is language from its total supply of sounds. It is not simply a matter of 
the increase and decrease of this supply in the course of history. All its specific characteristics are 
indications of the historical process. ... Music recognizes no natural law; therefore, all psychology 
of music is questionable. Such psychology - in its efforts to establish an invariant 'understanding' 
of the music of all times - assumes a constancy of musical subject. Such an assumption is more 
closely related to the constancy of the material of nature than psychological differentiation might 
indicate. What this psychology inadequately and noncommittally describes is to be sought in the 
perception of the kinetic laws of matter. According to these laws, not all things are possible at all 
times. ... The demands made upon the subject by the material are conditioned much more by the 
fact that the 'material' is itself a crystallization of the creative impulse, an element socially 
predetermined through the consciousness of man. As a previous subjectivity - now forgetful of 
itself - such an objectified impulse of the material has its own kinetic laws. That which seems to 
be the mere self-locomotion of the material is of the same origin as is the social process, by 
whose traces it is continually permeated. This energy pursues its course in the same sense as 
does actual society, even when energy and society have become totally unaware of each other 
' Adorno 1992b: 281. 
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and have come into conflict with each other. Therefore, the altercation of the composer with his 
material is the same as an altercation with society, precisely to the extent that it finds expression 
in his work, and does not simply face his product as consumer or opponent - a mere external and 
heteronomous factor.2 
A precursor to Adorno's conception of musical material can be located in the 
thought of Schoenberg, in particular his Harmonielehre. One of the central 
features of this conception of musical material is the notion of historical 
necessity, of the idea that the material of music (as distinct from the techniques 
that shape it) possesses immanent demands which are historical in nature. 
These are related both to the technical means available for musical production at 
any given point in history and to the expressive needs of the composer, needs 
which also change over time.3 This idea, as Adorno argues above, departs 
radically from the notion that material is universal and somehow timeless, 
unaltered by the forces of history and culture.4 
Crucially, according to Adorno, the compositional choices available to the artist or 
composer at any given time are not equal to the sum of all styles and techniques 
developed through history. Instead, they are restricted by the stage reached by 
the material at any given historical moment. Material, for Adorno, is inextricably 
linked to the structures and relationships which pervade society during any given 
period. It is within the material of music that music and society are mediated. The 
mediation of self and forms in the artwork is one manifestation of the dialectic of 
2 Adorno 1973a: 32-34. 
3 According to Adorno the composer 'loses that freedom on a grand scale which idealistic aesthetics is 
accustomed to grant to the artist. He is no longer a creator. It is not that the times and society impose 
external restrictions upon him; it is rather the rigid demand for compositional accuracy made upon him by his 
structure which limits him. The state of technique appears as a problem in every measure which he dares to 
conceive: with every measure technique as a whole demands of him that he do it justice and that he give the 
single correct answer permitted by technique at any given moment. ... His efforts find fulfillment in the 
execution of that which his music objectively demands of him. But such obedience demands of the 
composer all possible disobedience, independence, and spontaneity. This is the dialectical nature revealed 
in the unfolding of the musical material' (Adorno ibid.: 36-37). 
4 This is an approach to material favoured by Hindemith. See Adorno 1973a: 33. 
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subject and object.5 For Adorno, art is 'a kind of unconscious historiography'.6 In 
a letter to Ernst Krenek from 1 9 2 9 , Adorno argues that tonality can no longer be 
construed as a valid system of musical composition in the modem era: 
When I maintain that atonality is the only possible manner of composing today, it is not because I 
consider it ahistorically to be 'better', a handier referential system than tonality. It is rather that I 
think that tonality has collapsed, that every tonal chord has a meaning that we can no longer 
grasp; that, once we have outgrown the 'natural givens' of the tonal material, we can no more go 
back into that material than we can return to a form of economic production based on use-value, 
or (something which I would argue against Karl Krauss) than we are able to speak an objectively 
given, ontological language, the words for which long ago fell into disuse, (italics in original)7 
Adorno employs an essentially Lukacsian concept of 'second nature' to describe 
the idea that what appears to be 'natural' and given in art and music is in fact 
socially and culturally pre-determined and mediated.8 Lukacs claimed that 
Nature is a societal category. That is to say, whatever is held to be natural at any given stage of 
social development, however this nature is related to man and whatever form his involvement 
with it takes, i.e. nature's form, its content, its range and its objectivity are all socially conditioned.9 
Adorno takes up this notion from Lukacs and understands the interaction of 
history and nature as part of a 'reflection on nature'. This, as Paddison has put it, 
is 'a process which in effect is a response to the demands of the material, and 
5 As Max Paddison points out, the term mediation has essentially two meanings in Adorno's aesthetics: *(i) 
as the manner in which the outer world is mediated within the inner, hermetic world of the musical work 
through the historically sedimented material; and (ii) as the mediation of the material, particularly as 
gestures, within the structure of the work itself (Paddison [forthcoming]). 
6 Adorno 1984: 274. 
7 Adorno cited in Paddison 1993: 83. 
8 Paddison makes this point: 'Lukacs can be interpreted [in Theorie des Romans, 1916] in the following 
terms: ... as the forms of art "lose their obvious roots in supra-personal ideal necessities" they become 
merely existent and "form the world of convention". As such they become recognizable but 
incomprehensible, and form what he calls a "second nature" of meaningless necessities which have 
forgotten their origin. This "world of convention", in not being recognized as the exteriorization of previous 
inferiority, as the objectification of previous subjectivity, is called by Lukacs "a charnel-house of long-dead 
interiorities" (Paddison 1993: 32-33). 
9 Lukacs cited in Paddison 1993: 33. 
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which reveals material to be a "cultural product", rather than "nature".' 1 0 The 
implication of this idea of self-reflection, then, is the idea that the purpose of 
music is primarily cognitive, concerned with the revelation of social truths through 
the deciphering of 'second nature'. 
The view, expressed in Adorno's letter to Krenek and in the Philosophy of New 
Music, that there is only a single legitimate means of composing during a 
particular historical age could be seen as excessively narrow. However, Adorno's 
monograph on Mahler - Mahler: a Musical Physiognomy (1971, English 
translation 1992) - shows that, subsequent to the Philosophy of New Music, the 
philosopher developed a more inclusive vision of musical material. As Alastair 
Williams remarks, 
In describing Mahler's ability to turn a reified language against itself and to find new possibilities 
within the worn-out material, Adorno's conception of musical material and form becomes broader 
than it had been in earlier writings such a s Philosophy of New Wus/c. 1 1 
It is in relation to the notion of a 'mass musical language' that Adorno interprets 
the music of Mahler. This embraces 'the second hand, the found objects and 
"ready mades" from the cultural scrap heap'. 1 2 As long as there is an element of 
knowing or critical distance on the part of the composer in relation to past 
musical materials, Adorno comes to accept their validity as a legitimate 
alternative to a high modernist logic. 1 3 Without this element of self-reflexivity, 
1 0 Paddison 1993: 72. 
1 1 Williams 1997: 28. 
1 2 Paddison 1993: 274. See Paddison, Chapter 7, for a discussion of Adorno's concept. 
1 3 Alastair Williams (recalling Jurgen Habermas' distinction between 'system' and 'lifeworld') writes, 'It is 
clear that for music advanced material is not the only way of embodying the subject's engagement with 
intersubjective and objective conditions. It is, however, one way of doing so: a system that does not override 
surface contingency can be encoded within the unfolding of the material, as the interplay of objects in 
R6pons evinces. Another way of tackling the same issue is to evoke variant spaces within the lifeworld, by 
referring to different musics: in an echo of Mahler's practice, the sound objects, effectively, would be 
second-hand parts invested with a new latency by means of their configurations with one another. There 
does, however, need to be some syntagmatic continuity between the constituent elements, and it is 
essential that they refer to something other than themselves' (Williams 1997:147). 
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however, music becomes, he insists, an empty reflection of the system of 
capitalist exchange. 
The discovery of new possibilities within the fragments of a worn out language 
will be central to the ensuing discussion of Lachenmann's later music. His 
concept of 'rubble' (Trimmer) is similar to Adorno's 'mass musical language'. 
Whilst the technique of instrumental musique concrete revitalizes aspects of 
conventional performance practice and traditional modes of structuring sounds, 
from Accanto onwards Lachenmann attempts to deal with specific musical works 
of the past in such a way that causes them to be heard in a new way, imbued 
with a new life-force. 
The 'Aesthetic Apparatus' 
Musical structures derive their strength solely from conscious or unconscious resistance, 
the friction between them and prevailing structures of existence and consc iousness . Any 
concept of complexity which ignores this is meaningless. 1 4 
Lachenmann, 'On Structuralism' (1990, English version 1995) 
The increasing importance of tradition in Lachenmann's later work indicates a 
conception of musical material which parallels that of Adorno. The concept of 
'aesthetic apparatus' expounded in Lachenmann's essay, 'The "Beautiful" in 
Music Today' ('Zum Problem des musikalisch Schonen heute', 1976) 1 5 is highly 
reminiscent of Adorno: 
In practice, the composer who is concerned to express himself is obliged to take account of the 
'aesthetic apparatus' - that is, the sum total of categories of musical perception a s they have 
evolved throughout history to the present day; of the 'instrumentarium' which comes with them; of 
the techniques of playing and of notation; and last but not least, of the relevant institutions and 
1 4 Lachenmann 1995:100 (translation modified). 
1 5 This essay (translated by Cornelius Cardew in 1980) was the first of Lachenmann's writings to be 
published in English translation. Note that the essay was originally written around the time of Accanto. The 
connections between these two pieces of work will become clear.. 
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markets in our society. From the window display of a music shop to the complimentary tickets 
given to the town council 's charlady for the concert of the visiting f isherman's choir, from the 
Hohner mouth-organ to the pensionable officialdom of the radio symphony orchestra with its 
many fiddles tuned to the s a m e open fifths and its solitary b a s s clarinet, this 'aesthetic apparatus' 
embodies the ruling aesthetic needs and norms. 1 6 
The aesthetic apparatus is viewed by Lachenmann as something to be 
confronted critically, just as Adorno considers the interaction of history and 
nature to embody, in musical terms, a reflection on the part of the composer 
upon his material. This process is essential if the material is to be rendered newly 
expressive: 
A composer seriously concerned with 'expressing himself is at once fascinated 
by, and highly suspicious of, this aesthetic apparatus. In no circumstances will be 
simply make use of it; rather, he must master it, technically and spiritually. 
Whether he recognizes it or not, he cannot wrestle with the rules of the games 
implicit in the aesthetic apparatus without being dragged into the conflict that 
determines the consciousness of our society. This conflict - fear of freedom and 
simultaneous longing for it - is his own as well, and consequently he cannot 
evade the crucial decision. Either he must face up to the conflict and bring it to a 
head, or he must close his eyes and trust in his 'naive artistry'. If he chooses the 
latter course he must try to salve his conscience by pretending that the current 
rules of the aesthetic apparatus are harmless 'laws of nature', which can be 
ingeniously exploited, once one has adapted oneself to them. But he should 
recognize that the material he uses, however arcane or however familiar, is 
always and from the outset in direct connexion with the aesthetic apparatus, and 
under its sway. ... Only in coming to grips with the aesthetic apparatus and the 
categories that determine it, can self-knowledge and musical expression come 
1 6 Lachenmann 1980: 22. 
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about. Only then can the experience of freedom be artistically communicated as 
reality (with its distinguishing contradictions) and become conscious. 17 
One might substitute the word 'freedom' for the 'new' or the 'unknown', that which 
escapes the existing structures of society. 
" Ibid.: 23. 
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Sprachfertigkeit and Sprachlosigkeit 
It is only by engaging directly with tradition, Lachenmann argues, that the 
composer is able fully to express the situation that he terms 'speechlessness' 
(Sprachlosigkeit). This has come about as the result of the disintegration of 
shared norms and beliefs in modernity. 1 8 'Speechlessness', according to 
Lachenmann, forms one pole of the 'dual problem' of modern culture today. 
'False fluency' (Sprachfertigkeit), is manifest in public life and culture, 'in the 
desert of the media and of the cultural media' - the culture industry.1 9 
We are, Lachenmann insists, in 'an age when culture has become a drug, a 
sedative, a method of suppressing reality rather than illuminating it. ' 2 0 It is the role 
of the 'responsible' composer, he considers, to reveal the illusory quality of false 
fluency. 'As an artist I have not the least influence on political events; but I have 
the possibility - and the duty - to fight ... anti-intellectuality', Lachenmann has 
asserted. 2 1 New music must proceed by confronting the 'rubble', 2 2 the reified 
fragments of culture which have lost any sense of historical necessity. Art must 
address the human need for a coherent language in the face of its real 
fragmentation. 
1 8 Societal disintegration manifests itself in the sphere of art as the dissolution of forms. As Adorno remarks, 
'The aesthetic categories have lost their a priori validity. Now the same can be said of artistic materials 
themselves. The disintegration of materials is the triumph of their being-for-other' (Adorno cited in Paddison 
1993:263). 
1 9 Lachenmann in 'Accanto' (Lachenmann 1996: 168-169). 
2 0 Lachenmann 1995: 101. 
2 1 Lachenmann cited in Ryan 1999: 20. Paddison has alluded to the problem of 'speechlessness' facing the 
avant-garde - a problem which also concerned Adorno - in the following terms:'... the paradox - what one 
might call the imperative impossibility - of advanced art under the changed conditions of postmodernity (at 
least, as a critical, self-reflective art praxis which does not become totally assimilated to the interests of a 
commodity culture)'. He argues that, The "impossibility" in question is somewhat along the lines of Beckett's 
"I can't go on. I'll go on." The conditions are greatly unfavourable to a radical avant-garde, and yet it 
continues against the odds. It then becomes a matter of strategies. This is something articulated at length by 
Adorno in his philosophy of music' (Paddison 2001) 
2 2 Lachenmann 1996: 169. 
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As Lachenmann puts it, 
Composing that tries to come to terms with this yearning for an intact language c a n only 
overcome its own s p e e c h l e s s n e s s by making this false fluency explicit. S o composing for me 
m e a n s not avoiding the old musical language, but to deal with it in a ' s p e e c h l e s s ' way. You 
separate the material from its usual linguistic context, and through a new 'ordering' of the 
e lements , create connect ions and contexts which will then throw light and create a new 
expressiv i ty ' 2 3 
Lachenmann 1996: 168-169. 
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2. Beauty and Art'Fodder' 
Lachenmann's Dialectic of the 'Beautiful' 
By shutting his eyes to all the relations between men that constitute society, and are its 
real stuff and substance , man has ens laved himself to forces whose control is now 
beyond him, because he does not acknowledge their existence. He is at the mercy of the 
market, the movement of capital, and the slump and boom. He is deluded by himself. 
This is shown by the remorseless test of events . 2 4 
Christopher Caudwell, Studies in a Dying Culture (1938) 
T h e experience of the Beautiful is indissolubly connected with making perceptible the 
social contradictions in our reality: because to make them perceptible is to make them 
surmountable. 2 5 Lachenmann, 'The Beautiful in Music Today' (1980) 
'The "Beautiful" in Music Today' echoes the dual problem expressed in the 
distinction between speechlessness and false fluency, asserting the pressing 
need to redefine the conditions of the beautiful, to re-evaluate it in line with the 
events of history. Lachenmann draws a distinction between what he terms 
'humanity's legitimate and profoundly rooted demand for art as the experience of 
Beauty' and 'its false satisfaction and alienation in the form of art "fodder" 
manufactured by the bourgeoisie and preserved in a society of repressed 
contradictions'.2 6 This human need, he considers (much along the lines of Adorno 
in his 1955 essay The Aging of the New Music') has been denied by the avant-
garde since the Second World War 2 7 and, at the opposite pole - that of the 
2 4 Caudwell 1938: xxi-xxii. 
2 5 Lachenmann 1980: 23. 
26 Ibid: 20. 
2 7 In the essay, 'H6ren ist wehrlos - ohne H6ren' Lachenmann writes, 'My definition of beauty as "denial of 
habit" may act on an even more provocative level when thoughts of beauty are not abolished morally, 
calvinistically or masochistically, but on the contrary makes a claim for the notion of beauty with all its 
qualities of purity, clarity, intensity, richness, humanity, and even makes use of what so many self-
proclaimed defenders of Western culture think needs to be changed simply because the whole thing is too 
irritating for them.' In other words, Lachenmann argues that he does not deny beauty for moral Calvinistic or 
masochistic reasons. Rather, he attacks a post-Adorno culture which asserts, for example, that after 
86 
'culture industry' - nurtured uncritically by a society which seeks false 
reassurance in an outmoded tonal language. Integral serialism, or 'structural 
mannerism' as Lachenmann has termed it, 2 8 represents an attempt to cleanse 
sounds of a discredited expressive content and to achieve instead an objectivity 
which is scientific and positivistic in nature. 
A new world of sonic and temporal experience had been sighted from the standpoint of Webern's 
serial technique - a world centred on the organization of sound material. Amid the bustle of 
striking camp and heading for the new Promised Land, the question of Beauty w a s not merely out 
of place; it w a s downright suspect . For it involved those criteria and taboos, value judgements 
and ideals, on whose ruins everyone was then standing. 2 9 
Structural mannerism, Lachenmann claims, is undialectical - it possesses 'an 
empty and unresisting concept of complexity,' 3 0 which fails to acknowledge the 
mediation of musical material by society. It fails in its attempt to 'cleanse' musical 
material of its associative meaning. This is the 'stagnation in which new music 
finds itself',3 1 founded, as Adorno considers, on 'a superstitious belief in 
intrinsically meaningful primitive elements, which in truth owe their existence to 
history, and whose meaning is itself historical.' 3 2 Adorno contends that in late 
serialism the objectivity of material is fetishized as a thing in its own right - an 
approach which suppresses the subjective, expressive pole of music, its origins 
in humankind. The relationship between this argument and Adorno's critique of 
identity thinking is clear. Through its denial of society and reality, this music 
paradoxically affirms the status quo. 
Auschwitz it is impossible to write beautiful music any more. ('Meine Definition von Schdnheit als 
"Verweigerung von Gewohnheit" mag gewifJ umso provozierender wirken, als sie eben den 
SchOnheitsgedanken nicht moralisch, calvinistisch, masochistisch abschafft, sondern ihn im Gegenteil mit all 
seinen Tugenden von Reinheit, Klarheit, Intensitat, Reichtum, Menschlichkeit in Anspruch nimmt, aber eben 
dort in Anspruch nimmt, wo so mancher selbsternannte Huter abendlandischer Kultur meint sich alterieren 
zu mOssen, einfach, weil ihm das Ganze hier zu lastig ist' (Lachenmann 1996: 135). 
2 8 Lachenmann 1995: 96. 
2 9 Lachenmann 1980: 20. 
30 Ibid.: 93. 
3' Ibid. 
3 2 Adomo2002: 189. 
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The musical experiments centred around the Darmstadt School in the 1950s 
(and which still underpinned the compositional technique of many younger 
composers once this period had ended), aspired towards the ideal of progress. 
Yet, as Adorno and Lachenmann have argued, by effectively reducing art to a 
science, the expressive pole essential for musical meaning was subordinated to 
the desire for total control and detachment, liquidating the necessary tension 
between the two. It thus embodied not progress, but a form of regression. As 
Adorno maintains in 'The Aging of the New Music', 
The aim of the introduction of these technical elements is not the real domination of nature but 
the integral and transparent production of a nexus of meaning [Sinnzusammenhang], When s u c h 
transparency lets nothing glimmer through, when it is not a medium of artistic content [Gehal(\ but 
an end in itself, it loses its raison d'etre. 3 3 
In the same article Adorno proposes that the music of Boulez exemplifies this 
tendency. Boulez, he writes, is 
... a highly cultured and exceptionally gifted musician, with the highest s e n s e of form and with a 
power that is communicated even where he disavows subjectivity altogether. He and his disciples 
aspire to dispose of every 'compositional freedom' a s pure caprice, along with every vestige of 
traditional musical idiom: in fact, every subjective impulse is in music at the s a m e time an impulse 
of musical language. T h e s e composers have above all attempted to bring rhythm under the strict 
domination of twelve-tone procedure, and ultimately to replace composition altogether with an 
objective-calculatory ordering of intervals, pitches, long and short durations, degrees of loudness; 
an integral rationalizaton such a s such as has never before been envisaged in mus ic . 3 4 
Although it extends and develops the purely technical achievements of the early, 
or 'classical', serialists, structural mannerism can be seen to dispense altogether 
with their radical agenda. For Lachenmann, 
3 3 Adorno 2002: 193. 
34 Ibid.: 187. 
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... this sort of structural mannerism ignores and betrays those aspects which made 'c lassical ' 
structuralism and its precursors in the Viennese School so explosive. In today's different historical 
situation they should belong - whatever changed form they may take - to the rigor of 
composition. I am referring to the element of specific negation, of radical departure, or a radical 
syntactical design which h a s become form, the result of reflection on what music in a specific 
historical social situation can still b e . 3 5 
. . . a study of works from the 'c lassical ' period of serialism ... reveals that the 'compelling quality' 
of this music is not just derived from the virtuous consistency with which the self-imposed rules 
are adhered to - and work - but also at least a s much from the wisdom with which the music, 
even with the aid of s u c h a system of rules - and in dialectical contact with it - constitutes a 
reaction to existing social structures and the existing communicative rules of the bourgeois 
aesthetic apparatus they have created, and offers them resistance - not just rhetorical but actual 
- putting their normal functioning out of action, indeed sometimes even destroying it. 3 8 
Whilst the avant-garde failed to address the human need for beauty, it is within 
the realm of the culture industry, on the other hand, that Lachenmann considers 
the human need for beauty is preserved. However, this is only in the form of art 
'fodder', as a form of false consciousness maintained via the fetishization of past 
music: 
... the concept of Beauty, dismissed a s suspect by the avant-garde, w a s kept alive by society. Or 
kept society alive? Anyway, it lived on, not only a s a general criterion for identification, but also in 
its customary and socially accepted form a s reified categories. T h e s e facilitated the process of 
identification by offering a shield against the reality that could no longer be mastered. T h e shield 
w a s an apparently intact language: tonality and its expressive m e a n s . 3 7 
A s Europe recovered during the post-war period, people's consc iousness in all a reas started to 
revert to the old bourgeois value systems and taboos, and is still clinging to these, particularly in 
3 5 Lachenmann 1995: 96. 
38 Ibid.: 97. 
3 7 Lachenmann 1980: 21. 
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the area of aesthetic experience, well aware of the real threat to our time and our civilization. This 
gives us the s a m e illusion of security a s an ostrich creates by sticking its head into the s a n d . 3 8 
For Lachenmann, the image of reconciliation and harmony projected by the 
culture industry through its predominantly tonal language is false and irrational. 
This is a point expressed repeatedly by Adorno. 3 9 In the essay 'Uber Tradition' 
('On Tradition') (1978) Lachenmann asserts, 
Our cultural industry is an essential part of [the] defense mechanism [of our age]. 
In this instance it has monopolized tradition: it maintains the illusion of a long lost 
common basis of agreement by conserving and fetishizing historical aesthetic 
categories and the image of values associated with them: in music by persisting 
with categories of a dialectic and at the same time infinitely outworn tonality 
corresponding to reality at the turn of the [last] century, where the awareness of a 
still intact society was rendered less troubled by belief in progress with 
premonitions of threat but indeed found them delightfully inspiring. In the 
framework and perspective of a tonal pluralism preserved in this way right up to 
the present day - which thanks to the inbuilt dialectic of that tonality is infinitely 
outworn - old as well as New Music are allotted ideologically unthreatening roles 
as equally exotic and idyllic opportunities for escape.' 4 0 
In the 1960s, Lachenmann argues, the bourgeois cult of beauty began 
surreptitiously to infiltrate the avant-garde itself. Indeed, in The Aging' Adorno 
38 Ibid. 
3 9 See for example the chapter entitled 'The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception', in Adorno 
and Horkheimer 1972: 120-167. 
4 0 'Unser Kulturbetrieb ist ein wesentlicher Teil diese Verdrangungssystems. In diesem Sinn hat er die 
Tradition in Beschlag genommen: Die Illusion einer in Wirklichkeit langst verlorenen gemeinsamen 
Verstandigungsbasis bewahrt er durch die Konservierung und Fetischisierung historischer asthetischer 
Kategorien und daran gebundener Wertvorstellungen; in der Musik durchs Beharren auf den Kategorien 
einer dialectiktisch gleichsam ins Unendliche strapazierten Tonalitat, wie sie urn die Jahrhundertwende elner 
Wirklichkeit entsprach, in welcher Fortschrittsgiaube und Ahnungen der Bedrohung ein noch intaktes 
GesellschaftsbewuBts weniger verunsicherten als eher reizvoll beflugelten. Im Rahmen und aus der 
Perspektive eines solchermaOen in diese Gegenwart herubergeretteten tonalen Pluralismus - der sich dank 
jener der Tonalitat innewohnenden Dialektik bis ins Unendliche strapazieren Ial3t - lassen sich der alten wie 
der Neuen Musik ideologisch ungefahrliche Rollen als gleichermaBen exotische wie idyllische 
Zufluchtsm&glichkeiten zuweisen' (Lachenmann 1996: 339). 
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writes, 'Nobody really takes a chance any more; all are looking for shelter" - even 
those who were once proponents of the new.' 4 1 In Lachenmann's words, 
T h e old temptation w a s irresistible: expectations of the Beautiful - a s something theoretically 
neglected and unconquered yet socially a s intact and ineffective as ever, provided well-worn tonal 
habits are tricked out with elements that are more exotically attractive - began to influence avant-
garde musical thinking, which had once been so strict. 4 2 
The 'new-found freedom' exemplified in the 1960s by composers such as Ligeti, 
Penderecki and Kagel who showed a new tolerance for tonal elements, was in 
fact as regressive as the culture industry: The freedom to be tonal turned out to 
be the freedom to live in leaky places.' 4 3 
Today, according to Lachenmann, the general state of affairs for new music is 
bleak. Except for his teacher Luigi Nono, he writes, 
... leading composers of yesterday have exhausted their resources. Failing to s e n s e the truth 
about their material-fixated thought, they now decorate the cultural scene a s petrified monuments 
to their old achievements. . . . Today the avant-garde is brought low by that se l fsame bourgeois 
domesticated concept of beauty that it so arrogantly assumed it could ignore on the grounds that 
it preferred 'to turn back to the MS paper' . 4 4 
Lachenmann insists that there is an urgent need to address the abused concept 
of Beauty, to re-evaluate it in line with the contradictions of contemporary society. 
This, he argues, must take the shape of a 'rejection of habit' 4 5 and the denial of 
the conventionally beautiful. 
4 ' Adorno 2002: 199. 
4 2 Lachenmann 1980: 21. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. Here Lachenmann refers to a comment made by Boulez in 1948: 'I have a horror of dealing in words 
with what is so prettily called the aesthetic problem. Besides, I don't want to make this article any longer; I 
prefer to turn back to my MS paper' (Boulez cited in Lachenmann 1980: 20). 
A S Lachenmann 1995: 97. 
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Only by engaging dialectically with the 'bourgeois value system', Lachenmann 
insists, will it become possible to 
. . . move out from under its shield, to deal cognitively and pragmatically with reality, and let us 
combat the dominance of such inner ties, wherever their initial truth has become the fatal untruth 
of comfortable illusion, headstrongly and fearfully invoked arcad ias , and reactionary short-
s ightedness. 4 6 
Beauty can only become socially relevant and free from delusion when the entire 
'aesthetic apparatus' is taken fully into account: 
Only in coming to grips with the aesthetic apparatus and the categories that determine it, can self-
knowledge and musical expression come about. Only then can the experience of freedom be 
artistically communicated a s reality (with its distinguishing contradictions) and become conscious. 
T h e experience of the Beautiful is indissolubly connected with making perceptible the social 
contradictions in our reality; because to make them perceptible is to make them surmountable. 4 7 
The great music of the past, Lachenmann contends, must also be viewed in its 
historical context, in connection with the aesthetic apparatus of its time and 
against which it set its own expressive needs. The best of traditional art, for 
Lachenmann, achieved its power through a dialectical confrontation with the 
contradictions of the society of which it was a part: 
There is a need today for investigations into the music of B a c h , Beethoven, Mozart, Schubert, 
aimed at showing that the degree of individuation, of intensity and of truthfulness, achieved w a s 
inseparable from the process of grappling with the aesthetic apparatus at e a c h stage in its 
historical and social development. From the harmonic consistency of B a c h ' s chorale settings, 
which s o offended his contemporaries, through Mozart's subversive use of the e lements of 
Empfindsamkeit, which had once been so gracious, and Beethoven's liberated concept of form a s 
the display of thematic work, to Schubert , S c h u m a n n , Wagner, and Mahler, the elements of 
4 8 Lachenmann cited in Toop 1994: 16. 
47 Ibid. 
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compositional individuation are directly apprehensible a s rejections of the usual; a s latent or open 
c a u s e of scandal , a s expressive redefinition of the means of composition. 4 8 
Lachenmann ibid. 
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3. Towards A New Theory 
Lachenmann's theory of 'Dialectical Structuralism' 
Lachenmann's approach to the past and to the existing aesthetic apparatus is 
thus inherently dialectical. In the essay, 'On Structuralism' he expounds his 
concept of 'dialectical structuralism', as a means of conceiving his engagement 
with pre-extant structures. The concept also carries the suggestion expressed in 
Lachenmann's concept of Strukturklang, whereby a sound can never be 
conceived as existing purely in and for itself. Whereas in 'Klangtypen der Neuen 
Musik' sounds were construed in terms of their purely immanent connections with 
other sounds, Lachenmann subsequently extends this notion to embrace the 
whole aesthetic apparatus of which the sound also forms a part. This notion of 
structure as a relational entity finds a correlate in the claims of structural 
linguistics. 
Structural linguistics views meaning as an external attribute of things, rather than 
as an intrinsic part of their very essence. 4 9 The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857-1913), who spawned the later movement of French 
structuralism, 5 0 saw words as arbitrary, 'unmotivated signs' - there being no 
inherent relation between a word and that which it denotes. He claimed that the 
meaning of words depends upon their relationship with other words - hence 
Saussure's notorious remark that '[l]n the linguistic system, there are only 
differences, without positive terms'. 5 1 Peter Barry has summarized Saussure's 
well-known distinction between langue and parole as follows: 
4 9 This latter conception of meaning as 'inner essence' is exemplified by the doctrine of organicism. See Part 
Three, Section 6 for a discussion of this doctrine. 
5 0 This later movement began in the 1950s and is embodied by the work of figures such as Claude Levi-
Strauss and Roland Barthes. 
5 1 Saussure cited in Derrida 1973: 98. 
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[Saussure] used the terms 'langue' and 'parole' to signify, respectively, language a s a system or 
structure on the one hand, and any given utterance in that language on the other. A particular 
remark in French (a sample of parole) only makes s e n s e to you if you are already in possession 
of the whole body of rules and conventions governing verbal behaviour which we call "French" 
(that is, the langue). The individual remark, then, is a discrete item which only makes s e n s e when 
seen in relation to a wider containing structure, in the c lassic structuralist manner. 5 2 
That Lachenmann conceived of musical structures in this way in the early 1960s 
is testified to by the following statement: 
Structure a s a dialectical object of perception, in a s much a s the musical meaning and aural 
experience of individual sounds or their elements were not determined just by themselves - i.e. 
by their own direct physical characteristics - but by their relation to their immediate and wider 
environment, their affinities, the various role they played in a context or hierarchy ... created by 
the composer and for which he assumed responsibility. 5 3 
By the time of Lachenmann's second major aesthetic manifesto, 'Bedingungen 
des Materials' (1978), these affinities and relationships are extended to those 
present in the material before the composer even begins his work. In 1978, 
Lachenmann attempts 'to register and group around the "pure" structure of a 
work those other aspects which experience tells us shape every single sound 
and compositional element in advance "before the composer ever gets near to 
U» >54 
Taxonomy of Expressive Qualities 
The Expressive Typology formulated by Lachenmann in 1978 to complement the 
sound typology deals with the relational aspects of sounds outside the purely 
immanent structure of the work. These constitute the 'aesthetic apparatus' 
5 2 Barry 1995:44. 
5 3 Lachenmann 1995: 97. 
54 Ibid.: 98. 
95 
embedded in the material of music, the experience of which, Lachenmann 
claims, contradicts the 'tabula rasa' approach of the 'structural mannerists'. 5 5 In a 
manner strongly reminiscent of Adorno, Lachenmann argues that musical 
material is always already imbued with its past uses and past associations, even 
if these are different from the functions it performs today: 'What is at any rate 
certain is that whatever sound material we use, we are at the same time 
establishing - consciously or unconsciously - the structures from which this 
sound or material comes'. 5 6 So, in the atonal work Wozzeck, by Alban Berg, 
Lachenmann writes that the C major triad 
. . . i s , in the context of Berg's work, an atonal construct, and yet at the s a m e time it contains its 
tonal origins a s a degraded, broken, ultimately rejected element. We do not just hear what this 
sound is now - i.e. its quality a s a musical interval within the framework it occurs in - but also 
what it was and is no longer. B e c a u s e of its lost, but well-remembered - here broken - tonal 
characteristics it can no longer be merely mechanically integrated into the atonal context. 5 7 
One is reminded here of Adorno's famous statement from Philosophy of New 
Music that in an atonal context, 'It is precisely the triads which ... are 
cacophonous and not the dissonances! As a substitute for dissonances, these 
triads might even be justified.' 5 8 
Lachenmann wrote 'Bedingungen des Materials' twelve years after publishing the 
article 'Klangtypen der Neuen Musik',. In this essay he ventures beyond an 
immanent conception of structure, formulating a new sound typology, this time of 
the 'expressive qualities' of musical material. This marks a turning point in 
Lachenmann's thinking about music towards a consideration of musical tradition, 
and of the need to confront it dialectically. 
55 Ibid.: 93. 
5 6 Lachenmann 1995: 99. 
57 Ibid.: 100. 
"Adomo 1973a: 34. 
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The first expressive category listed by Lachenmann in 'Bedingungen des 
Materials' is 'tonality' (der 'tonale' Aspekf).59 This encompasses the historical and 
ideological aspects of pitch, and also the dialectical mechanism of tension and 
release which enables the perception of distance or space in music. Tonal 
thinking, argues Lachenmann, is implicit in all manifestations of atonality, to 
which it is dialectically related. He insists that 'the concept goes beyond the inner 
requirements of tonality and becomes a synonym for tradition and the aesthetic 
apparatus which embodies it '. 6 0 
The second of Lachenmann's expressive categories is sensuality, or, as he puts 
it, the 'acoustic-physical experience' 6 1 (der 'sinnliche' Aspekf).62 Through this 
Lachenmann alludes to the first four timbral categories listed in 'Klangtypen der 
Neuen Musik' (Kadenzklang, Farbklang, Fluktuationsklang, and Texturklang), to 
'that area which was discussed earlier in connection with sound typology 
because it is here that the immanent compositional speculations of structural 
composing occur'. 6 3 
'Structure' (der 'strukturelle' Aspekt) forms the third expressive category. 6 4 In line 
with his dialectical ideal, Lachenmann defines this as 'not just as an experience 
of order, organization, but also as an experience of disorganization - an 
ambivalent product of construction and destruction (just as a piece of wooden 
furniture can be related to the tree which was destroyed in order to make it) . ' 6 5 
This paradoxical notion of structure, as both organization and disorganization, 
recalls Adorno's theory of modernist art. Art, Adorno argues, must bear witness 
to the disintegration of material whilst nevertheless containing it within a dynamic 
unity. In 'Form in der neuen Musik' (1966) Adorno writes, 
5 9 Lachenmann 1996: 35. 
6 0 Lachenmann 1995: 98. 
81 Ibid. 
8 2 Lachenmann 1996: 35. 
6 3 Lachenmann 1995: 98. 
6 4 Lachenmann 1996: 35. 
6 5 Lachenmann 1995: 98. 
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... the formal problem for composers today: is disintegration possible through integration? The 
position reached by compositional c o n s c i o u s n e s s is such that it is only through the critical 
dissolution [Aufldsung] of the meaning-giving aspects of the composition, of that context which 
al lows meaning any positive ex is tence, that the synthesiz ing, meaning-giving elements of 
composition hold their own. Integration and disintegration are entwined. 6 6 
The full implications of der 'strukturelle' Aspect will be explored in more detail in 
the ensuing analysis of Accanto. 
The fourth and final of Lachenmann's expressive categories he terms 'Aura' or 
the 'existential category' {der 'existentielle' Aspekt).67 This is defined as 'the realm 
of associat ion, memories, archetypal magical predeterminat ions ' . 6 8 
Lachenmann's attention to the aura of musical material represents a specific 
departure from the sound structure. 
I think, the decisive specification of compositional thinking can be extracted from the particular 
way of reducing the term of structure in favour of inclusion of the 'aura' , b e c a u s e through this 
procedure the social reality and the existential experience of the individual appear not only a s a 
component to hide from or reject but a s an essential component of musical information, however 
mirrored. 6 9 
Walter Benjamin's work on the concept of aura in 'The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction' is useful for an understanding of Lachenmann's fourth 
category. In this essay, Benjamin describes aura as 'presence in time and space, 
... unique existence at the place where it happens to be. ' 7 0 Thus 'uniqueness', 
and embeddedness in tradition are crucial aspects of the experience of aura in 
an artwork. Benjamin contrasts this with technically reproduced art, in which this 
6 6 Adorno cited in Paddison 1993: 158. 
6 7 Lachenmann 1996: 35. 
6 8 Lachenmann 1995: 98 
6 9 Lachenmann cited in Hockings 1995: 12-13 - Hockings' own translation (original in Lachenmann 1996: 
97). 
7 0 Benjamin 1992: 513. 
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sense of distance is greatly attenuated, enabling 'the original to meet the 
beholder halfway'. 7 1 
A further, related condition of aura is the autonomy of the artwork. As Adomo has 
written, 
Benjamin's concept of the 'aural' work of art corresponds by and large with that of the hermetic 
work. T h e aura present therein is the uninterrupted sympathy of the parts with the whole, which 
constitutes the hermetic work of art. ... The hermetic work of art belongs to the bourgeois, the 
mechanical work belongs to fascism, and the fragmentary work, in its state of complete negativity, 
belongs to Utopia. 7 2 
The concept of aura throws another perspective on Lachenmann's critique of 
later serialism. For Lachenmann there is an inevitable dialectic in musical works 
between the historicality of musical material, its auratic associations, and the 
paradoxical attempt to create a new, self-contained musical work. To adopt a 
term from Jurgen Habermas, integral serialism neglects the 'life-world' in favour 
of the rational structures which pervade society. 7 3 Yet it fails, argues 
Lachenmann, because musical material cannot be cleansed of its auratic 
associations. As we shall see, it is precisely these aspects of the auratic work 
that are challenged by Lachenmann in Accanto. 
71 Ibid. 
"Adorno 1973a: 125-126n. 
7 3 For a discussion of the concepts of structure and lifeworld see for example Habermas's essay 'Questions 
and Counterquestions' (Habermas: 1985). 
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4. Negating Mozart's Aura: Accanto 
Tonality and Auratic Quality 
Lachenmann has seldom specified his objectives more specifically. In the introduction to 
the clarinet concerto Accanto (1982), he lists the destruction of the melody, harmony and 
the beautiful tone. Beyond a provocative rejection, he consciously works against 'a 
pulsing meter as basis for every familiar tonal determination'. During the whole clarinet 
concerto, for example, Mozart's concerto runs silently on a tape. Only once does it break 
into the region of acoustic perception. Already on an exposed level, L a c h e n m a n n 
deconstructs Mozart's masterwork, the tonal language, the genre of a concerto, the 
expectations on a virtuoso soloist and the capacity of a clarinet.74 
Elke Hockings, 'Helmut Lachenmann's Concept of Rejection' (1995) 
Accanto (1975-1976) is a transitional work. It looks back to the technique of 
'defamiliarization' characteristic of the instrumental musique concrete series 
(Lachenmann refers to this piece as the final work of this period). Yet it also 
anticipates aspects of the later works such as Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied 
from 1979-1980, which refer to specific traditional works. Instrumental musique 
concrete, as we have seen, is an attempt to structure music through timbral 
affinities, forging immanent acoustic connections between sounding elements. It 
can also be argued, as we have seen, that there is however a dialectic in this 
earlier strand of Lachenmann's music between structure and isolated mimetic 
moments, and this is captured by the term 'sound structure'. 
Within the mimetic realm, I have argued, there are two levels: the sensuous 
aspects of sound which hark back to a dormant nature and the 'extra-musical' 
level of expectations connected with the instruments used, expectations which 
are defied by Lachenmann's idiosyncratic sound production techniques. Viewed 
7 4 Hockings 1995: 13. 
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in relation to the expressive taxonomy discussed above, instrumental musique 
concrete becomes the interaction of category two (der 'sinnliche' Aspekt) which 
deals with the physical aspect of sound, and category three (der strukturelle 
Aspekt or Strukturklang). 
Completed two years prior to 'Bedingungen des Materials', however, Accanto 
anticipates his essay's two other 'aspects'. In this work, the composer indicates 
in the score that a tape recording of Mozart's Clarinet Concerto should run 
silently throughout the duration of the piece: 'During the piece, a tape with the 
clarinet concerto of Mozart "secretly" unfolds, intervening periodically at 
determined rhythms', 7 5 Lachenmann writes (hence the title Accanto, meaning 
'beside' in Italian). The addition of a new rhetorical level to the instrumental 
musique concrete structure can be understood as an incorporation of categories 
one and four of Lachenmann's expressive taxonomy. 
The Mozart brings tonality into play (category one), an expressive quality which is 
set against and negated by Lachenmann's own 'composed' music. Prior to what 
Lachenmann refers to as the central 'window' of the piece, in which a sustained 
quotation of the Mozart concerto is sounded, this is only hinted at through the 
evocation of characteristic rhythmic configurations - conventional formulae such 
as the cadenza-like flurries in the clarinet at bar 52, heavily distorted 
(defamiliarized) by the forces of the 'liberated' sound world into which they have 
been violently inserted. After this central juncture, specific references to A major 
enter into the 'force-field' (Adorno), yet these are slowly broken down. 
The Mozart also brings with it an auratic quality (category four), a paradoxical 
sensation of 'veneration and anguished love' 7 6 for that which is brutally mutilated 
and effaced. AsToop writes, 'in works from the mid-seventies ... Lachenmann 
7 5 Lachenmann 1992: 7. 
76 Ibid. 
began to re-engage with specific instances of, in particular, the Austro-German 
classical legacy. The relationship is complex, and at times almost masochistic, 
since it rests in part on denying oneself what one innately loves, without seeking 
to deny the love itself.'77 As Lachenmann puts it, 
The dialectic of beauty, considered as a habit refused, is not new in my music. It is the concrete 
relationship, almost paradigmatic, with regard to a particular work, that is to say a particular 
genre, which is new. A destructive relationship with the thing one loves, in order to preserve its 
truth. ... The clarinet concerto of Mozart represents for me the incarnation of beauty, humanity, 
purity, but equally - and at the same time - the example of a means of flight before it has become 
a fetish: an 'art' apparen t l y in l ine wi th humanity, which has nevertheless really become a 
consumer good in a certain society. It has thus become, with all the reflections of compositional 
technique and derivations of resources referring to it the secret point of reference which my music 
outlines with veneration and anguished love.7 8 
Mozart's aura is present in Accanto only in the form of its negation, a signal that 
a once intact language is no longer a legitimate one. The 'unique distance' of the 
classical work is destroyed alongside the appearance of 'uninterrupted sympathy 
of the parts with the whole' (Adorno). By effectively consigning it to history, 
however, Lachenmann seeks paradoxically to recover the piece from its 
reification at the hands of society, and thus to keep it (and its aura) alive. 
The destructive, yet simultaneously creative, relationship to 'the object' is 
encapsulated by Benjamin's concept of allegory, which will be explored in more 
detail in Part Three, Section 6 of this thesis. 
In siphoning off the life and conventionally beautiful qualities from Mozart's 
Clarinet Concerto, Lachenmann highlights, or even mimetically re-enacts, its 
"Toop 1994: 14. 
7 8 Lachenmann 1992: 7. 
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abuse by society - 'the way society now treats historical works betrays their 
original essence.' 7 9 
7 9 Lachenmann 1996: 168. 
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Analysis of Accanto 
In his discussion of Accanto, Lachenmann writes that 'the speechless structure 
consciously recalls its origins as the result of ruined, decayed tonal language'. 8 0 
In addition to the recorded Mozart, which is subject to rhythmic fragmentation by 
its fading in and out, there are essentially two types of material. These are 
Lachenmann's own composed sounds, which he describes as 'pointillistic 
decaying elements', and, secondly, 'splintered fragments of the old language', 8 1 
which force their way into the disjointed, decaying texture. For Lachenmann 
these are archetypes of classical tonality. He writes 
In the course of the piece, these commonplace linguistic cl iches refer increasingly to a specific 
work, the clarinet concerto of Mozart to be precise, a s the paradigm for that historical art which 
e a c h of us so loves. A n d at the s a m e time it [the clarinet concerto] s e e m s so alien in its 'un-
willing' role for the person who , through art, wants to flee from himself and his own genuine 
uncertainties. 8 2 
The ensuing discussion will serve to highlight examples of Lachenmann's attitude 
of 'creative destruction' (to adopt Walter Benjamin's term) 8 3 in relation to the 
classical model and to the tonal apparatus in toto. 
Six of the following examples are based on Lachenmann's own essay on 
Accanto. Further examples, referring specifically to the suppressed presence of 
A major, are my own. 
Examples 1 and 2 are transformations of conventional tonal gestures into 
timbrally-conceived gestures, an instantiation of the technique of instrumental 
musique concrete. The effect of this transformation, claims Lachenmann, is to 
8 0 Lachenmann 1996: 169. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
"Benjamin 1977: 183-184. 
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freshly orientate our perception, to draw attention to the physical or sensational 
aspects of the traditional gestures. The gestures lose any previous functional 
signification and, decontextualized and defamiliarized, their materiality is 
foregrounded. The first example (Ex. 13) shows a series of scales in the solo 
clarinet at bars 60-63 of the piece. Despite their lack of precise rhythmic 
specification, avoidance of conventional tone (breathiness) and sheer speed in 
performance, the scales do nevertheless hark back if only distantly to the Mozart, 
exhibiting a diatonic character, even if there is as yet no specific reference to a 
tonal centre. Lachenmann's instructions in the score for this section read, 'on the 
boundary of tonelessness' {'an der Grenze zum Tonloseri). 
Ex. 13 8 4 (see overleaf) 
8 4 Lachenmann 1996:171 (Beispiel 2). 
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Ex. 13 
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Beispiel 2 
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Hockings goes so far as to suggest that 'Lachenmann's attack against tonality 
has been mainly an attack on the perception of musical motion.' Indeed, the 
continuity of these passages is markedly different from the fragmented, 
pointillistic texture in which they occur; hence they are brought into relief.85 Manv. 
of the performance techniques used by the solo clarinet in Accanto are 
anticipated by Lachenmann's solo clarinet work Dal niente (Interieur III) from 
1970. The following description of this earlier piece given by Pace demonstrates 
this: 
Dal niente u s e s a s a parameter a spectrum from pitched to unpitched notes running in tandem 
(though engaging in a dialectical relationship) with the pitch spectrum itself. T h e clarinettist 
graduates between different degrees of 'breathiness', from clear pitches to unpitched breaths. A 
melodic line performed without d iscernable pi tches still however p o s s e s s e s contoural 
characteristics, so it becomes a ghostly shadow of a musical line, or an oblique perspective 
thereof. Sometimes a continuous line of notes is presented, of which only fragments are Ditched. 
so as to produce a filtering effect. 8 6 
The second example (Ex. 14) shows a broken chord heard first in the clarinet at 
bar 36 and later, with pitches removed and only rhythm remaining, across the 
ensemble. 
See Ex. 14 8 7 (overleaf) 
Hockings 1995: 8. 
Pace 1998a: 12. 
Lachenmann 1996: 172 (Beispiel 3). 
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'In both cases', writes Lachenmann, 
.. . you can follow how the sound breaks out of its original 'fluent' linguistic categories of.melody 
and harmony, but also out of its original, conventional instrumental context. Sound here is no 
longer experienced a s a natural result of the normal instrumental playing, but rather, through the 
result of a particular approach to the instrument which makes explicit the concrete, physical 
quality of it - its hardness, softness, and above all the energetic conditions by which the sound is 
created. They produce a situation in which the usual 'beautiful' sound of the instruments is no 
longer what you a s s u m e will happen, but is actually the exception to the rule. 8 8 
Example 3 is more complex. 'Chopped up' fragments of the recorded Mozart 
introduce this section at bar 80 and then fall silent. The 'suppressed' Mozart is 
now reflected in the metric rhythmic behaviour of the instruments at the 
foreground level. In this section what the composer terms a 'formal block', is 
created (the section begins at bar 80 and starts breaking apart at bar 139). 
Ex. 15 8 9 (see overleaf) 
This block can be seen in terms of Farbklang, Lachenmann's second sound 
category. It is a perverse appropriation of a surface detail of the Mozart, an 
almost gleeful satirical reduction and vulgarization of the classical piece (perhaps 
a reflection of Lachenmann's perception of the way most people now hear 
Mozart). Lachenmann takes a standard accompanimental figure - a repeated 
note gesture - and parodies it. This figure is passed boorishly around the various 
instruments of the orchestra, stripped of context, pitch and conventionally 
'beautiful' qualities, brutally reduced to a crude, heavily accented thudding noise. 
8 8 'In beiden Fallen ubrigens kann man erleben, wie der Klang nicht nur aus seinenalten sprachfertigen 
Kategorien - Melodie, Harmonie etc. - herausgebrochen ist, sondern auch aus seinem ublichen gewohnten 
instrumentalen Kodex. Klangnamlich wird hier nicht mehr erfahren als selbstverstandliches Resultates 
ublichen Instrumentalspiels, sondern als Resultat eines spezifischen Umgangs mit diesem Instrument, der 
die konkrete Korperlichkeit, die Harte, die Weichheit, die energetischen Bedingungen beim Hervorbringen 
des Klangs oder Gerauschs bewuBt macht und in geordneten, musikalisch erlebbaren Zusammenhang 
bringt, so daR der gewohnte »schone« Klang hier keine Selbstverstandlichkeit, sondern im Gegenteil ein 
Sonderfall wird' (Lachenmann 1996: 65). 
8 9 Lachenmann 1996: 173 (Beispiel 4). 
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Ex. 15 
Beispiel 4 
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Lachenmann 'causes the life to flow out of it and it remains behind dead' 
(Benjamin). It can be seen that, through effecting this transformation, 
Lachenmann mirrors the reified, socially abused status of the classical work. 
Nevertheless, despite the destructive qualities of this passage, the 'formal block' 
can in fact be considered as a Utopian moment in the piece, a reaching of the 
present beyond itself. The forced integration and extreme limitation of 
possibilities occasioned in fact encourages the listener to hone in upon the inner 
richness of the sounds themselves. The irony of this section is that although the 
metric grid represses the music's rhythmic vitality, it has the contingent result of 
releasing materiality, of bringing into focus the wealth of timbral variety in the 
orchestra and opening up the mimetic realm. The music can be construed in 
Adornian terms, as a dialectic of liberation and repression, a creative 
confrontation of outer appearance (the martial, pulsing rhythm) and inner reality 
(timbral colour). As Lachenmann explains, The pulsating meter, the basis for that 
familiar tonal measure of time, is used here as the grid for sound articulation on 
the inside, and on the outside, at the same time, a quasi chopped up t ime. ' 9 0 A 
passage from Daniel W. Smith's essay on the French philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze's theory of sensation offers a revealing perspective: 
Modern art and modern philosophy converged on a similar problem: both renounced the domain 
of representation and instead took the conditions of representation a s their object. Paul Klee 's 
famous phrase echoes through Deleuze 's writings on the arts like a kind of motif: not to render 
the visible, but to render visible. Twentieth-century painting aimed not at the reproduction of 
visible forms but the presentation of the non-visible forces that act behind or beneath these forms. 
It attempted to extract from these intensive forces 'a block of sensations' , to produce a material 
capable of 'capturing' these forces in a sensat ion. 9 1 
9 0 'Das pulsierende Metrum, Grundlage fur jede gewohnte tonale Zeitbestimmung, wird zum Gitter einer 
Klang-Artikulation nach innen, und nach aufien zugleich quasi zerhackte Zeit' (ibid.:70). 
9 1 Smith 1996: 40. 
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Lachenmann's 'formal block' can indeed also be seen on a deeper level, as a, 
'block of sensations', bringing to speech the forces habitually silenced by the 
conventions of representation - the 'visible forms'. 
To summarize, there are two, conflicting ways to hear this passage: as a 
destructive act, which treads roughshod over the flow of time, dissecting each 
pulse from the next - as 'chopped up time', as Lachenmann puts it 9 2 - or as a 
liberation of the timbral realm, achieved through the focusing the listener's 
attention on minute differences between each attack. Through the latter effect, 
the structure 'reaches beyond itself in a Utopian gesture. 9 3 
The fourth example marks the first point in the piece at which the tape recording 
of the Mozart concerto forces its way unambiguously into the musical fabric and 
sounds for an extended period of time (beginning at bar 192). 
Ex. 169 4 (see overleaf) 
9 2 'quasi zerhackte Zeit' (Lachenmann 1996:175). 
9 3 This effect is an example of what Lachenmann calls 'structural hallucination', a phenomenon I examine in 
Part Three Section 5 and Part Five Section 3 below. 
M Lachenmann 1996: 174 (Beispiel 5). 
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This 'breakthrough' (Durchbruch) moment 9 5 is an unmediated confrontation, a 
clashing of two discrete worlds. Benjamin's description of 'shock effect', a 
dramatic rupturing of organic form, is pertinent here. Drawing a link between 
early film and Dadaism, Benjamin writes, 
From an alluring appearance or persuasive structure of sound the work of art of the Dadaists 
became an instrument of ballistics. It hit the spectator like a bullet, it happened to him, thus 
acquiring a tactile quality. It promoted a demand for the film, the distracting element of which is 
also primarily tactile, being based on changes of place and focus which periodically assai l the 
spectator. 9 6 
Lachenmann remarks that 'The tape, which has almost secretly accompanied the 
whole piece is here faded in over a passage of seconds. The music at this 
moment expresses its trauma'. 9 7 The effect is indeed shocking. 
The solo clarinet reacts with a 'honking' sonority, and the piano begins to 
hammer out the repeated rhythm of Example 3 in time with the recording. Again 
the Mozart acts as a restrictive force, apparently commanding that the sounds fall 
into line. By bar 197 the recording has been removed from the texture, leaving 
only a skeletal stuttering in the piano, a deathly echo of the Mozart concerto and 
the clearest signal yet that its language should not be taken at face value. 
Sprachfertigkeit becomes Sprachlosigkeit Throughout this passage, the pulsing 
meter, which began at bar 80, has been continually present. Lachenmann 
comments on this momentous section of the work: 
The music has repeatedly appeared much earlier quasi incognito in the structural unfolding, in the 
form of rhythmically 'minced up' fade-ins. Here the so-cal led ' instrument' 9 8 is so unaltered -
9 5 Adorno employs this term in his Mahler monograph - see for example his discussion of the First 
Symphony in Adorno 1992a, page 5 onwards. 
9 6 Benjamin 1992: 517. 
9 7 'Das Tonband, das wahrend des ganzen Stucks quasi heimlich mitlief, wird hier sekundenlang 
aufgeblendet. Die Musik gibt hier ihr Trauma zu erkennen' (ibid.:70). 
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distinctly deployed - that the 'sound', which is no more than simply the musical language of 
Mozart, draws attention to itself a s a separate music , a s a separate world. Th is is the 
disconcerting moment in which my music is confronted with that which it both loves and avoids - . 
avoids because it loves it and hates its ideological commercial abuse. And naturally, that spirit of 
societal harmony, as we seek to experience it in Mozart's works, is never so far away, so radically 
called into question, a s here, at the point where this music rings out." 
The fifth example shows a quotation of a Mozartian melody in the solo clarinet 
part at bars 206-208. Marked Sprechstimme, the passage is highly distorted, 
'defamiliarized' to the point where it loses its pitch identity. Lachenmann himself 
does not explicitly mention this, but the passage, in conjunction with an A major 
chord at bar 209, marks a splitting of the figurative and the harmonic. Bar 209 
presents the tonic key of the Mozart concerto independently of its figurative 
context. The splitting of the Mozart's 'fluent' language into two parts - rhythmic 
figuration and harmonic sonority - seems to be the means by which the 'shock' 
of the central Mozart quotation is absorbed and assimilated into Lachenmann's 
sound structure. 
Ex. 17 1 0 0 (see overleaf) 
9 8 Note that the Mozart tape itself is referred to as an 'instrument', as if it too undergoes the 
'defamiliarization' that actual instruments of the orchestra undergo when they are incorporated into 
instrumental musique concrete. 
9 9 'Dabei hat in Form von rhythmisch zerhackten Einblendungen die Musik schon fruher immer wieder, quasi 
incognito, am Strukturgeschehen teilgenommen. Hier allerdings wird diese sogenannte »lnstrument« so 
unverstellt und deutlich eingesetzt, dal3 der »Klang«, der nichts anderes ist als eben die musikalische 
Sprache Mozarts, so auf sich selbst als eigene Musik, als eigene Welt aufmerksam macht. E s ist der 
befremende Moment, wo meine Musik mit dem konfrontiert wird, was sie zugleich liebt und meidet, meidet, 
weil sie liebt und ihren ideologischen, kommerziellen MiBbrauch haBt. Und naturlich ist jener Geist der 
gesellschaftlichen Harmonie, wie wir ihn in Mozarts Werken erleben suchen, nirgends so weit weg, so 
radikal in Frage gestellt wie hier, wo diese Musik tatsachlich erklingt' (Lachenmann 1996: 70). 
100 Ibid:. 174(Beispiel 6). 
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Lachenmann, Accanto, bars 206-2G3 
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Before discussing a sixth example put forward by Lachenmann, I will propose 
some additional instances where an A major sonority is dissolved into the 
'emancipated' texture. 
The descending scale in the strings at bar 216 is one such instance (Ex. 18). 
This is heavily distorted by the winds, but the scale is clearly in A major. The 
scale is preceded by a cadenza-type passage in the clarinet (bar 214) which, 
heavily distorted, is a parody of a classical cadenza. 
At bar 222 there is a further allusion to A major (an A major dominant seventh), a 
sudden tutti eruption marked fff, heavily distorted once again (Ex. 19). At bar'248 
a motive is announced, one note at a time, a resonant C sharp-B-A-G sharp-F 
sharp - a decayed echo of the increasingly distant classical piece (Ex. 20). This is 
suggestive of an interrupted cadence in A major, or even a tonicization of the 
relative minor key. These are all sounding gestures which are in fact distorted 
reminiscences of the Mozart or its tonal centre. Lachenmann describes his sixth 
example (Ex. 21), drawn from the closing bars of the piece, in the following way: 
A rocking accompanimental figure similar to the accompaniment at the beginning of the slow 
movement of the Mozart concerto, is transformed into a kind of toneless breathing. At the very 
latest moment the music h a s found its way back to that s p e e c h l e s s , probing character that 
represents its own self-understanding of speech less expression. . . 1 0 1 
See Exs. 18,1 0 2 19,1 0 3 20 1 0 4 and 21 1 0 5 (see overleaf) 
1 0 1 'Aus einer schaukerlartigen Begleitfigur, ahnlich der Begleitung zu Beginn des langsamen Satzes des 
Mozartkonzerts, wird eine Art tonloses Atemn. Spatesens hier hat die Musik zu jenem sprachlosen 
Abstastcharakter zuruckgefunden, der ihrem eigenen Selbstverstandnis von sprachlosem Ausdruck 
entspricht..." (ibid.: 72). 
1 0 2 Page 53 of Lachenmann Accanto full score, bars 215-219. 
1 0 3 Page 54 of Lachenmann Accanto full score, bars 220-223. 
1 0 4 Page 61 of Lachenmann Accanto full score, bars 248-250. 
1 0 5 Lachenmann 1996: 175 (Beispiel6). 
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The 'toneless breathing' that Lachenmann describes is barely audible. Yet its 
sinister implications are transparent. Devoid of its original life force, its false 
fluency, the Mozart concerto is ultimately reduced to a comatose shadow of its 
former self. All that is left in its place is speechlessness. 
To summarize, Accanto can be understood as falling into two sections: a rise into 
focus of the Mozart culminating in the central 'window' at bar 192 followed by a 
gradual decay of the classical linguistic residues. In the first half, the Mozart is 
manifest primarily in the form of crude rhythmic figurations which have a dual 
function of rhythmic restriction and timbral liberation. In the second half, windows 
of A major are absorbed into Lachenmann's 'emancipated' sound world and 
thereby neutralized. It is as if the sustained presence of the Mozart recording 
from bar 192 onwards has now injected an A major sonority into the piece, which 
is gradually 'worked out' by the remaining music. The motive at bar 248 can be 
construed as a wilful reinterpretation of A major as a scale, an example of the 
manner in which tonal harmonies are rendered less transparent as the piece 
progresses. By Lachenmann's sixth example (bars 206-208), any suggestions of 
A major have been dissipated entirely: supplanted by a sound which is far 
removed from any suggestion of the concerto. All fragments of the Mozart have 
been eliminated. 
Mimesis as a Form of Self-Preservation 
Adorno's concept of mimesis has up to now been understood as the 'non-
conceptual affinity of a subjective creation with its objective and unposited 
other', 1 0 6 in other words, as that which escapes conceptualization. I have argued 
that the concept mimesis contributes to an understanding of Lachenmann's 
instrumental musique concrete as an attempt to foreground the sensuous 
particularity of sounds. This aspect of mimesis is present in the 'language-less' 
1 0 6 Adorno 1984: 80. 
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aspect of Accanto. Yet there is a further aspect of the concept which, I would 
argue, sheds light on the tendency of later works such as Accanto to engage 
directly with tradition. This is the suggestion in Adorno's philosophy of mimesis 
as a process of adaptation to the outside world through mimicry, a means of self-
preservation in the face of threatening external forces. Paddison proposes that 
... mimesis could be understood a s a form of copying, or identifying with, the outside world in 
order to protect oneself from a threatening environment, a s a m e a n s of survival. This is the 
continuation of primitive magic in art, 'an identification with the aggressor' whereby 'becoming one 
with the enemy immunizes you'. In following 'the logic of the object' through mimicking it, art, 
according to Adorno, at the s a m e time reflects it, criticizes it, and frees itself from it. 1 0 7 
For Adomo, it is specifically within the artwork that this process of self-
preservation occurs. As he puts it in Aesthetic Theory, 
Art works oppose domination by mimetically adapting to it. If they are to produce something that 
is different in kind from the world of repression, they must assimilate themselves to repressive 
behaviour. E v e n those works of art which take a polemical stance against the sfafus quo operate 
according to the principle they oppose. This principle deprives all being of its specific qualities. In 
sum, aesthetic rationality wants to make amends for the damage done by instrumental rationality 
outside art . 1 0 8 
Lachenmann's essays are scattered with references to the commodification of art 
and the damaging effect that it has on art's critical potential. Adorno shares this 
view; indeed one of the central dichotomies in his work on aesthetics is that of an 
uncritical, commodified art and an avant-garde art characterized by the active 
rejection of commodification. Lachenmann's assimilation of 'reified' works such 
as Mozart's Clarinet Concerto in Accanto can be understood as a form of mimetic 
identification with the aggressor as the 'culture industry', as Adorno calls it. 
Paddison 1997: 141. 
Adorno 1984: 403-404. 
124 
The Disintegration of Forms 
The critical re-engagement with music of the past can also be understood within 
the framework of Adorno's theory of the mediation of nature and history (See 
Part One, Section 4). Lachenmann's relentless demystification of the familiar 
and the unquestioned in works such as Accanto is largely a critique of the 
unreflective thinking which enables, in Lachenmann's view, their continued 
currency in the fragmented context of modern life. Music that has come to 
assume a 'natural', invariant character, is shown to be false, and revealed as 
'second nature'. '[T]he disintegration of forms' as Paddison writes, 'serves to 
reveal their historicity, and the breakdown of a "referential system" like tonality 
serves to reveal its apparently "natural" foundations as, in fact, historical - that is, 
as a "second nature" tied to particular cultural determinants.' 1 0 9 
In Adorno's theory of aesthetic modernism, the dialectic of nature and history 
assumes the shape of a 'rupture between self and forms'. It is in terms of this 
notion that Lachenmann's critique of musical tradition can be understood in its 
historical context. Through this notion, the 'rupture between self and forms', 
Adorno describes the fragmentation of formal referents in the modern era, their 
inadequacy in conforming to the expressive needs of the artist. As has been 
argued, the disintegration of a shared artistic language in modernity reflects a 
larger societal crisis; the breakdown of cohesiveness and continuity in social 
relations, and the subjective alienation that results. The fragmentation of artistic 
forms in modern art does however have a progressive function which could be 
understood in terms of enlightenment. It is the supposedly 'natural' foundations of 
classical works such as Mozart's Clarinet Concerto that Lachenmann seeks to 
call into question, in the process aiming to reveal the ideology which supports 
1 0 9 Paddison 1993: 31. 
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and nourishes it. 'Demythologization', the emancipation from myth, is one of the 
core objectives of the Enlightenment Project. 
The Traditional Dual Concept of Form Subverted 
In the essay 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis' (1969), Adomo explicates his 
conception of musical form. As a dual concept, it denotes both artworks 
constructed from 'above to below', and also from 'below to above'. 1 1 0 The first 
type refers specifically to genre and convention, and relates to the 'background' 
level of expectations in a musical work, the 'terms of reference which the 
composer and his recipients have in common before the composition starts: as 
the knowledge of a musical language and its forms' (to adopt the words of Hans 
Keller - whose approach to analysis, like Adorno's, has its roots in 
Schoenberg). 1 1 1 Paddison summarizes Adorno's dual concept of form as follows: 
The first kind of form can be understood in relation to the handed-down, pre-given genres and 
formal types, imposed on the material 'from above". T h e s e represent a level of universality (what 
Adorno calls schlechte Allgemeinheit) and are normative, the form being organized from totality to 
detail . 1 1 2 
In Adorno's words, the particular structure, or 'immanent form' of the individual 
work, asserts itself against background form, in a 'complex relation of deviation to 
schema'"3.'By structure', he writes, 'I do not mean ... the mere grouping of 
musical parts according to traditional formal schemata, however; I understand it 
rather as having to do with what is going on, musically, underneath these formal 
schemata.' 1 1 4 To cite Keller once again, 
mlbid.: 181. 
1 1 1 Keller 1994:124. 
1 , 2 Paddison 1993: 181. 
1 1 3 Adorno 2002: 162-180. 
" 4 Ibid.: 164. 
126 
The background of a composition is both the sum total of the expectations a composer raises in 
the course of a piece without fulfilling them, and the sum total of those unborn fulfillments. The 
foreground is, simply, what he does instead - what is actually the score. ... The foreground is that 
which suppresses the background. 1 1 5 
The background boils down to form, which many p ieces have in common, and which can be 
found in the textbooks; the foreground is the individual structure, which happens instead of the 
form, unless the music is a bore and fulfills all expectations. . . . 1 1 6 
It is this second type of form (which for clarity I shall call structure and likewise 
reserve the term form to denote conventional norms and schema) the 
implications of which Adorno claims modernism takes up and expands upon. 
Seen in these terms, Accanto parodies the traditional relation of form to structure. 
The formal arrangement of solo clarinet and orchestra, and the additional 
presence of the recorded Mozart would suggest that the structure of the new 
work is in some way related to or set against the formal genre of the concerto. 1 1 7 
However, the form of the Mozart is entirely dissipated by Lachenmann's 
treatment of the piece. What we have instead are a series of dislocated, 
fragmented cliches which seem to operate on a purely surface level. In addition 
to tonal references and formulae, Lachenmann includes references to the clarinet 
concerto genre. The solo passage in the clarinet which starts at bar 52, for 
example, is suggestive of a classical cadenza, yet here it is entirely isolated, its 
original formal context is absent. The same applies with the accompanimental 
figure at bar 80 onwards. There is no melody in the traditional sense 
counterpointed against this figure, only the 'liberated' timbres of the orchestra. 
The recording itself can be taken to symbolize the concerto genre as form. The 
subversion of the traditional form/ structure relationship reaches arguably its 
most dramatic point at bar 192. Here, the decontextualized immediacy of the 
1 , 5 Keller 1994:123. 
116 Ibid: 124-5 (my italics). 
1 1 7 Pace in fact suggests that 'the large-scale structure of the work bears a certain resemblance to a 
classical concerto, but turned inside out' (Pace 1998a: 17). 
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recorded Mozart is a startling emphasis of its alienated distance from 
Lachenmann's own music. Following this central window, there is a progressive 
distancing of the Mozart, its presence increasingly inaudible, until all that is left is 
a 'toneless breathing'. Keller writes that 'As the tension in a piece of music 
relaxes, the foreground moves nearer to the background, until it lands right in it at 
the end' . 1 1 8 In Accanto, the satisfaction of a final reconciliation is emphatically 
denied. 
The central tension in Accanto is between Lachenmann's instrumental musique 
concrete and the sounding presence of the Mozart. The Mozart tape could be 
seen as a kind of 'background' form unheard and running simultaneously with the 
'foreground' structure of Lachenmann's music. Lachenmann draws upon the 
Mozart as a quarry for sounding figurations, but does not make use of this formal 
archetype (except perhaps negatively). In this 'liberated' soundscape, pitch as a 
structural principle is actively deconstructed. The foregrounding of timbre means 
that, as distinguished from the traditional relation of form and structure, there can 
be no structural relation between the two realms, at least not in the traditional, 
tonal sense. 
It is helpful to consider the relation of the Mozart to Lachenmann's 'liberated' 
soundscape in terms of Beckett's 'stream of consciousness' prose. Paddison 
observes that Adorno 
... talks of Beckett transforming thought into a kind of 'second-order matter', arguing that he uses 
thoughts a s the fragmented materials of the interior monologue 'to which spirit [Ge/sr] itself has 
been reduced by the reified remains of culture [dinghafter Ruckstand von Bildung]'"9 
If, in Accanto, Mozart's Clarinet Concerto represents the 'reified remains of 
culture', its interjection into Lachenmann's own 'interior monologue', a possible 
118 Ibid. 
1 , 9 Paddison 1993: 276. 
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analogy with Beckett would be the rupturing of the Beckettian monologue by 
quotations from Shakespeare, the grammar of which is largely conventional, but 
which is also recognized as highly poetic. The expressive effect would be similar; 
the mimetic interjections of Shakespeare would be as incongruous as those of 
the highly familiar Mozart. It is by indulging in this tension of highly opposed 
worlds that, in an Adornian sense, Accanto 'both mediates society and liberates 
itself from it, in the sense of showing a different set of potential relations to those 
which dominate existing society'. 1 2 0 
120 Ibid. 
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Part Three: 1980 
Tanzsuite mit Deutschiandlied: 
Allegory and Textuality 
1. Structure as an Arpeggio of 
Hollowed-out Forms 
The Sources of Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied 
That which is unchanging in nature can look after itself. It is up to us to change it. But a 
nature which clings on to itself murkily and oppressively, and fears the light of an 
illuminating and warming consc iousness , is rightly to be distrusted. There will no longer 
be room for such a view of nature in the art of a real humanism. 1 
Adorno, 'Reaktion und Fortschritt' (1930) 
L a c h e n m a n n ' s struggle for credibility in a commercial ly-or iented music industry 
e x p r e s s e s itself a s avoidance of unequivocality ... His hinting at the common is so 
elusive that it demands intense deciphering. At its best, the aura is conjured up but not 
real. 2 Elke Hockings, 'Helmut Lachenmann's Concept of Rejection' (1995) 
Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied (Dance Suite with German National Anthem) was 
completed in 1980, four years after Accanto. Composed for orchestra and 
amplified string quartet, it too incorporates specific traditional tonal materials. 
Whereas the musical source in Accanto is a single classical work, however, in 
Tanzsuite Lachenmann draws on a range of well-known pre-extant pieces. Many 
of them are popular or folk in origin. These objets trouves are, in Lachenmann's 
words, 
...familiar things: ... dance -based gestures and musical formulae, but also Lieder and in two 
c a s e s fragments of B a c h ' s music - playfully assembled ... impressions which ... embody the 
collective security under whose shield bourgeois thinking and feeling, magically protected, 
flourish and foster one another. 3 
The traditional classical sources of Tanzsuite include the German national 
anthem itself - the melody of which was later to be the basis for the slow 
1 Adorno cited in Paddison 1993: 92. 
2 Hockings 1995: 13. 
3 Lachenmann cited in Toop 1994: 16. 
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movement of Haydn's 'Emperor' Quartet Opus 76 No. 3 - and the Pastoral 
Symphony from Bach's Christmas Oratorio. In addition, Lachenmann draws upon 
popular dance forms such as the polka, waltz, march, siciliano and tarantella 
(mediated through our knowledge of past classical music), the traditional folk 
song O du Weber Augustin and the popular German lullabies Schlaf, Kindlein, 
Schlaf and Ihr Kinderlein Kommet. 
Since it dares to engage directly with Germany's nationalistic past and the 
appalling memories of Nazism associated with it, Tanzsuite could be considered 
an even more provocative work than Accanto. Any evocation of the 
Deutschlandlied is, of course, highly controversial. As Toop remarks, it is 'about 
as untouchable as the Horst Wesselied.' Indeed, Toop points out, thirteen years 
prior to the conception of Tanzsuite Stockhausen 'attracted stringent criticism' for 
alluding to both pieces in HymnenS 
Despite the invoking of such anachronistic and 'untouchable' musical materials, 
Lachenmann's references to tradition are emphatically not to be taken at face 
value. His use of the sources is laden with irony: composing subject and handed-
down material exist in a state of irreconcilable tension. Pace has observed that 
Stockhausen had taken a rather naive view of this anthem a s , like any other, merely emblematic 
of a people, but Lachenmann w a s much more acutely aware of its connotations. Consequently 
his use of it is in no s e n s e affirmative: whilst it subtly informs parts of the work ... its only 
recognizable appearance is near the end, in a distorted grotesque form. 5 
Whilst, as I will argue, the Deutschlandlied is also recognizable in the opening 
bars of the Tanzsuite, Pace's point is extremely important. The banality and 
simplicity of the children's songs, for example, is perhaps intended to symbolize 
an innocence to which, it is implied, in the light of historical events humanity can 
4 Toop 1994: 16. 
5 Pace 1998b: 5. 
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never return. This is only heightened by their juxtaposition with the national 
anthem, itself heavy with the associations of a lost innocence as we shall see. 
Source Models as Metric Structures 
T h e time structure (das Zeitnetz) ... is regulated here by rhythmic shapes , which we can 
continue to recognize like the skeletal vestige of a well-loved and familiar experience. 6 
Lachenmann, 'Horen ist wehrlos - ohne H6ren' (1985) 
The overall form of Tanzsuite falls into five separate sections, each of which is 
subdivided still further. These sections provide a formal 'backdrop' to the work, 
onto which is suspended a montage of discrete musical elements. 
Ex. 22 (see overleaf) 
6 'Das Zeitnetz, von dem ich im vorigen Beispiel als Rhythmus (Struktur-Arpeggio) sprach, wird hier regutiert 
von rhythmischen Gebilden, die wir als Skelette wohlvertrauter heimatlicher Erfahrung wiedererkennen 
konnen' (Lachenmann 1996: 129). 
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Ex. 22 
Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied 
Table of Movements 
Section I 0. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Preamble 
Introduction 
Waltz 
March 
Transition 
bars 01-041 
bars 1-5 
bars 6-21 
bars 22-44 
bars 45-69 
Section II 5. 
6. 
7. 
Siciliano 
Capriccio 
Valse Lente 
bars 70-132 
bars 133-192 
bars 193-247 
Section 8. Transition 
9. Gigue 
10. Tarantella 
11. Transition 
bars 248-278 
bars 279-423 
bars 424-472 
bars 473-491 
Section IV 12. Aria I 
13. Polka 
14. Aria II 
bars 492-531 
bars 532-568 
bars 569-609 
Section V 15. Introduction 
16. Galop 
17. Coda (Aria III) 
bars 610-620 
bars 621-752 
bars 753-819 
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As has been suggested, the metric structures are frequently not as recognizable 
as Lachenmann implies above. Indeed, any listener hoping to readily identify the 
various movements as one would in a traditional dance suite - or indeed any of 
the sources - will encounter only confusion and ambiguity. A central irony of the 
piece is precisely the subversion of the expectations created by such a frank and 
unambiguous title. 
The source models are presented as 'hollowed-out' forms, empty shells, stripped 
of most of their original characteristics. In depriving his materials of their 
conventionally 'beautiful' qualities, Lachenmann makes it impossible for the 
listener to perceive these traditional elements in a conventional way. It is 
significant that the familiar songs in Tanzsuite are present in the music without 
their texts: 'false fluency' is rendered 'speechless' on the most blatant possible 
level. These songs occupy the work, but 'negatively', like so many restless spirits 
of thwarted hopes and illusions.7 They project not their original aura, but one 
which has been corroded. For the most part, only the metric structure is left 
intact, although even this may be augmented, or re-contextualized in such a way 
that this, too, is greatly attenuated. 
Lachenmann adopts the term Struktur-Arpeggio ('structural arpeggio' or 
'arpeggio-structure') to describe the structural formation of the sources across 
the work. 8 This can be understood along the lines of the terms 'family' and 
'polyphony of ordered juxtapositions' expounded in Part One. However 'structural 
arpeggio' is perhaps more appropriate for this piece due to the recurrence of 
some source materials. The German national anthem, for example, is present 
both at the beginning and towards the end of the piece (a notional tonic, perhaps 
- although, fittingly, the closing statement of the anthem is less perceptible than 
7 Lukdcs' comment about 'a charnel-house of long-dead inferiorities', as the 'world of convention' having 
forgotten its origins in humankind is, I would argue, a fitting description of both Accanto and Tanzsuite (see 
Paddison 1993: 33). 
8 Lachenmann 1996: 129. 
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that at the opening). It will be recalled that a 'polyphony of ordered juxtapositions' 
denotes for Lachenmann a conception of structure which is non-coercive; which 
brings together and registers affinities between disparate objects within a specific 
time frame in a manner which recalls the Adornian/ Benjaminian notion of 
constellation - a unity of diverse particulars.9 
Pitch is accorded a far less prominent structural role than rhythm in the 
Tanzsuite, although the tension engendered between the subcutaneous melodic 
aspects of the original sources and Lachenmann's instrumental musique 
concrete is at times essential for the expressive impact of the music. This 
rhythm-centredness is an instance of Lachenmann's own idiosyncratic 
transformation of pitch-centred, serialist principles. The metric structures in 
Tanzsuite are like serial rows in a work of Webern: they subtend and command 
the overall musical movement, and yet they do not have rhetoric potency as 
themes. 
The use of pre-extant musical sources is also part of Lachenmann's concern in 
general with the historical associative qualities of musical material, as evinced in 
the essay 'Bedingungen des Materials' (see Part 2). Lachenmann has argued 
that metric structures drawn from traditional music enable a richer listening 
experience than does the serial row, either at a conscious or unconscious level, 
precisely because of their rootedness in our cultural memory. Whether or not this 
9 In the essay 'On Structuralism', Lachenmann reflects on this idea of 'uniting' the incommensurable, 
recalling the work of Foucault: 'In the introduction to his book T h e Order of Things", the French philosopher 
Michel Foucault makes a well-known reference to a short story by Jorge Luis Borges in which the latter 
describes a fictitious "Chinese Encyclopedia" in which "the animals are classified as follows: a) animals 
which belong to the emperor, b) embalmed animals, c) tame animals, d) milk pigs, e) sirens, f) animals in 
fables, g) dogs without master, h) those belonging to this group, I) those that behave as though they were 
mad, k) those painted with a very fine camel-hair brush, I) and so on, m) those which have broken the water-
jug, n) those which look like flies from a distance". This abstruse non-scale of animals tells us little about the 
hierarchy of animal species but a lot about the imagination which produced such a classification. As a 
composer I constantly find myself in similar situations which challenge me to view the incommensurable as 
one unit, for reasons which can be found in the particular structure of my search, i.e. in my own structure. 
The form our search takes is part of ourselves - it cannot easily be regulated from the outside (why should I 
search for rules when I have already found their results?). The form of my search is an expression of my 
self (Lachenmann 1995:99). 
137 
is always the case is in fact questionable. Nevertheless, the expectation of 
recognition is certainly an important aspect of the piece - and the title certainly 
provides this. Lachenmann deliberately contextualises the piece within a web of 
cultural meaning and associations which are often absent, or at least not 
deliberately invoked, in integral serialist works. In the following statement, 
Lachenmann puts a rather more complex slant on the idea of the recognisability 
of the his source models: 
The question of whether it is recognizable is less important for me - who, a s I said before, doesn't 
want to s a y something but create something 1 0 - than the fact that a structure adopts and is 
controlled by a time and sound network from a song that is deeply rooted in us, a structure that 
contains in itself no less logic than any serial methodology. The result is a s complex a s any other 
pure structure: a landscape of impulses, in which one can lose oneself in hearing it, and yet one 
still s e n s e s how one is further carried along by its formal law. This formal law, with all the 
moments when it falls apart and when it is interrupted, is the form of the Deutschlandlied and so 
there is in us - even if it is unconscious - a feeling of re-encounter [Wiederbegegnung].11 
It is not the immediate recognition of the sources which is important, 
Lachenmann seems to suggest, but the fact that they are rooted within a 
particular cultural ideology. 
1 0 This statement implies that Lachenmann is concerned with the idea of perception as opposed to cognition. 
The implications of this will be explored in Parts Four and Five. 
1 1 'Die Frage, ob jeder hier auch das Deutschlandlied wiedererkennen kann, ist mir, der ich wie gesagt nicht 
etwas sagen, sondern etwas machen will, weniger wichtig als die Tatsache, daB hier eine Struktur ihr Zeit-
und Klangnetz von dem tief in uns verwurzelten Lied borgt und steuern laBt, eine Struktur, die nicht weniger 
Logik in sich birgt als jedes serielle Prinzip. Das Resultat ist so complex wie jede andere reine Struktur: eine 
Landschaft der Impulsen, in die man sich beim Horen verlieren kann, und in der man doch spurt, wie man 
vom Formgesetz weitergetragen wird: Dieses Formgesetz, mit alien Bruchen und Brechungen, ist dasjenige 
des Deutschlandlieds, und so gibt es - wie unbewulBt auch immer - in uns eine Wiederbegegnung' 
(Lachenmann 1996: 129). 
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2. The Folksongs As Textual Commentary 
Deutschlandlied: A Musical Preamble 
The abrasive opening bars of Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied in the amplified 
string quartet are a grotesquely distorted and heavily accented statement of the 
German national anthem. The quartet's amplification is an essential ingredient of 
its expressive force, given its placing within the expansive forces of a full 
orchestra. As Toop has pointed out, 'The amplified string quartet projects innately 
soft sounds into aggressive audibility.'1 2 
The opening section (bars 01-041) functions as a kind of 'pre-coda', symbolizing 
in condensed form the theme of decomposition which informs the entire piece. It 
is thus, in effect, comparable to a Schoenbergian 'Idea' - and yet, paradoxically, 
was inserted after Lachenmann had completed the main body of the work. This 
suggests a less rigorous approach to structural composition than, say, one would 
find in the integral serialist pieces of Boulez which involve a high degree of pre-
composition. 
(See Ex. 23, overleaf) 
, 2 T c o p 1994: 16. 
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Ex. 23 
Hans Zender gewidmet 
Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied 
Helmut Lach'enmann (1979/80) 
1 * 
3u\fc.c. I 
Partitur-Kbliothek 5114 © 1980 by Breitkopf & Hartel, Wiesbaden 
Printed in Germany 
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Lachenmann, Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied, bars 01-041 
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Lachenmann has written that 
. . .many of my p ieces do not begin with the first beat, but often already before. In scores like 
Accanto and Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied, for example , there is e a c h time a so-ca l led 
introduction (Vorspann) with bars 01 - OX, which were composed at the end of the work. A s soon 
a s I have formalised an opening, the thought that it is now fixed is unbearable to me ; It is a s if \ 
have decided to build a house at such and such a place and not to build another in the knowledge 
that I will never live anywhere else. I feel stifled. I am pleased to know that this is not necessari ly 
my "first word". It also happens that in the course of composing I leave large s p a c e s open and 
reserve myself the right to fill them in, or not. 1 3 
Lachenmann has described bars 01-041 of the Tanzsuite in terms of the 
construction of two virtual instruments, each a 'family' of specific performance 
actions. This is a clear example of what he meant by the pronouncement that 
'composing is building an instrument' (Komponieren heiBt: ein Instrument 
bauen).u In the initial bars, Lachenmann writes, the Deutschlandlied 'is realized 
in augmented projection onto the fingerboard of an imaginary stringed 
instrument' {eines imaginaren Saiteninstruments). This first instrument is 
comprised of three specific performance actions: pizzicato, the pressed drawing 
of the bow across the fingerboard {gepreBtes Streichen mit dem Bogen), and 
pizzicato double stopping behind the bridge. 
The pitches of the original song are present in the music, but they are obscured 
by the substitution of a four-note pizzicato chord for each single note of the 
Deutschlandlied. The contour of the Deutschlandlied melody is undeniably 
present here, yet the pitches and tone quality are stifled and as if straining to be 
1 3 'lm ubrigen beginnen viele meiner Stucke nicht mit dem ersten Takt, sondern schon vorher. In Partituren 
wie Accanto und Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied zum Beispiel gibt es jeweils einen sogenannten "Vorspann" 
mit den Takten 01-OX, der ganz am Schluft der Arbeit komponiert wurde. Sobald ich einen Anfang formuliert 
habe, ist mir der Gedanke oft unertraglich, daft dies nun festgelegt sei. E s ist, als ob ich mich entschieden 
hatte, ein Haus an dem Punkt und an keinem anderen zu bauen, im Wissen, daft ich niemals mehr irgendwo 
anders leben werde: Derlei beklemmt mich. Ich habe es gern zu wissen, daft dies nicht unbedingt mein 
"erstes Wort" sein muft. E s kommt auch vor, daft ich im Verlauf des Komponierens grofte FlSchen frei lasse 
und mir die Moglichkeit vorbehalte, sie auszufullen, Oder auch njchf (Lachenmann 1996: 209-210). 
1 4 Lachenmann cited in Nonnenmann 1997:106 (quotation first cited in Part One). 
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heard through the 'toneless' sonorities which violently suppress it. The melody 
has lost all sense of continuity, taking the form instead of a series of sharp, 
angular attacks engulfed by an edgy silence. With the melody is reduced to a 
mere shadow, or fossilized relic of its original identity, what we hear of the 
original Deutschlandlied is primarily its rhythmic structure. A striking example of 
Sprachlosigkeit, this soundworld is a far cry from the robust, triumphant 'false 
fluency' of the original anthem. Lachenmann's Deutschlandlied is characterized 
not by a showing of strength and nationalistic pride, but by alienation and 
suffering, the destruction of wholeness. This sense of suffering is rendered all the 
more poignant for the listener by the suppressed presence of the familiar tonal 
melody. 
Progressively, this first imaginary stringed instrument self-deconstructs and is 
reduced to a skeletal rapping sound. As Lachenmann has commented, 
While the first line [of the anthem] is spelt out on this imaginary instrument it is not only 
transposed twice just a s if the instrument had become out of tune while being played - in which it 
becomes impossible to play octaves - but the instrument itself which spoilt the melody, becomes 
reduced to a mere tapping sound on the fingerboard; so that the melody is recognizable, even if 
with the overlapping of the first line with its repetition, perception of the precise structure becomes 
so distracted that the quotation is not noticed. 1 5 
In a perverse, self-defeating gesture, the deconstruction of familiar sounds and 
pieces is turned inwards to obliterate Lachenmann's 'imaginary instrument' itself. 
This is Lachenmann at his most brutal, and it is at points such as these that the 
1 5 Wahrend so die erste Zeile auf diesem imaginaren Instrument buchstabiert wird, wird sie nicht nur 
zweimal transponiert, so als ob das Instrument wahrend des Spielens umgestimmt wurde - wobei Obrigens 
auch auf die Oktavlagen kein Verlaft ist -, sondem jenes "Instrument" selbst wird demontiert: Der zuvor 
dominierende Gerauschanteil, der die Melodie trubte, reduziert sich zu einem bloften Kiopfgerausch auf' 
dem Griffbrett; so, daft die Melodie erkennbar wird, es sei denn, daft durch die Uberlagerung der ersten 
Zeilemit ihrer Wiederholung die Wahrnehmung ins Punktuell-Strukturelle so sehr ebgelenkt wurde, daft sie 
auf das Zitat nicht achtet' (Lachenmann 1996:129). 
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criticism of musica negativa, leveled at Lachenmann by Hans Werner Henze, 
seems almost valid.1 6 
It is as if tempting fate that Lachenmann sets up a second virtual instrument at 
bar 010. This time the attacks are spread further apart, resulting in an overall 
decrease of momentum compared with that of the first instrument. In bar 012 this 
instrument itself withers away, and the texture becomes increasingly sparse. By 
the middle of the bar only the high pizzicato chords in the first violin remain. 
Although barely audible, Lachenmann refers in his commentary to a suppressed 
tonal movement in this passage: 'this [second] instrument also falls apart, and 
the end of the first half of the song on the dominant, opens out into a soundless 
movement of the bow ad infinitum', a gesture defying closure. 1 7 The ethereal 
'soundless movement', which begins at the end of bar 012, is created by the 
drawing of the bow across the tuning pegs of the instrument in the first and 
second violins. The effect is reminiscent of the heavy, 'toneless' breathing of a 
sleeping or comatose person (another image of Sprachlosigkeif). Time is as if 
suspended; the music 'treads water'. There is at this point a sense of immense 
suffering and despair, of the renunciation of all hope.1 8 
Ex. 24 
1 8 Hans Werner Henze is cited in Lachenmann 1996: 331. 
1 7 'Aber auch dieses zweite imaginare Instrument zerfallt, und der SchluB der ersten Liedhalfte, auf der 
Dominante, mundet in eine tonlose Streichbewegung ad infinitum (Lachenmann 1996:129). 
1 8 This is very different to the affirmative suspension of time in the Siciliano, which will be discussed in Part 
Three, Section 5. 
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At bar 016, however, the score is marked doppio tempo and, with an increase of 
activity the 'breathing' is transformed into a shuffling sound, erupting at bar 021 
into a new section, marked feroce. This passage gives vent to the second half of 
the anthem - once again expressing a sense of repressed tonal movement, yet 
here with greater force and a sense of heightened frustration. The music careers 
into a climax and pelts out, in brutal accents, the rhythm of a football chant. 
'[A]lmost like an explosion' Lachenmann writes, 'the second half of the 
Deutschlandlied ("from the Maas to the MemeT) is spat out in the familiar 
rhythmical manner of a football stadium ... only to slip into the Waltz.'19 In modern 
day life, in Germany as well as in Britain, nationalism at its most basic and 
elemental can be located at the scene of an international football match. Here,, 
Lachenmann reduces the fervour of nationalism to the often crude, aggressive 
behaviour of a crowd of supporters at such a match. Grotesque and deeply 
sardonic, this is undeniably one of the most intensely shocking moments of the 
piece. 2 0 
Overleaf is Lachenmann's own analytical reduction of bars 01-025: 
(See Ex. 25, overleaf) 
1 9 b i s das Ganze wieder ins Zittern gerat und fast explosionsartig den zweiten Teil ("von der Maas bis an 
die Memel") ais vertrauten Rhythmus aus FuBball-Schlachtfeldern ausspuckt (Abb. 6, S . 131), urn von dort 
an in den Waltzer hineinzuleiten' (Lachenmann 1996: 129). 
2 0 In bar 20 there is a direct correlation between the rhythm of the anthem and that of the chant, whereas in 
the remaining bars Lachenmann picks out the rhythm through overlaid accentuation. 
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O du lieber August in 
The popular folksong, O du lieber Augustin, will serve in the following discussion 
as an example of what I understand as the negative- or virtual-presence of 
Lachenmann's sources in Tanzsuite. This is not the only time Lachenmann will 
draw on this particular folksong: it also appears subsequently in his Mouvement 
(-vor der Erstarrung) (1983-4). Furthermore, just as the Deutschlandlied carries 
the association of classical music (specifically Haydn), O du lieber Augustin also 
recalls the Trio section from the second movement Schoenberg's Second String 
Quartet (1908), where it makes an appearance. Hence, the songs are not only 
linked with traditional German popular culture but also with the Viennese 
Classical String Quartet tradition, a fact which perhaps helps explain the 
presence of the solo string quartet in the Tanzsuite. 
O du lieber Augustin forms the metric backbone to entire sections of the piece, 
and yet the only real sign of its presence at any point is in the score, where it is 
annotated at the very bottom of the pages as accented beats coupled with 
phonemes from the lyrics. These accents are 'spat out' by the instruments of the 
orchestra, although the presence of other, apparently unrelated accents in the 
music prevents the rhythm of O du lieber Augustin from being clearly audible. 
Whilst the performers are aware of the presence of the folksong, its 
decontextualized metric form provides no real point of orientation for the listener. 
Each attack is subject to a different sounding effect: there is no uniformity of 
timbral identity which allows the listener to pick out the melody from the 
heterogeneous textures surrounding it. Furthermore, when the accent points do 
occur, they are not cleanly articulated. It is clear that the music 'breathes' 
according to this rhythm, yet the relationship is perhaps best expressed as a 
collapsing of the texture into these accented points. 
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The accents are like 'black holes', exerting a gravitational force. The melody is 
also subject to an extreme rhythmic augmentation, which lessens the possibility 
further of hearing the accents as a single melodic line. 
(See Ex. 26 overleaf) 
151 
Ex. 26 
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Lachenmann, Gigue from Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied, bars 342-356 
153 
Tarantella 
The Tarantella divides the two parts of O du lieber Augustin. Given its brash 
tone, it seems fitting that the folk song should fall absent here. With its 'sinister 
cavortings',1 the Tarantella exudes a manic energy reminiscent of David del 
Tredici's Final Alice, a surreal contrast to the stifled context of speechless 
suffering into which it has been inserted. Beginning at bar 424, this lengthy 
section is characterized by an obsessive 6/8 rhythm with strongly accented 
fortissimo off-beats that account for its menacing quality. From bar 435 onwards 
the atmosphere is further heightened through the addition of high, braying horns 
to the texture and, underlying these, sustained crescendo in the amplified string 
quartet. 
(See Ex. 27 overleaf) 
' Toop 1994: 17. 
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Lachenmann, Tarantella from Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied, bars 424-439 
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The Tarantella section climaxes in bar 459, and from bar 460 the sustained 
crescendo chords in the string quartet (previously 'underneath' the texture) are 
now foregrounded. The downbeats in the tutti orchestra have disappeared, 
leaving only sustained string chords and fragments of the tarantella rhythm. This 
texture forms the beginning of the Transition section. (The Transition starts at bar 
473. Note, however, that bar 468 is effectively the resumption of the texture of 
423, suggesting that the Tarantella was inserted at a relatively late stage in the 
composing of the piece). 
In bar 472, O du lieber Augustin resumes where it left off. This time, however, the 
folksong is foregrounded as a series of disjointed accents in a relatively sparse 
texture. The mood of this passage contrasts sharply with that of the Tarantella; 
its exhilaration now appears to have been wrong-headed. From this moment 
onwards, the music seems to fall apart, reflecting on a larger scale the 
deterioration of the 'imaginary instruments' in the opening bars of the piece. 
There is a similarity between this process and that in Accanto, where, after the 
eruption of the recording into the music beginning at bar 192, the piece also 
seems gradually to disintegrate. 
Bar 490 prepares the entry at 492 of Aria I for amplified string quartet. This is an 
aria for gepreBte solo string quartet sounds, an example of action notation 
showing the influence of early instrumental musique concrete works such as 
Pression. The grinding sounds form an uncomfortable parody of what one would 
expect from a so-called 'Aria'. This section could be understood as a final 
reflection of the refrain of O du lieber Augustin - 'Alles ist hin' (see below). 
(See Ex. 28 overleaf) 
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Lachenmann, Aria 1 from Tanzsulte mit Deutschlandlied, bars 489-500 
Textual Commentary 
'Alles ist hin' ('Everything's gone'), sings out the refrain of O du lieber Augustin. 
The presence of the folk song text is significant for an understanding of the whole 
piece. Previously, Schoenberg inflected the meaning of this refrain when 'alles ist 
hin' became an indirect reference to the composer's own estrangement with his 
wife. In the case of Lachenmann, the 'alles' of 'alles ist hin' could be understood 
as an ironic commentary on 'Deutschland, Deutschland, uber alles', the first line 
of the German anthem. 
The plight of the figure of Augustin in the context of the anthem becomes a comic 
emblem of a nation in tatters: 'Hut ist weg, Stock ist weg, Augustin liegt im Dreck' 
('His hat's gone missing, his stick has fallen away and Augustin is lying in the 
dirt': bars 472-494). One might well infer from this the expression of the situation 
in Germany immediately after World War II: the bitterness of defeat, the dashed 
hopes. The poignancy is acute: the listener has just been drawn into and carried 
along by the energy and frantic excitement of the Tarantella, just as so many 
were during the heady early years of the National Socialist regime in 1930s 
Germany. 
A further striking example of textual commentary can be found in the final section 
of the piece, where the Deutschlandlied'is subjected to a final 'death blow'. There 
is a complete restatement of the anthem in the Galop and Coda (Aria III) from 
bars 623-815, which begins in the piano, the articulation becoming increasingly 
percussive, culminating in the suspended cymbals. It begins with piano clusters 
and chords bars 623-654. It then reappears as a knocking sound bars 658-717 -
strikes from left hand on 5 different strips of skirting board [Rahmenleisten] that 
have been pressed onto the piano. Finally, it resounds on the tuning pegs of the 
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piano at bars 718-815, to the accompaniment of a lullaby, Schlaf Kindlein Schlaf, 
in bars 774-793. 
Richard Toop has suggested that the displacement of the Deutschlandlied by the 
lullaby Schlaf, Kindlein, Schlaf acts by way of a meta-comment upon 'the infantile 
character of most "nationalist" aspirations.' 2 I would suggest, too, that in this 
context the lullaby embodies an ironic condemnation of the 'sleepy' political 
consciousness in Germany after the World War, in which politicians consistently 
neglected to confront the real issues, turning a blind eye to the consequences of 
their own actions during the war. 
The Role of the Solo String Quartet in Tanzsuite 
The 'virtual' commentary upon the musical action by the unsung ('speechless') 
source texts is an important dimension of meaning in Tanzsuite, one not readily 
available to any listener not equipped with the score. As we have seen, the 
sources selected by Lachenmann for the Tanzsuite have a strong cultural 
resonance, to German culture in particular. We have already noted the close 
links of the Deutschlandlied and O du lieber Augustin to the world of 'classical' 
music. In the Siciliano, as we have seen, Lachenmann himself inserts a quotation 
from the Pastorale of Bach's Christmas Oratorio and, as Pace has pointed out, 
this rhythm also appears in the first movement of Beethoven's Seventh 
Symphony.3 This, then, is a discourse of intertextuality, of quotations within 
quotations. 
The theme of public versus private emerges as central to Lachenmann's 
Tanzsuite, and is one manifestation, I would argue, of the dichotomy of 
2 Toop 1994: 17. 
3 Pace 1998b: 4. 
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'speechlessness' (Sprachlosigkeif) and 'false fluency' {Sprachfertigkeit), central 
to Lachenmann's aesthetics. 
Traditionally a 'private' medium for chamber settings, the placement of a string 
quartet in the midst of the orchestral fabric is in itself highly unusual and, I would 
argue, effectively deconstructs the conventional public/ private dichotomy. The 
amplification of the quartet creates a new sound world: the most 'private' 
utterances raised into the 'public' domain. As Lachenmann has commented, the 
role of the quartet 
. . . is many-sided: obbligato and concertante, leading and accompanying in varying guises. A s a 
chamber music unit lodged within an orchestral l andscape , it constantly imposes its own 
dimensions on the orchestra, occasionally being outplayed, and nesting itself into the holes in the 
tutti fabric: its like a flea in a fleece, forcing one to listen from many perspectives. 4 
In addition to its amplification, the quartet also performs the very opening 
gestures of the piece, gestures that present its dramatic trajectory in condensed 
form. It is thus accorded a status which certainly competes with the 'public' forces 
of the full orchestra. Both O du Weber Augustin and the Deutschlandlied can be 
seen to embody 'private' conceptions, which later came to assume a public 
significance. 
As Lachenmann must be well aware, a composer in Germany can never be 
entirely innocent. Even if, unlike Wagner for example, the composer does not 
overtly support a political cause, his music still runs the risk of being 
compromised, adopted for public ends which lie beyond those of the original 
music. As Toop has observed, today the German national anthem seems 'a 
muted token of appalling historical memories (and also a sobering reminder of 
4 Lachenmann cited in Toop 1994:16-17. As Toop implies, the orchestra has also suffered a reversal of 
sorts: The treatment of the orchestra is scarcely less remarkable than that of the quartet: for much of the 
time, it operates as a vastly expanded percussion section, full of sudden stabs and muted shufflings' (Toop 
1994: 17). 
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what can become of even the most sophisticated and intelligent affirmative art).'5 
Related to this theme, and central to Adomo's Aesthetic Theory, there is the 
constant danger that music will be adopted for commercial ends, in a way which, 
Adorno considers, removes much of its critical power. The perceived dichotomy 
of 'authentic', self-reflective art and an uncritical commodity art features 
throughout Adorno's writings on music. Lachenmann's brazen rejection of 
tradition can be understood an affront to the 'culture industry' and the media. 
5 Ibid.: 16. 
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3. Working the Frame: A Parergonal Logic 
'Perceptive Ambiguity' 
Deconstruction must neither reframe nor dream of the pure and simple a b s e n c e of the 
frame. T h e s e two apparently contradictory gestures, systematically inseparable, are the 
very functions of what is being deconstructed here. 6 
Jacques Derrida, La Ve'rite' en peinture (1978) 
Kant's own difficulties with the problem of the frame delineating the aesthetic become, in 
Derrida's interpretation, exemplary of what he cal ls 'parergonal logic' - where the 
interiority of art and its exteriority are s e e n to be interconnected in fundamental, 
paradoxical, and undeniable w a y s . 7 David Carroll, Paraesthetica (1987) 
The varying degrees of perceptibility of the sources in Tanzsuite pose a number 
of interesting questions with regard to the status of the traditional materials in the 
piece. If the sources Lachenmann describes as all-important to the expressive 
effect cannot in fact be perceived by the listener, to what extent can they really 
be considered integral to the piece? How far is some prior knowledge of the 
location of the sources necessary for the experience to be meaningful? Where 
can one place the boundary between what is essential to the inner logic of the 
piece, and what is external or 'supplementary'?8 Indeed, how far are the songs 
actually present in, or part of, the piece? 
I would like to propose that the 'perceptive ambiguity'9 engendered through the 
'defamiliarizing' treatment of the sources reflects an engagement on 
Lachenmann's part with issues also taken up in the philosophical writing's of 
8 Derrida cited in Carroll 1987:131. This is reminiscent of Adorno's theory of identity and non-identity in 
Negative Dialectics. 
7 Carroll 1987: 143. 
8 To use a term from deconstructionist philosophy. Owens 1992: 54, see Section 6 below. 
"Hockings 1995: 13. 
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Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man. 1 0 By rendering fluid previously fixed or stable 
notions of inside and outside, work and frame, Lachenmann is engaging in a 
form of deconstructionist critique of musical convention which parallels Derrida's 
critical rewriting of philosophical tradition. 
According to deconstruction, notions of presence and authenticity are untenable, 
since they are cannot discount their apparent opposite. Indeed, conceptual 
oppositions are not opposite at all but reciprocally related, and mutually 
dependent. 'Logocentrism' is the term employed by deconstruction to describe 
any attempt to establish an order of meaning 'outside', or prior to, history and 
language. The 'doctrine of presence' is the name given to the logocentric belief 
that meaning or truth can be made present, in an unmediated form, to the 
thinking subject. The philosophy with which Derrida is interested is guilty of this 
delusion when it tries to define Utopian concepts such as 'nature', 'truth', 'justice', 
and 'happiness'. The assumption is that these fundamental notions possess a 
nucleus of meaning in their own right. Following on from Saussure's assertion 
that 'in the linguistic system there are only differences, without positive terms'" 
Derrida deduces that each element in the system 
. . . is constituted with reference to the trace in it of the other elements of the sequence or system. 
This linkage, this weaving, is the text, which is produced only through the transformation of 
another text. Nothing, either in the elements or in the system, is anywhere simply present or 
absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of t races . 1 2 
Paradoxically, according to Derrida, the 'origin' is non-originary. Any attempt to 
grasp meaning directly will be endlessly deferred. 
1 0 Elke Hockings has suggested that 'Lachenmann's reflective language initially took its impulse from the 
Weiss/ Benjamin/ Lukacs tradition, and later shifted to the language of post-structuralist philosophy' (ibid,: 
10). 
" Saussure cited in Derrida 1973: 98. 
" Derrida cited in Culler 1983: 99. 
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Just as Derrida problematizes the self-present nature of concepts, so does 
Lachenmann confound a number of common assumptions about the nature of 
music, and musical forms. The romantic notion of the fully integrated, 
autonomous artwork is one such assumption deconstructed by Lachenmann in 
the Tanzsuite. 
According to Derrida, and Adorno in Negative Dialectics, the concept can never 
be at one with its objects, but this does not mean that concepts should be 
renounced altogether. For Derrida, the notion of a fixed border is a sign of 
dogmatism. Thus the question of closure (i.e. what is inside the work, what is 
outside) becomes critical. Seen in musical terms, John Cage lets everything into 
the frame: 4'33" epitomizes this logic. Lachenmann, on the other hand, delimits 
the frame, as does Adorno. Ironically, the source materials with which he 
engages in the Tanzsuite end up more or less 'outside' the frame of the work: 
they are barely perceptible and often only so in the score. Even so, they exert an 
influence on the music, transforming and being transformed by it. Moreover, they 
are crucial for the integrity of the piece, for its 'authenticity' in the Adornian sense. 
The sources have an internal structural relation to the music and yet they are 
'outside' perception: at once negated and assimilated ('sublated', to adopt a term 
from Hegel). 
Ergon and Parergon 
In La Verite en peinture Derrida deconstructs the opposition of work and frame, 
according to which the limits of the aesthetic - what can and cannot be 
considered art - have been debated for centuries. As with his assault on 
logocentrism in figures such as Saussure and Rousseau in Of Grammatology, in 
La Verite Derrida demonstrates that on close inspection the opposition of work 
and frame evaporates: the terms are mutually constitutive. The section of 
Derrida's text with which I am concerned is that devoted to a re-evaluation of 
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Kant - specifically the Critique of Judgement, in which Kant deals with issues 
such as aesthetic judgement and the sublime. Contrary to much Kant criticism, 
Derrida seeks to show that Kant does not in fact delimit the frame of the 
aesthetic, but renders it problematic. As Carroll has pointed out, 'In placing a 
frame around the aesthetic, as Derrida claims all philosophies of art do, Kant, at 
the same time, reveals its problematical status.'1 3 Derrida's aim is to tease out the 
loopholes in Kant's exposition of the concept of the frame. 
Kant employs the terms ergon and parergon to depict work and frame 
respectively. Just as, for Derrida, presence and absence are intertwined, so, too, 
ergon and parergon resist being separated. The parergon, as Derrida argues, in 
fact makes up for a lack at the center of the ergon. 
What constitutes them a s parerga is not simply their exteriority or surplus nature, it is the internal 
structural relation that attaches them to the interior lack of the ergon. And this lack would be 
constitutive of the very unity of the ergon. Without this lack, the ergon would have no need to a 
parergon.14 
Derrida insists (with idiosyncratic word play) that the parergon is 'a combination 
[un mixte] of outside and inside: it is a combination that is not a mixture [un 
melange] or a half-measure but rather an outside that is drawn inside the inside 
in order to constitute it inside.'15 
The relevance of this idea for Lachenmann's Tanzsuite is clear. By rendering 
ambiguous the declared source materials, and by including the texts in the score 
rather than in the music itself, Lachenmann calls into question the distinction 
between essence and supplement, central to traditional theories of art. 
1 3 Carroll 1987: 136. 
u La V6rit&. 69 in Carroll 1987: 138. 
15 Ibid. 
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A similar idea to the above can be found in the work of Roland Barthes, in his 
famous essay, 'From Work to Text'. Setting the organicist ideal of biological 
growth against the concept of the 'network', Barthes asserts, 
... the metaphor of the Text separates from that of the work: the latter refers to the image of an 
organism which grows by vital expansion, by 'development' ... the metaphor of the Text is that of 
the network; if the Text extends itself, it is a s a result of a combinatory systematic . 1 6 
The Text, as opposed to the work, involves the dissemination of meaning, its 
extension into space, cutting across a number of works (as does the Tanzsuite). 
It is a 'stereographic plurality' with no real sense of closure or centre: 'The logic 
regulating the Text is not comprehensive (define "what the work means") but 
metonymic; the activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-over ,..' 1 7 The Text 
defies the fixing of the frame. 
Lachenmann's questioning of the work concept also mirrors Adorno's own 
dilemma regarding the double existence of the artwork. Adorno asserts that the 
work of art is both a hermetically sealed entity in its own right and a social 
document. This is why, for him, art takes on the character of cognition. 'Art is and 
is not being-for-itself writes Adorno in Aesthetic Theory.18 Adorno claims that 
'The unresolved antagonisms of reality appear in art in the guise of immanent 
problems of artistic form. This ... defines art's relation to society.'19 
, s Barthes 1977:161. 
17 Ibid: 158. 
1 8 Adorno 1984: 9. 
19 Ibid.: 8. Lachenmann's Ausklang (1984-5) could also be fruitfully interpreted in terms of the ambiguity of 
the frame. There is no clear dialogue between piano and orchestra: instead, material is transferred from one 
sounding 'body' to the other in such a way that any hierarchy between the two is dismantled. The idea of the 
orchestra as a resonating body for the piano further confuses the issue: paradoxically, the orchestra is as if 
inside the piano itself. 
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4. The Siciliano 
Rhythmic Nets 
The invocation of traditional dance suites by a composer of avant-garde music 
such as Lachenmann is at face value deeply anachronistic, even absurd - an 
apparently regressive gesture. As Toop has pointed out, 'A "dance suite" might 
have been expected from the newly emerging Young Conservatives in Germany, 
but scarcely from the erstwhile exponent of Verweigerungsmusik.20 
Yet, as with the German national anthem, Lachenmann's allusion to the suite 
genre is highly ironic - a provocative gesture in the direction of those comfortable 
structures of 'bourgeois thinking and feeling' that he sets out to derail. 
The dance forms in the first section of the Tanzsuite - the waltz and march - are 
barely distinguishable, although in performance the image of the conductor 
beating a waltz provides an important visual signal of the structural presence of 
that dance. 
In the extensive Siciliano part in the second section of the work, however, a 
dotted rhythm figure is brought to the forefront of the music, which marshals 
Lachenmann's defamiliarized sounds into a painfully familiar form. In this 
'liberated' landscape where nothing is certain, such a clearly identifiable rhythm 
appears trite and simplistic, its incongruity ridiculous, even comical. 
(See Ex. 29 overleaf) 
'Toop 1994: 16. 
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Lachenmann, Siciliano from Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied, bars 70-75 
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There is a distinction to be made in the Tanzsuite between the use of source 
melodies as 'metric structures', as in the Deutschlandlied ox O du lieber Augustin, 
and what I will here term 'rhythmic nets'. The metric structures cannot always be 
perceived. 'Rhythmic nets', on the other hand, are blatantly clear: they reign in 
the speechless sounds with heavy irony. The rhythmic net embodies a block of 
continuity in an otherwise highly discontinuous, pointillistic landscape. 
The 'rhythmic net1 section of the Siciliano is also characterized by the 
preponderance of specific action categories. In his analysis of this section 
Lachenmann alludes to the way in which 'families', or categories of sound 
production, intersect to determine the experiential logic of the music. His graphic 
reduction of the score from bar 70 onwards (see Ex. 30) is an attempt to 
demonstrate this interaction. The seven sound production categories in play at 
this point he defines as pizzicato, 'struck' [geschlagen] sounds, 'pressed' 
[geprefit ] sounds, flautando, 'rubbed' [gestrichen] sounds, 'blown' [geblasen] 
sounds and 'toneless' [tonlos] sounds. 
See Ex. 30 (overleaf) 
The sound production categories in themselves, Lachenmann argues, are 
however 'not sufficient to describe the underlying experience of the music. At 
least as important are the vertical combinations of these sound production 
categories with each other, above all the manner in which they are constituted 
together in more or less fluid rhythmic shapes', as a metric grid. Thus, running 
through all the different methods of sound production, 'there is for example a 
projection (a family) of tightly-determined* [geschlossenen] 'rhythms, like the 
dotted [punktierte] Siciliano rhythm'.21 
2 1 'So geht zum Beispiel quer durch all die verschiedenen Hervorbringungsweisen eine Projektion (eine 
"FamiNe") aus streng geschlossenen Rhythmen, etwa der punktierte Siciliano-Rhythmus, auf einem 
einzelnen Becken geschabt..." (Lachenmann 1996:134 - my italics). 
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The final result is a complex mesh of sound production categories 'forced' into 
the mould of the Siciliano rhythm. These 'tightly determined' rhythms are clearly 
identifiable; often periodic. Lachenmann contrasts these rhythms in his essay 
with what he calls more fluid rhythms - those with a less apparent rhythmic 
profile, 'whose single attacks are split between different instruments in a hocket-
type style'.1 In the experience of listening, each attack appears dislocated from 
the next. 
Master Muller's Poultry 
At bar 101, in the second paragraph of the Siciliano section, the theme from 
Bach's Pastoral Symphony is introduced, in etiolated form. Lachenmann, in his 
commentary, paints a grotesque image: 
... the whole work crystallizes into a kind of gestural shadow of the well-known aforementioned 
Pastorale: to cite Wilhelm Busch (which also applies to the National Anthem quotation in the 
Introduction): 'Here one can still perceive them, finely shredded up and in pieces, yet even so 
Master Muller's poultry consumes them.2 
Exs. 31 and 32 (overleaf) 
1 "Neben solchen "geschlossenen" Rhythmen haben wir es zum einen mit weniger geschlossenen zu tun: 
Rhythmen, deren einzelne Impulse auf verschiedene, sich hoquetusartig abldsende Instrumente verteilt sind 
..." (Lachenmann 1996: 134). 
2 'lm zweiten Stadium, ab Takt 101, kristallisiert sich das Ganze zum gestischen Schatten der bekannten 
schon erwahnten Hirtenmusik: Um mit Wilhelm Busch zu sprechen (was auch schon fur das 
Deutschlandlied-Zitat in der Einleitung gait): "Hier kann man sie noch erblicken, feingeschrotet und in 
Stucken, doch sogleich verzehret sie Meister Mullers Federvieh"' (Lachenmann 1996: 134). 
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Lachenmann, Siciliano from Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied, bars 95-110a 
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Lachenmann's score reduction of this section provides six bars of the original 
Pastorale, and sets out his own 'shredded up' musical 'language', itself derived 
from the Bach, below it. The rhythmic shape of the original Bach is clearly 
discernible in the reduction, divided in hocket-style across the categories of 
sound-production. Yet the original pitches are barely in evidence. The quotation 
from the cartoonist Busch in Lachenmann's commentary highlights the deeply 
ironic, socio-critical nature of his treatment of tradition. 
The use of the term 'poultry' would seem to be a scathing reference to an 
uncritical audience which routinely consumes the 'damaged fruits' of an abused 
and trivialized cultural tradition.3 Bach's music has, Lachenmann seems to be 
suggesting, been reduced, as the saying goes, to 'chicken feed', and the 
performed-out desecration of the Bach in Tanzsuite is a symbolic 're-enactment' 
of this. In deconstructing this music, Lachenmann, in Adornian fashion, is striving 
to uncover a social 'truth'. The bitter irony is that even now, in its disintegrated 
state, this insignificant (because historically anachronistic), pre-packaged music 
will find willing consumers.4 
Ex. 32 (overleaf) 
3 Tradition, so von jenen Verdrangungsbedilrfnissen einer anachronistisch verharrenden (kullurellen) 
Offentlichkeit in Beschlag genommen, hat damit ihren lebendigen Sinn verloren. Sie ist ein Tummelplatz 
geworden, vergleichbar einem umgesturtzten Baum, dessen Stamm, Aste, Wurzeln, FrOchte der Ausblutung 
freigegeben herumliegen' (Lachenmann 1996: 339). 
4 One is reminded here of Mahler's adoption of diverse stylistic elements in his symphonies in a way that at 
one time shocked contemporary audiences; and how frequently these works are now performed today. 
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5. Structure Hallucination and 
Derrida's concept of differance 
Structure Hallucination 
In his writing on the Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied, Lachenmann refers to a 
moment in the music which he terms, 'structure hallucination' {Struktur-
Halluzinationen).1 This entails the radical paring down of musical structure as a 
means of liberating content.2 We have already analyzed a striking example of this 
phenomenon in the section based on the repeated note figure in bars 80-139 of 
Accanto. 
In the discussion of the Siciliano in Section 4 of Part Three, we saw that 
Lachenmann's own 'composed' sounds are as if straitjacketed into the siciliano 
rhythm. This section I referred to as a 'rhythmic net'. What Lachenmann means 
by 'structure hallucination', however, can be understood as a more extreme 
example of the net, insofar as the music in this instance is 'reduced' not only 
rhythmically, but also texturally. The two stages - rhythmic nets and structure 
hallucination - often appear in succession. 3 
See Exs . 33 and 34 (overleaf) 
' See for example the article 'Struktur und Musikantik' (1979) in Lachenmann 1996:155-161. 
2 The concept of 'structure hallucination' could be likened to the paintings of Bridget Riley. (I am indebted to 
Max Paddison for pointing out this connection.) With the sustained contemplation of Riley's works, abstract, 
two-dimensional images appear to move and rise out of the paintings, taking on a three-dimensional 
appearance. It should be noted, however, that Riley's patterns do not deliberately invoke tradition in the 
manner of the siciliano rhythm from the Tanzsuite. 
3 This comes close to the music of Lachenmann's near-contemporary, Nicolaus A. Huber, 'in its restriction of 
particular parameters such as pitch, so that others, such as resonance, become more apparent' (Pace 
1998b: 5). 
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Ex. 34 
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Lachenmann, Siciliano from Tanzsu/fe m/f Deutschlandlied, analysis of bars 117-132 
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At bar 110 of the Siciliano, Lachenmann effects a distillation of the timbral variety 
down primarily to string sounds (although these are in fact joined in the 
background by a 'rubbed* marimba and a 'dampened minor second' figure in the 
piano). At bar 117 the dampened minor second figure in the piano emerges from 
the background of the music into the foreground, with a sinister echo of the 
Siciliano rhythm - its hollow reduction to a metric skeleton alone. Whilst dynamics 
and pedaling, and the overall duration of the rhythm are clearly composed into 
the score by Lachenmann, the precise effect of the pedaling in this highly 
exposed context cannot be strictly controlled. Lachenmann takes advantage of 
this margin of 'chance' by instructing that the piano should be amplified in order 
that these subtle differences may be magnified. (Different acoustic effects will, 
after all, be achieved depending upon the depth of pedaling, and slight variations 
of attack; unavoidable given that the performer is required to repeat the material 
over a relatively extended period.) This passage can be understood in terms of 
the concept of 'liberated perception'.4 
This dialectic of sameness and difference finds a visual analogue in the throbbing 
patches of colour in a Rothko canvas. Lachenmann's explicit aim is the 
'liberation' of perception through the rendering newly expressive of obsolete 
structures ('the leap to freedom by entering into the lion's den of one's own 
socialized, unliberated ego [Ich]'5, 'extending into the simultaneously known at 
the same time unknown'6). This is potentially a very exciting moment in the 
piece.7 As Lachenmann remarks in the essay 'Horen ist wehrlos - ohne Horen' 
(1985), 
4 See Parts Four and Five. 
5 'Jenes Paradox: der Sprung ins Freie durch Eindringen in die Hflhle des Lowen, des eigenen 
vergesellschafteten, unfreien lens' (Lachenmann 1996:134). 
6 'Ein SchlQssel zum Eidringen ins zugleich Bekannte und erneut Unbekannte' (Lachenmann 1996:135). 
7 The recording made by the Arditti Quartet with the German Symphony Orchestra of Berlin and conducted 
by Olaf Henzold is, however, disappointing in this respect. In the score Lachenmann insists that the piano 
should be amplified, yet on this recording the sound is distant, and much of the inner richness of the sounds 
is lost. 
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With this total narrowing down to the high piano sound a highly differentiated world of perception 
opens itself out afresh due to the different accentuations of the s a m e sound and through 
simultaneous muting and pedaling with different levels of resonance which one cannot simply 
'compose' , but one has to liberate the experience first by locking out, and muting away the things 
that overlay it.8 
The following example is Lachenmann's second analytical study of the same 
passage from the Siciliano, published eight years later9. It places a stronger 
emphasis on the basic Siciliano rhythm. 
See Ex. 35 (overleaf) 
8 'Mit dieser totalen Verengung auf den hohen Klavierklang otfnet sich erneut eine hochdifferenzierte 
Wahrnehmungswelt durch verschiedene Akzendtuierung immerdesselben Klangs und durch seine 
gleichzeitige Erstickung und Pedalisierung mit abgestuften Hallnuancen, die man nicht einfach 
"komponieren" kann, sondern deren Erfahrung man erst durch Aussperren, Wegdampfen des 
Daruberliegenden freilegen mu(3' (Lachenmann 1996: 134). 
9 Lachenmann 1996: 181-183 
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Salut fur Caudwell 
Lachenmann's Salut fur Caudwell (1977) for two guitars is described by the 
composer in his essay Struktur und Musikantik ('Structure and Musical 
Performance') from 1979 as another instance of the 'dialectic of the widening of 
listening by limiting the material.'10 Through the reduction of the material to its 
lowest common denominator, and the repetition of this material, Lachenmann 
aims, paradoxically, to move beyond it. He seeks to break out of conventional 
ways of listening to it and to open perception up to its physical - rather than 
structural or semantic - qualities. At a specified moment in the piece, the two 
guitarists are required to speak aloud an extract of text by Christopher Caudwell, 
the dedicatee of Salut. As with the aforementioned moment in the Siciliano, time 
appears to tread water and the music seems to point beyond itself. The individual 
phonemes are so dislocated that what one perceives are not words, but the 
sound of each phoneme. 
This text naturally demands an absolutely singular line of hearing and demotes everything else to 
accompaniment, no matter how complex it may be. In a kind of forward diversion I have held back 
all the structural complexity and given it an extremely straightforward rhythm which almost 
corresponds to a plain metronomic beat. It therefore acquires a simple reposeful (gerasterte) 
even tempo, in which the text almost of itself makes one aware of its phonetical structure and is 
drawn into the resulting musical character. The ostinato form of the even-tempoed gestures 
enables one to perceive for the first time the emotional life of the sound in relation to speech a s 
an essential part of expression. 1 1 
Ex. 36 1 2 (see overleaf) 
, 0 'der Dialektik von Hflrerweiterung durch Materialverengung' (Lachenmann 1996:134). 
1 1 Dieser Text erzwingt naturlich zunachst ein absolut einschichtiges H6ren und degradiert alles andere zur 
Begleitung, mag es auch noch so konplexitat verzichtet und es bei einem auRerst geraden Rhythmus 
belassen, der fast dem nackten Metrum entspricht. Dabei bildete sich eine einfach gerarsterte Zeitebene, in 
renden musikalischen Charakter einbezieht. Die Ostinatoform des gleichmaftigen Bewegungswesentliche 
Komponente des Ausdrucks wahrzunehmen (Lachenmann 1996:158). 
1 2 Lachenmann 1996: 160 
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The separating-out of the words of the Caudwell text into their phonetic elements 
and their assignment to mechanical (non-human) rhythm, anathema to the less 
rigid, more nuanced rhythm of natural speech disrupts the semantic 
recognizability of the words and we are left to ponder the sounds for themselves, 
in their literality, their materiality. It is a mesmerizing experience, the human 
voices strictly in keeping with the repeated rhythms to which we have been 
subjected in the guitars for some time previously, become themselves 
instrument-like, defamiliarized. The paradox of structure-hallucination is that 
structure is thereby rendered newly expressive. 
Deferral of Identity 
Just a s the moving arrow in Zeno's paradox is never fully present but a lways 'marked 
with the traces of past and future', so the concept is always inscribed within chains and 
systems of other concepts. P resence , to be presence, must paradoxically combine with 
difference, its apparent opposite. Derrida writes that ' [p resence is a determination and 
effect within a system which is no longer that of presence but that of difference . . , ' 1 3 
Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (1973) 
The neologism 'differance' fuses two apparently incompossible meanings: 
'differing [le differer] as discernibility, distinction, diastem, spacing; and deferring 
[le differer] as detour, delay, relay, reserve, temporalizing'.14 Derrida's 'silent 
deformation'15 of the term - the addition of the anomalous 'a' - encapsulates the 
contention that writing is not understandable as the mere representation of 
speech, and its dual meaning symbolizes the impossibility of grasping meaning 
directly. 
One outcome of the notion of differance is the end of authorship, as is argued for 
in Barthes' famous essay The Death of the Author' ('La mort de I'auteur', 1968). 
1 3 Derrida 1973: 147. 
14 lbid.A49. 
1 5 Culler: 1983:97 
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Barthes argues that the 'slippage' of meaning intrinsic to every linguistic sign 
works to counter what the author intends to express. The author loses his 
perceived ability to determine what a word signifies, to convey meaning directly. 
In an essay which brings together the music of Morton Feldman and Derrida's 
philosophical concept of differance, Herman Sabbe has written: 
Fe ldman 's mus ic , in deconstructionist terms, is composed of no recurring, no irreversible 
significations; it is composed of 'modulations', differences which are not oppositions but shiftings, 
on-going d isplacements , de-center ings, un-fixings: a chain of differences, not a system of 
(reciprocally related) oppositions of fixed, constituted, essentialized meanings. 1 6 
Such a description offers a revealing perspective on Lachenmann's 'structure 
hallucination', and accurately describes the way in which stable identities are 
undercut from within. Of course, with the paring down of the musical material to a 
bare minimum and the restriction of means, such displacement is rendered all 
the more palpable. 
Structure hallucination re-enacts the slippage between sign and referent which 
Derrida (after Saussure) proclaims. For Derrida, meaning is endlessly deferred 
and disseminated. It signifies in musical terms the renunciation of the total control 
of the composer, an opening up to the non-identical. I consider the following 
words on Feldman to be equally applicable to the music of Lachenmann: 
Just a s Derrida questions the one-to-one relationship between the (verbal) notational sign and the 
definite mental context it would "express" or "represent". . . Feldman's music, to my mind, refuses 
the ultimate identification of idealized (sound) objects. 1 7 
1 6 Sabbe 1996: 11. 
"Ibid:. 12. 
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Paradoxically ... Fe ldman, by demonstrating the contingent materiality of notation, denies the 
score any transcendental autonomy, any pretension of identifying definite mental objects,- thus 
opposing the very idea of expressionist or representational aesthetics . . . 1 8 
6. Deconstructing the Organicist Ideal 
The Tanzsuite as Palimpsest 
In allegorical structure ... one text is read through another, however fragmentary, 
intermittent, or chaotic their relationship may be; the paradigm for the allegorical work is 
thus the pal impsest. 1 9 
Craig Owens, Beyond Recognition (1992) 
If the object becomes allegorical under the gaze of melancholy, if melancholy c a u s e s life 
to flow out of it and it remains behind dead, but eternally secure , then it is exposed to the 
allegorist, it is unconditionally in his power. That is to say it is now quite incapable of 
emanating any meaning or significance of its own; such significance a s it has , it acquires 
from the allegorist. He places it within it, and stands behind it; not in a psychological but 
in an ontological s e n s e . 2 0 
Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1963, English tr. 1977) 
Benjamin's description of the allegorist is a suggestive account of Lachenmann's 
treatment of his sources in the Tanzsuite. His handling of them does indeed 
extract their life-force, their 'false fluency', leaving them petrified and 
'speechless', a 'muted token' of the collapse of past ideals. 
Lachenmann, however, departs from Benjamin's description insofar as his 
sources are not rendered 'incapable of emanating any meaning or significance of 
[their] own'. As Craig Owens has suggested, 
Ibid.: 12-13. 
Owens 1992: 54. 
Benjamin 1977: 183-184. 
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[The Allegorist] does not restore an original meaning that may have been lost or obscured: 
allegory is not hermeneutics. Rather he adds another meaning to the image. If he adds, he does 
so only to replace: the allegorical meaning supplants an antecedent one; it is a supplement. That 
is why allegory is condemned, but it is also the source of its theoretical significance.21 
The sources of Tanzsuite are, in fact, loaded with cultural - even political 
associations and, as part of his engagement with the historicality of musical 
material, Lachenmann relies upon these associations for the expressive effect of 
his work. This is no sterile game of 'musical masks', to invoke Adorno's critique 
of Stravinsky in Philosophy of New Music. Notwithstanding this, none of the 
sources in Tanzsuite are presented as brazenly as is the clarinet concerto in 
Accanto: they appear only as strange remnants, pulverized remains. Although for 
most of Accanto the tape 'inserts' are so chopped up by the notated rhythms that 
they become unrecognizable, the central Mozart 'window' shows the classical 
concerto closer to its original state than any of the sources in the Tanzsuite. 
Peter Burger provides a useful summary of Benjamin's understanding of allegory. 
The allegorical artist, says Burger, undertakes a double manoeuvre: first, he 
decontextualizes his object, dismantling any semblance of totality: 'The allegorist 
pulls one element out of the totality of the life context, isolating it, depriving it of 
its function. Allegory is therefore essentially fragment and thus the opposite of 
the organic symbol', observes Burger.2 2 The allegorist then recontextualizes, 
'join[ing] the isolated reality fragments and thereby creating] meaning.'2 3 He 
imparts to his fragments a new, intensified meaning, outside of their original 
context. The use of the words 'reality fragments' here is significant: rather than 
seeking to mask its artificiality and exhibit itself as a 'natural' object, allegory 
flaunts its constructedness, rupturing any sense of unity and totality. 
2 1 Owens 1992: 54 - my italics. 
^Burger 1984: 69. 
23 Ibid. 
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For Burger, allegory is the is the distinguishing impulse of avant-garde art: 'In the 
case of the avant-gardiste work, it is possible only to a limited extent to speak of 
the work as the perfect embodiment of the totality of possible meaning.'24 
Since allegory is understood here as essentially a reaction against organicist 
aesthetics, it will be useful at this stage to briefly explore some of the 
characteristic features of the organicist doctrine. This body of ideas, prevalent in 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, adopted biology as an intellectual 
paradigm. Lachenmann's rejection of the conventionally beautiful can be 
understood in part as a reaction against the idea of the artwork as 'natural' 
object. 
Organicism: The Living Work' 
In modern aesthetics, allegory is regularly subordinated to the symbol, which represents 
the supposedly indissoluble unity of form and substance which characterizes the work of 
art as pure presence. Although this definition of the art work as informed matter is, we 
know, as old as aesthetics itself, it was revived with a sense of renewed urgency by 
romantic art theory, which provided the basis for the philosophical condemnation of 
allegory. According to Coleridge, 'The Symbolical cannot, perhaps, be better defined in 
distinction from the Allegorical, than that it is always itself a part of that, of the whole of 
which it is the representative.25 Craig Owens, Beyond Recognition (1992) 
The fact that we divide a work of art into parts, a poem into scenes, episodes, similes, 
sentences, or a picture into single figures and objects, background, foreground, etc. ... 
annihilates the work, as dividing the organism into heart, brain, nerves, muscles and so 
on turns the living being into a corpse. 2 6 
Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (1929) 
2< Ibid: 72-73. 
2 5 Owens 1992: 62. 
2 6 Croce cited in Solie 1980: 150 
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To interpret a text allegorically is to read it as an artificial construct whose meaning 
unfolds in a temporal dimension, where signs point back to no ultimate source in the 
nature of 'organic' or phenomenal perception.27 
Christopher Norris, Utopian Deconstruction (1989) 
... in allegory, the observer is confronted with the "fades hippocratica" (the deathmask) of 
history as a petrified primordial landscape.2 8 
Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1963) 
In the organic work of art, form is understood to be present from the outset of the 
work, a potential within the thematic material. At any one juncture, part and whole 
are conceived as one: there is a strong sense of the interrelation between all 
things. As Stephen Pepper has written, 
There are two qualitative dimensions that yield organistic standards of beauty - the degree of 
integration and the amount of the material integrated. ... The maximum of integration is a 
condition where every detail of the object calls for every other. ... Or negatively, it is a condition 
where no detail can be removed or altered without marring or even destroying the value of the 
whole. Such a whole is called an organic unity.29 
The tradition of idealist philosophy, from Leibniz in the seventeenth century, 
through Hegel and beyond, is closely related to the organicist ideal. For Hegel, 
as Ruth Solie observes, 'Beauty is ... defined ... as the union of idea and 
objective reality; that is, the success of this unification is the measure of the 
degree of beauty.'30 The concept, or the theme in music, for example, possess an 
intrinsic meaning or 'inner essence': the very opposite of Saussure's image of a 
differential system. For de Man, 'in the world of the symbol, life and form are 
identical... its structure is that of the synecdoche, for the symbol is always a part 
2 7 Norris 1989: 318. 
2 8 Benjamin 1977: 166. 
2 9 Spengler cited in Solie 1980:148. 
3 0 Solie 1980: 149. 
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of the totality that it represents.'31 Connected with this is the idea of hierarchy: the 
part is always subordinated to the whole. 
According to Heinrich Schenker's analyses, tonal works are unified by a vital 
force - the Chord of Nature - which preordains the unfolding of the work, as 
does the seed of a plant or tree. Tanzsuite seems to invoke the Chord of Nature 
as an idea, only to subvert it. The Preamble, arguably the only moment in the 
piece when the Deutschlandlied is audibly present (at least once the listener is 
forewarned of its presence), suggests an organic conception. However, the way 
in which the piece subsequently proliferates (rather than unfolding teleologically) 
is more suggestive, I would argue, of a rhizomatic metaphor of growth (as 
elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus) than an organicistic 
one with a direct correspondence between 'idea' and work.32 The promise of a 
suite with characteristic movement 'types' is not honoured. Only rarely - e.g. in 
the Siciliano, Gigue, and Tarantella - is a dance figure made the basis of a whole 
movement as in, say, a J .S . Bach suite. 
The link between this conception and Hegel's model of history as teleology is 
readily apparent. Allegory documents the breakdown of this worldview, as its 
adoption by recent 'postmodernist' art critics such as Craig Owens makes clear. 
Lachenmann's fragmentation of traditional tonal music can be understood in this 
light. 
Temporality and Spatiality 
In the work of Schenker, what becomes important is the abstract idea of unity, 
and the artwork as object of cognition. As Solie has pointed out, Schenker 
3 1 De Man 1983: 191. 
3 2 The rhizome is an a-centred, non-hierarchical, a-teleological metaphor of growth. For a description of the 
'rhizomatic' as compared with the 'arborescent' model of thought, see Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
'Introduction: Rhizome', pp. 3-25. 
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confounds the temporal with the spatial, applying a spatial metaphor - that of 
structure - to tonal works. 'Schenker predicates his notion of totality not upon 
perceptual mechanisms in the observer, but upon the work of art itself.'33 In 
mature Schenker, Solie observes, 'the growth direction does not mirror the 
perceptual progress of the piece, but rather its conceptual progress from 
background to foreground.'34 
Paul de Man also argues that the assumptions of organicism depend upon a 
repression of the temporal aspect of knowledge, a denial of the fact that 
knowledge can never achieve such a 'moment of ecstatic visionary inwardness 
with nature.'35 For de Man (after Saussure), allegory subtends the structure of all 
language.36 As Norris puts it 
... allegory is the one authentic mode of reading in so far as it acknowledges the inevitable failure 
of all attempts to make meaning coincide with the realm of intuition or phenomenal self-evidence. 
To read allegorically is always to recognize that understanding is a temporal process, one that 
takes place not on the instant of punctual, self-present perception but through a constant 
anticipatory awareness of what is lacking in the present. 3 7 
Norris adds that 'renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, [allegorical 
art] establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference.'38 Tanzsuite 
mit Deutschlandlied can, I would argue, be understood in this way. The form of 
the suite itself already implies a series of different pieces rather than a unified, 
'organic' object. Further, the placement of text 'outside' the work, and the 
defamiliarization of the sources means that they are never fully present. The 
3 3 Solie 1980: 151. 
34 Ibid: 153. 
3 5 Norris 1989: 318. 
3 6 In 'From Work to Text', Barthes, too, elaborates this idea of the dispersion of meaning. He asserts that the 
literary work is no longer to be thought of as a closed, centred object but instead as a process, an 'activity of 
production'. Barthes thus posits a notion of structure that departs radically from the symbolist conception. Its 
metaphor is no longer that of the organism, but of the de-centred, open-ended network. For Barthes, the 
work no longer consists of motivated signs but of the free-play of signifying elements (see Barthes 1977: 
155-164). This idea of the work as network provides a fitting description of Lachenmann's 'rhythmic nets'. 
37 Ibid.: 327. 
38 Ibid. 
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technique of instrumental musique concrete, represents the forging of a distance 
with the source, the 'origin'. Lachenmann corrupts the authenticity of his sources, 
refusing the transparency of meaning. 
Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied embodies not an organic, self-present entity but a 
chain of deferral, the constant abjuration of meaning. 
Lachenmann renounces full subjective autonomy through the action-based 
technique of instrumental musique concrete. Perception, as opposed to structural 
hearing, is also highly important to the composer, as is evinced by the centrality 
of the concept of 'liberated perception' to his writings. He does nevertheless also 
subscribe to a certain extent to Adorno's (Schoenbergian) idea of music as 
conceptless cognition (Erkenntnis), as is clear in his view of the demystifying 
function of music. 
The Tanzsuite suggests an ambivalent attitude to structure. The Preamble, with 
its presentation of the Deutschlandlied, seems to hint at the possibility of an 
organic conception of the work. Yet Lachenmann undercuts this illusion. The 
confusion of inside and outside realms brings into question the notion of 
autonomy, and the use of diverse sources means that there is no single 'idea' as 
in organicism, but, rather, a 'polyphony' of 'ideas'. 
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Part Four: Philosophical Perspectives 1 
"Liberated Perception" in the work of Barthes, 
Lyotard and Deleuze / Guattari 
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1 • Horerl Zuhdrer 
Perception and Cognition 
There are issues raised in Lachenmann's writings which suggest some sort of 
ambivalence on the part of the composer with regard to the key philosophical 
notion of subjectivity, the survival of which is so crucial to the thought of Adorno 
and the Frankfurt School. This discrepancy is notable given the many 
correspondences explored in Parts One and Two between Lachenmann's 
aesthetic position and the thought of Adomo. 
There is a contrasting school of thought, epitomized by the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Jean-Francois Lyotard from the 1970s, which, in my view, is called 
to mind by this apparent divergence from the Adornian standpoint. Deleuze and 
Lyotard react in a very different fashion to Adorno to the problem of the threat to 
the subject under late capitalism. In works such as Libidinal Economy (1974),1 
and Anti Oedipus (1972),2 there is to be found a wilful abandoning of the subject, 
even a tone of celebration as to its loss. History, too, ceases to exist as a force to 
be reckoned with for these philosophers. Direct sense experience becomes 
instead the only viable form of engagement with the world. 
Lachenmann's notion of 'liberated perception', and his concept of Horen are 
highly evocative of Deleuze and Guattari's notions of schizophrenic experience 
and Lyotard's concept of intensity. In his essay, 'Accanto', Lachenmann 
elaborates these ideas in relation to his clarinet concerto. Horen can be 
understood as a mode of listening which bypasses the mental faculties of the 
1 Lyotard - English translation 1993. 
2 Deleuze and Guattari - English translation 1983. 
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listener and accesses the nervous system directly. Listening according to this 
paradigm ceases to be cognition-based, and becomes instead a predominantly 
physical experience: 
The 'listener' who, in the case of the Mozart, acquiesces in full understanding and agreement with 
a familiar musical language, will in this situation, where the familiar language is so decomposed 
[Zersetzf]3 become a 'hearer': a physical acoustic perceiver [Korperlich-ajustisch 
Wahrnehmender] who 'searches out' [Abtasten] realms of time and sound without being 
presented with co-ordinates - or perhaps one should say: he himself is 'searched out'. 'Hearing' 
[Hdren} means experiencing oneself afresh, experiencing oneself as a changed person, but also 
as a person capable of change. 'Hearing' means, in contrast to 'acquiescent' listening: radically 
altering one's bearings, having to adapt oneself anew; it means, by probing unfamiliar structures, 
mastering hidden spaces in oneself. 
In this experience of one's own potential for change, putting one's own strength to the test, 
reconciling oneself and coming to terms with the unfamiliar, something other than that moral or 
moralizing surfeit of false fluency, or uninspired [platf\ cultural pessimism is set in motion -
namely, the optimistic belief [Hoffnung] in one's own abilities to rise to new challenges of thinking 
and feeling.4 
In the article 'On Structuralism', Lachenmann describes a similar attempt to 
break away from traditional ways of experiencing music, from 'prevailing 
structures of existence and consciousness' 5 - via the concept of 'liberated 
perception': 
3 The German term also carries the meanings 'subverted', 'undermined' or 'decayed'. 
4 'Der "Zuhfirer", bei Mozart eine vertraute Musiksprache in Verstandnis und Einverstandnis mitvollziehend, 
wird dort, wo die vertraute Sprache sich so zersetzt hat, "Horer": kSrperlich-akustisch Wahrnehmender, der 
ohne vorgegebene Orientierung Zeit- und Klangraum abtastet - oder vielleicht sollte man sagen: Er selbst 
wird auf eine ihm ungewohnte Weise von der Musik abgetastet. Hdren heiRt so, sich selbst als Veranderter, 
aber auch als Veranderbarer neu erfahren. Hdren heiftt im Gegensatz zum mitvollziehenden ZuhSren: sich 
radikal umorientieren, sich neu zurechtfinden mussen, heiRt, im Ertasten ungewohnter Strukturen 
verborgene Raume in sich erschlieRen. Und in dieser Erfahrung der eigenen Veranderbarkkeit, im Erproben 
der eigenen Kraft, sich im Ungewohnten zu finden und zurechtfinden, setzt sich etwas anderes durch als 
blol3 moralischer oder moralisierender UberdruG an jener falschen Sprachfertigkeit oder jenem platen 
Kulturpessimismus, namlich die Hoffnung auf die eigene Fahigkeit, neuen Herausforderungen des Denkens 
und Fuhlens gerecht zu werden' (Lachenmann 1996:169). 
5 Lachenmann 1995: 100. 
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To break through prevailing structures affecting the material means wrenching, tearing the 
specific sound elements in these structures from their existing, apparently self-evident context 
and allotting them to different, newly-created categories which the composer has to establish. 
This means experiencing the familiar in an unfamiliar context, mobilizing, relaunching perception 
and making it accessible as experience. Thus at the heart of this process of destruction lies 
'liberated perception'. ... This element of shattering the familiar by making us aware of and 
illuminating its structure creates a situation not just of uncertainty but also of deliberately created 
'non-music'. This is at the same time an element of crucial importance for the process of listening, 
and it is only by allowing oneself to experience this 'non-music' that listening becomes genuine 
perception.6 
The implication is that in order for listening to become 'genuine perception', the 
listener must free his mind from what he already knows, from the familiar, and 
open himself up to the unknown, the non-identical - in himself and in reality. 
The moment of 'creative liberation' would seem to transcend the time frame of 
the work itself: time, as it were, points beyond itself. During the 'flash' of liberated 
perception, the individual sound is freed up to perception. This instant of 
'exposed' sound functions like a window in the music: set free, it possesses its 
own structure in excess of that of the work. Yet, paradoxically, it is also a 
component of the structure from which it comes. During this structural 'mutation' 
(a turning inside-out), structure, understood as the entire work and embodying its 
communicative 'message', is now presented, transformed, in the short-term 
moment. The 'message' is now in the moment. Lachenmann is advocating a new 
form of structural listening which is not context-based in the conventional sense. 
He subverts the traditional, Schoenbergian idea of structural perception (where, 
broadly speaking, one must appreciate the whole to appreciate the Idea). If the 
short-term is, as it were, the 'structure', there is almost no difference between 
perception and understanding (cognition). 
Lachenmann 1995:100- 101. 
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The concept of Sprachlosigkeit is also linked to the idea of liberated perception. 
In the essay 'Horen ist wehrlos - ohne Horen' (1985), Lachenmann writes, 
... this is not just about listening to a type of music which bemoans the sad way of the world 
through scratchy sounds, nor, however, to a type of music which escapes from this world with 
some exotic sound, but to music in which our perception is sensitized and made aware of itself, of 
its own structure and in addition tries to make the perceiving spirit sensitive to those structures of 
reality to which such a process of composition is a reaction. In other words, music which is 
always open to adventure, which once again grasps the concept of beauty within changed, 
speechless [Sprachlosigkeif] conditions, in the famed hope that what comes from the heart 
although without words will still be taken to heart.7 
Paradoxically, for Lachenmann it is the Sprachlosigkeit, not the Sprachfertigkeit 
moments of the work which communicate. 
Whilst recalling the philosophies of Deleuze and Lyotard, the notion of liberating 
perception is also highly suggestive of the ideas and aims of the American 
experimental tradition. It will be useful to explore in more detail some of these 
ideas as a way of furthering an understanding of what Lachenmann intends on a 
musical level by this concept. Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to return 
to some of the wider philosophical implications of the concept mentioned at the 
opening of this section. The following two sections thus consist of a brief survey 
of some of the most important examples of the early thought of Lyotard and 
Deleuze. 
7 g e h t es eben nicht urn das Hdren einer Musik, die den traurigen Weltlauf durch Kratzgerausche 
beklagt, aber auch nicht um eine Musik, die vor dieser Welt in irgendeine Klanggexotik sich fluchet, sondern 
um Musik, bei welcher unsere Wahrnehmung sensibel und aufmerksam wird im Grunde auf sich selbst, auf 
die eigene Strukturhaftigkeit, und die daruber hinaus versucht, den wahrnemenden Geist sensibel zu 
machen fur jene Strukturen der Wirklichkeit, auf die ein solches Komponieren reagiert: Musik also, die sich 
auf das Abenteuer einlaftt, den Begriff Schonheit unter veranderten, sprachlosen Bedingungen nochmals zu 
fassen in der beruhmten Hoffnung, daft, was von Herzen Kommt, trotz aller Sprachlosigkeit auch wieder zu 
Herzen gehe' (Lachenmann 1996: 135). 
203 
2. Lyotard's Libidinal Philosophy 
The student revolt of the late 1960s was the last hurrah of the old world revolution. It was 
revolutionary in both the ancient Utopian sense of seeking a permanent reversal of 
values, a new and perfect society, and in the operational sense of seeking to achieve it 
by action on streets and barricades, by bomb and mountain ambush. ... And yet this was 
not the world revolution as the generation of 1917 had understood it, but the dream of 
something that no longer existed: often enough not much more than the pretence that 
behaving as though the barricades were up would somehow cause them to rise, by 
sympathetic magic. The intelligent conservative Raymond Aron even described the 
'events of May 1968' in Paris, not quite inaccurately, as street theatre or psychodrama.8 
Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes (1994) 
The events of May were able to shake the whole edifice of bourgeois society because 
there were shifts in the social positions of desire from bottom to top and across the 
structures and institutions of France. For a time there were forces at play which could not 
be represented in the political theater. ... For a short while there were affects deployed 
elsewhere, not on the surface of capital. The movement ended when the rebellious 
intensities were captured by the machinery of representation (the Party, the political 
discourse of the established organizations) and compressed into exchange relations, into 
claims for higher salaries, university reform, into fictitious strategies for seizing state 
power, etc. 9 Robert Hurley, 'Introduction to Lyotard' (1974) 
Intensity 
The body of French philosophy epitomized by Jean-Francois Lyotard's work 
Libidinal Economy and by Anti-Oedipus, the first volume of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, can be understood in part 
as a reaction or outgrowth of the events of the late 1960s in France. Lyotard was 
during the 1950s and early 1960s a member of the leftist group Socialisme ou 
8 Hobsbawm 1994:446-7. 
9 Hurley 1974: 126. 
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Barbarie and later worked on the newspaper, Pouvoir Ouvrier. In 1968 he was 
teaching philosophy at Nanterre and became a militant in the March 22 
movement, which he points to as an example of a politics of affirmation. 
As Peter Dews has pointed out, 
Having left S ou B in 1963, Lyotard ... became active in the Mouvement du 22 Mars, the 
spontaneist, anti-authoritarian wing of the May movement. 'The Movement of '68', Lyotard wrote, 
in this introduction to his first anthology of essays, 'seemed to us to do and say on the grand 
scale what we had sketched out in words and actions in miniature and by anticipation Nor 
was he slow to learn the anti-structuralist lessons of this political experience: '... an approach 
solely guided by the model of structural linguistics makes it impossible to understand the 
functioning of symbolic systems like those described by Mauss, or the appearance of 
("revolutionary") events in a semantically "well-regulated" system like contemporary capitalism. In 
the first case, as in the second, there is a dimension of force which escapes the logic of the 
signifier.'10 
This 'dimension of force which escapes the logic of the signifier' would continue 
to exist as a central concern for Lyotard throughout his career, and underpins his 
wholesale rejection of the idea of rational thought and of the autonomous subject 
in Libidinal Economy. Force, also expressed by Lyotard in terms of the ineffably 
singular, the heterogeneous, or the figural, is, in his opinion, entirely suppressed 
by rational thought systems and capitalist institutions. Whilst Adorno, also 
recognizing the repressive aspects of such systems, attempts a form of 
'immanent critique', Lyotard endeavours to move beyond their categories 
altogether. In the spirit of The Movement of '68', he seeks to burst open their 
confines and to liberate experience, opening it to the ineffably singular, to that 
Dews 1987: 111. 
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which cannot be represented.11 It is this notion of 'intensity', I would propose, that 
resonates with Lachenmann's concept of 'liberated perception'. 
Libidinal Economy represents a paradoxical attempt to imagine what experience 
might be like prior to the emergence of an autonomous, self-reflecting subject. 
The central notion of the book is that of a 'great ephemeral skin'. This fictional 
skin operates prior to all categories, identities and prior to language. Prior to any 
sort of representation, it communicates nothing but libidinal intensity. As Dews 
has put it, the ephemeral skin is 'constituted by the deployed surfaces of the 
body, which are swept by an incessantly mobile libidinal cathexis generating 
points of pure sensation or "intensity".'12 The skin is 'ephemeral' because it defies 
being 'fixed' by stable concepts, and it does not allow for abstractions - the 
intensity it projects is purely physical (hence 'skin'). As Hamilton Grant puts it, the 
skin 'could be considered as a sort of analogical presentation of difference 
independent of the (secondary) orders of re-presentation in which identity, 
signification and reference are determined.'13 This idea can be seen as a 
reconstruction of the Freudian conception of the unconscious. Indeed, 
Bennington points out that Lyotard is particularly indebted to Freud's paper, 'The 
Unconscious' (1915). In this paper, Freud summarizes the 'primary process' as 
follows: 
... exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobility of cathexes), timelessness, 
and replacement of external by psychical reality - these are the characteristics which we may 
expect to find in processes belonging to the system Ucs.14 
Important points to emphasize from Freud's conception, then, are the dissolution 
of conceptual oppositions and the mobilization of all fixed oppositions. The 
" Even Lyotard's later publications on postmodernism, and language games' - such as The Postmodern 
Condition (1979, English tr. 1984) and Just Gaming (1979, English tr. 1986) - can be seen as a continuation 
of these concerns. 
1 2 Dews 1995: 24. 
1 3 Hamilton Grant in Lyotard 1993: xii. 
' 4 Freud cited in Bennington 1988:16. 
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possibility of critique is annulled. In valorizing the great ephemeral skin, Lyotard 
is advocating a means of moving beyond the contradictions of capitalist society. 
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The Libidinal Body 
The notion of the great ephemeral skin deconstructs the idea of the organic, 
unified body characteristic of traditional psychoanalysis. The following extended 
quotation demonstrates this, and also exemplifies Libidinal Economy's 'free-
flowing', literary style. 
It is not a part of the body, of what body? - the organic body, organized with survival as its goal 
against what excites it to death, assured against riot and agitation - not a part which comes to be 
substituted for another part, like, for example, in the case of this little girl, the fleshiness of the 
arm for that of the thighs and its faint fold for the vaginal slit; it is not this displacement of parts, 
recognizable in the organic body of political economy (itself initially assembled from differentiated 
and appropriate parts, the latter never being without the former), that we first need to consider. 
Such displacement, whose function is representation, substitution, presupposes a bodily unity, 
upon which it is inscribed through transgression. There is no need to begin with transgression, we 
must go immediately to the very limits of cruelty, perform the dissection of polymorphous 
perversion, spread out the immense membrane of the libidinal 'body' which is quite different to a 
frame. It is made from the most heterogeneous textures, bone, epithelium, sheets to write on, 
charged atmospheres, swords, glass cases, peoples, grasses, canvasses to paint. Ail these 
zones are joined end to end in a band which has no back to it, a Moebius band which interests us 
not because it is closed, but because it is one-sided, a Moebian skin which, rather than being 
smooth, is on the contrary (is this topologically possible?) covered with roughness, corners, 
creases, cavities which when it passes on the 'first' turn will be cavities, but perhaps on the 
'second', lumps. But as for what turn that band is on, no-one knows nor will know, in the eternal 
turn. The interminable band with variable geometry (for nothing requires that an excavation 
remain concave, besides, it is inevitably convex on the 'second' turn, provided it lasts) has not got 
two sides, but only one, and therefore neither exterior nor interior.15 
In the collection of essays published one year prior to Libidinal Economy, Des 
Dispositifs Pulsionnels, Lyotard urges, 
,5Lyotard 1993:2-3. 
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Don't react by falling back on the outmoded category of the individual subject, but think in terms 
of a future perspective with a free circulation of energy, freed from rule by commodities.16 
The emergence of the subject, Lyotard contends in Libidinal Economy, can only 
occur through a cooling of intensity, a slowing down of the 'libidinal band'. This 
'disintensification' 
... allows the displaceability and non-identity of the drives/ pulsions and intensities to be arrested 
and given a designation and signification. It is through procedures of exclusion (notably negation 
and exteriorization) that the [libidinal] bar gives birth to the conceptual process . . . 1 7 
Indeed, any form of representation occludes the libidinal band, and suppresses 
difference. As Dews has written, 
For Lyotard each segment of the band is 'absolutely singular', so that the attempt to divide it up 
into conceptual identities implies the denial of disparities, of heterogeneities, of transits and 
stases of energy, it implies the denial of polymorphy.18 
Lyotard's notion of 'investment', of the channeling of desire, can be understood in 
terms of Lachenmann's aesthetics. The 'investment', or pre-structuring of 
experience and the loss of spontaneity which this entails ('the bourgeois cliche of 
expression'19) is precisely what Lachenmann seeks to move beyond through 
'creative destruction' and instrumental musique concrete. 
1 6 Lyotard cited in Mertens 1983:118. 
' 7 Hamilton Grant in Lyotard 1993: xii. 
, B Dews 1995: 23-24. 
Lachenmann 1995: 97. 
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Affirmative Desire 
No need to do a critique of metaphysics (or of political economy, which is the same 
thing), since critique presupposes and ceaselessly creates this very theatricality; rather 
be inside and forget it, that's the position of the death drive.20 
Lyotard, Libidinal Economy (1974) 
'What brings us out of capital and out of "art"... is not criticism, which is language-bound, 
nihilistic, but a deployment of libidinal investment.'21 
Lyotard, Des Dispositifs Pulsionnels (1973) 
Libidinal Economy, then, represents an attempt to transcend the division of 
subject and object, not through a Hegelian sublation of opposites, but by 
returning below the subject-object relation to uncover a force prior to their 
separation. 
This philosophy embodies a rejection of the negativity of Critical Theory, in 
particular its insistence on maintaining the category of subjectivity in spite of its 
fragmented and alienated state under capitalist conditions. Indeed, this 
distinction has been isolated as one of the central points of divergence between 
modernist and postmodernist positions. Max Paddison, for example, has written 
that 
The current engagement of Critical Theorists like Habermas with postmodernist/ antimodernist 
critics hinges on a fundamental disagreement regarding the nature of subjectivity and the relation 
of the Subject to the objective 'life-world'. Critical Theorists oppose to the decentred Subject of 
postmodernism the persistent modernist ideal of an autonomous self-reflecting Subject, battered 
and fragmented as it has now undoubtedly become. 2 2 
As Mertens, too, has observed, 
2 0 Lyotard 1993: 3. 
2 1 Lyotard cited in Best and Kellner 1991: 155. 
2 2 Paddison 1996: 43-44. 
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... [Lyotard] refers to the Frankfurt School of Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas as still stressing 
alienation and still thinking in terms of the subject. [He] thinks that 'alienation can be evaluated 
positively, as a means of destroying capitalism from the inside.'23 
Rather than negatively opposing capitalist conditions like Critical Theory (and 
facing up to the prospect of the indefinite impossibility of any sort of 
reconciliation) Lyotard's solution is to espouse a definition of desire as 
affirmative. He abandons the notion of desire as nostalgia, as lack, and 
embraces instead a notion of desire which is entirely positive and productive. 
3. Deleuze and Guattari's 'Body Without Organs' 
Schizophrenia as Emancipation 
As a psychic decentring process whereby subjects escape from the bourgeois reality 
principle, its repressive ego and superego constraints, and its Oedipal traps, the 
schizophrenic process poses a radical threat to the stability and reproduction of 
capitalism.24 Best and Kellner, Postmodern Theory (1991) 
Let a thousand machines of life, art, solidarity, and action sweep away the stupid and 
sclerotic arrogance of the old organizations.25 
Felix Guattari and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us (1990) 
Like Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari espouse a fundamentally undialectical stance 
with regard to the relation of subjectivity and society. In Anti Oedipus, both 
subject and object are seen as second order constructions, products of the 
activity of a-subjective 'desiring machines'. All forms of systematization -
^Mertens 1983: 120. 
2 4 Best and Kellner 1991: 90. 
2 5 Guattari and Negri cited in Best and Kellner 1991: 93. 
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including that of theory - are viewed as inherently totalitarian and oppressive. 
Rational thought, as with Lyotard, is one such form of codification to be 
abandoned: 'It is not the sleep of reason which engenders monsters but a vigilant 
and insomniac rationality'26 Deleuze and Guattari intone. The self-reflective 
subject is also 'part of these things we must dismantle through the united assault 
of analytical and political forces.'2 7 
One of the central constructions of Anti Oedipus is schizophrenia, or the 'schizo-
subject'. The schizophrenic mode of experience entails dispensing with 
subjective identity in order to permit the free flow of the libidinal energies that 
subtend representational and identity thinking. Schizophrenia is, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, the necessary condition of human emancipation from capitalist 
conditions. In Anti Oedipus, they coin the term 'schizoanalysis' for their 
theoretical project. 
The task of schizoanalysis is that of tirelessly taking apart egos and their presuppositions; 
liberating the prepersonal singularities they enclose and repress; mobilizing the flows they would 
be capable of transmitting, receiving, or intercepting; establishing always further and more 
sharply the schizzes and the breaks well below conditions of identity; and assembling the 
desiring-machines that countersect everyone and group everyone with others.2 8 
Schizophrenia is not seen in the conventional sense as an illness, but as an 
emancipatory psychic condition - a decentring process through which the 
repressive constraints imposed by the forging of the ego are evaded. This 
condition is considered the product of capitalism's 'decoding' of stable meanings 
and identities.29 As Best and Kellner point out, 
2 6 Deleuze and Guattari 1977:112. 
2 7 Deleuze and Guattari cited in Best and Kellner 1991: 92. 
2 8 Deleuze and Guattari: 1983. 
2 9 The concept of 'decoding' resonates with Lachenmann's concept of 'defamiliarization'. 
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Capitalism subverts all traditional codes, values and structures that fetter production, exchange 
and desire. But it simultaneously 'recodes' everything within the abstract logic of equivalence 
(exchange value), 'reterritorializing' them within the state, family, law, commodity logic, banking 
systems, consumerism, psychoanalysis and other normalizing institutions... Capitalism 
rechannels desire and needs into inhibiting psychic and social spaces . . . 3 0 
Whilst capitalism perpetually 'recodes', thus undermining its own subversive 
potential, schizophrenia represents this decoding tendency taken to an extreme, 
'its inherent tendency brought to fulfillment, its surplus product, its proletariat, its 
exterminating angel'.3 1 
Pleasure and Pain 
For Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenic experience is characterized by 
discontinuity and fragmentation. Past and present are no longer unified, and the 
individual moment in time takes on an overwhelmingly literal and vivid quality: 
There is a schizophrenic experience of intensive quantities in their pure state, to a point that is 
almost unbearable - a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended 
between life and death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure naked intensity stripped of 
all shape and form.32 
Fredric Jameson's description of schizophrenia in Postmodernism, or, The 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism is pertinent here. Jameson understands the 
condition as part of a 'crisis in historicity'33 and the recent rise to dominance in 
Western culture of a spatial logic to supplant the older, temporal one. An effect of 
this perceived crisis is, for Jameson, the loss of personal identity. He describes 
the resulting experience as follows: 
Best and Kellner 1991: 89. 
Ibid: 90. 
Deleuze and Guattari: 1984: 18. 
Jameson 1991: 25. 
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... the breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities and 
intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis; thereby isolated, that present 
suddenly engulfs the subject with undescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly 
overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the material - or better still, the literal -
signifier in isolation. This present of the world or material signifier comes before the subject with a 
mysterious charge of affect, here described in the negative terms of anxiety and loss of reality, 
but which one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of euphoria, a high, an intoxicatory 
or hallucinogenic intensity.34 
This account of experience parallels that of Kant's theory of the sublime, with its 
admixture of pleasure and pain. It also resonates with Lachenmann's description 
of Horen as the experience of music in the absence of co-ordinates (the Horer 
'"searches out" [Abtasten] realms of time and sound without being presented with 
co-ordinates').35 Also pertinent in this context is Lachenmann's description of 
liberated perception as 'spiritual provocation', 'interplay with the unquantifiable' 
and 'interplay with the incommensurable'.36 
Body Without Organs 
... Deleuze and Guattari describe the body in terms of speeds and intensities, productive 
flows of forces seeking to escape the authority of unity, organization, and hierarchy, what 
they refer to as stratification. Thus, BwO (their abbreviation) refers not to a body that is 
literally without any organs, but rather a body that is not determined, not ruled or 
structured by those organs, whether sexual organs, heart, or lungs.3 7 
Dorothea Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation (1999) 
The correspondences between Anti Oedipus and Lyotard's Libidinal Economy 
are clear. In addition to the issues discussed above regarding subjectivity and 
history, both texts feature a redundancy of language and an absence of 
34 Ibid.: 27-8. 
3 5 Lachenmann 1996:169. See also Part Four, Section 1. 
3 6 'Where art does not come into contact with the incommensurable ... where it avoids interplay with the 
unquantifiable, it is dead' (Lachenmann 1995:101). 
3 7 Olkowski 1999: 57. 
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traditional philosophical argument in favour of rhetoric. A predilection for 
neologisms is one further aspect of this correlation: Lyotard's 'grand ephemeral 
skin' finds its counterpart in Anti-Oedipus with the notion of the 'body without 
organs' (BwO) - another site for the non-coercive distribution of intense 
differences, prior to the formation of the self-identical, organic subject. The body 
without organs (a concept formulated by Antonin Artaud) is an entity in constant 
flux, always 'in-between' stable identities. It experiences not ideas, but intense 
affects. Elizabeth Grosz has described this body as follows: 
Unlike psychoanalysis, which regards the body as a developmental union or aggregate of partial 
objects, organs, drives, orifices, each with their own significance, their own modalities of pleasure 
which, through the processes of Oedipal reorganization, bring these partial objects and 
erotogenic bodily zones into alignment in the service of a higher goal than their immediate, local 
gratification (the ultimate goal being reproduction), the BwO invokes a conception of the body that 
is disinvested of fantasy, images, projections, representations, a body without a psychical or 
secret interior, without internal cohesion and latent significance.38 
Both Lyotard's Libidinal Economy and Deleuze and Guattari's Anti Oedipus offer, 
I would argue, suggestive models of what Lachenmann would seem to designate 
by Horen as a means of musical experience. 
It will be useful at this point to examine in more detail some of the deeper 
philosophical implications of the positions taken by Deleuze and Lyotard as 
compared with Adorno. In doing this, I hope to arrive at a better understanding of 
what is undeniably the value of Adorno's dialectical stance. 
Grosz cited in Olkowski 1999: 57. 
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4. Postmodernism vs. Negative Dialectics 
The Aporias of Postmodernism39 
Adorno's criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy (and his criticism of sociology) consisted 
of demonstrating that any philosophy (or sociology) which did not involve a notion of 
subject and object and their mediation falls into antinomies which can be derived from the 
social processes which underlie the theoretical thinking in question. Such philosophy 
depends too on identity thinking (reification).40 Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science (1978) 
Studies have begun to emerge over the past few years on the affinities between 
postmodernism and Critical Theory, pertaining mostly to issues of subjectivity, 
history and the critique of representational thinking. Both theories have singled 
out for criticism the identity thinking associated with figures such as Hegel (see 
Part 1). The two philosophical currents highlight what they see as the repressive 
aspects of subjective reason and focus on that which it excludes in the name of 
closure and presence (hence the appearance of terms such as 'difference', 
'intensity' and 'nonidentity' in their work). They attack the notion of a self-
identical, all knowing subject, both at the level of self-identity, and in terms of the 
identity of subject and world, as object. Both schools of thought have turned to 
the aesthetic sphere as a means of subverting reified thought patterns. 
Both see Hegel's assumption of the existence of Geist, ('spirit' or 'mind'), as the 
omnipresent force which drives the historical process, as problematic. The 
central notion of Absolute Spirit relies upon a transcendental subject, a subject 
3 9 It has been argued that there are significant differences between the terms 'postmodernism' and 
'poststructuralism'. Alastair Williams, for example, has claimed that 'poststructuralism's textual explorations 
of metaphysics, artistic autonomy, narrative and history challenge but do not jettison the discourses of 
modernity; many forms of postmodernism, in distinction, claim to be beyond this framework' (Williams 1997: 
124). I retain this distinction: following Williams' definition of the two terms, the Lyotard and Deleuze of the 
1970s are considered 'postmodern', whilst Derrida and de Man 'poststructuralist'. However, it should be 
noted that Dews, who is cited is this section, employs the term 'poststructuralism' to describe recent French 
theory in general - whilst I adopt the term 'postmodernism' for this purpose. 
4 0 Rose 1978: 62. 
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that surpasses both history and the concrete individual. Hegel's notion that the 
terminus of history can be reached through the dialectical process of the 
'negation of the negation' seems to claim that even disasters such as war and 
acts of human cruelty eventually play a part in the realization of Absolute Spirit 
through the course of history. In other words, the notion that history has a 
purpose or is rational and teleological, is now also seen as suspect, not least 
since the culture it helped engender culminated with Hitler's fascistic regime in 
genocide. 
Despite these affinities, the very different conclusions reached by Critical Theory 
and postmodernism must be taken into account - particularly with respect to 
subjectivity and its relation to the objective life-world, and to the relative 
importance assigned to history and tradition as meaningful forces to be engaged 
with. , 
As we have seen, Lyotard rejects the idealist notion of a self-identical, unified 
subject, as does Adorno, yet unlike Adorno, he also renounces dialectics.41 In the 
essay 'Adorno as Devil' published in the wake of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti 
Oedipus, Lyotard writes, 
The dissipation of subjectivity in and by capitalism; Adorno, like Marx, sees there a defeat; he will 
only be able to surmount this pessimism by making of this defeat a negative moment in a 
dialectics of emancipation and of the conquest of creativity. But this dialectics is no less 
theological than the nihilism of the loss of the creative subject; it is its therapeutic resolution in the 
framework of a religion, here the religion of history. ... Art is a kind of Christ in its denunciating 
function. As for effective redemption, it is even further away than in Christology, and must be; art 
is not reconciliatory, that is its force, to hold itself inside nihilism, to assume it, and thus manifest 
it.42 
4 1 For clarity, I will focus in what follows on Lyotard, although many of the essential points are equally 
applicable to Deleuze and Guattari. 
4 2 Lyotard 1974:127. 
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In other words, according to Lyotard, by preserving the concept of negation, 
Adorno keeps all reconciliation at a distance. Art, as we have seen, has a central 
role to play for both theorists. As David Carroll has remarked, 
Art, when it is considered - as it is by Adorno - as the manifestation of critical thinking, may be 
the sign of a loss or failure in terms of the criteria and values of traditional art, but it is also the 
indication that this loss will eventually be compensated for. Lyotard considers Adorno's aesthetics 
to be 'tragic,' but he demands that this loss be conceived affirmatively and not tragically, with no 
implication of possible reconciliation. The libidinal side of art is, for Lyotard, the affirmation of what 
in Adorno remains negative: the arbitrary, the fragmented, the irrational, and the non-dialectical. 
Libidinal aesthetics thus constitutes the reversal of critical theory and aesthetics, the affirmation of 
what is negative - not as if it were negative - but as if the negative were really the affirmative and 
in no need of reconciliation or redemption.43 
Lyotard's essay constitutes an assault on Adorno for 'being content to be the 
"devil" in a world without true gods', 4 4 for retaining the category of critique. 
Lyotard seeks to move beyond critical reflection, beyond good and evil, and 
beyond any notion of reconciliation: 
Totality is missing = there is no god to reconcile = all reconciliation can only be represented in its 
impossibility, parodied = it is a satanic work. You wasted your time replacing God with the devil, 
the prefix super - with the old sub-terranean mole, you remain in the same theological 
deployment. You pass from shamefaced nihilism to flaunted nihilism. Adorno's work, just as 
Mann's and Schonberg's, is marked by nostalgia. The devil is the nostalgia of God, impossible 
god, therefore precisely as a god. 4 5 
More recently, in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984), 
Lyotard elaborates a postmodern aesthetic of the sublime, as a negative moment 
within the modern. Derived from Kant, it marks the occurrence of an 'event' which 
escapes the grasp of pre-existing concepts or categories of experience (in 
4 3 Carroll 1987: 50. 
44 Ibid. 
4 5 Lyotard 1974: 132-33. 
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Kantian terms, a discord between the faculties of 'common sense'). Whilst the 
sublime, as Lyotard understands it, is essentially a condition of the new, he takes 
the principle to nihilistic extremes. Discounting any sentiments of nostalgia for the 
loss of unity and absence of reconciliation in modernity (desire as lack) he calls 
instead for a celebration of difference, the affirmation of disunity and 
formlessness, a euphoric acceptance of the impossibility of reconciliation. Utopia 
ceases to be something which has yet to be attained, as in Adorno's 
'melancholic' stance. For Lyotard, the category of identity should simply no 
longer exist. He asserts, 
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. We have 
paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the 
concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience. Under the 
general demand for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear the mutterings of the desire 
for a return to terror, for the realisation of the fantasy to seize reality. The answer is: Let us wage 
a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and 
save the honour of the name.*6 
As Dews has argued, one of the fundamental theoretical failings of 
postmodernism is precisely this 'lack of any concept of individuation as an 
identity which is developed and sustained through the awareness of non-identity.' 
He continues, 
Post-structuralism does indeed seek for difference, but it does so through an immersion in 
fragments and perspectives, not perceiving that this splintering is itself the effect of an 
overbearing totality, rather than a means of escape from it.47 
Adorno's solution to the problem of identity thinking is, as we have seen, to try on 
the contrary, to turn identity thinking against itself: 
4 8 Lyotard 1992:150 (my italics). 
4 7 Dews 1987: 233. 
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Totality is not an affirmative but rather a critical category. Dialectical critique seeks to salvage or 
help to establish what does not obey totality, what opposes it or what forms itself as the potential 
of a not yet existent individuation.48 
Like Lyotard, Adorno also refers to the Kantian sublime, in his Aesthetic Theory. 
However, in a way that recalls Lachenmann's concept of 'liberated perception', 
he sees it as a process through which the subject is made aware of its own 
limitations - not as a pretext for destroying the identity principle, but as a means 
of redeeming it. The resemblance of Adorno and Lachenmann's positions can be 
seen by comparing two statements on the sublime below, by Adorno and 
Lachenmann respectively: 
As works of art open themselves to contemplation, they begin to irritate the viewer, who becomes 
uncertain of his distance and his role as mere spectator. The highest summit of art may be this 
instant of awareness, where the subject realizes that the truth of an art work ought actually to be 
the truth about himself. This instant redeems subjectivity, including subjective, feeling-oriented 
aesthetics, by negating it. Traumatized by art, the subject is able to experience itself properly, 
dissolving its petrified features and waking up to the narrowness of its self-posited standpoint. 
Trauma is the true happiness the subject can find in art works. But it is a happiness fashioned 
against, and in spite of, the subject, which is why crying is the vehicle of sadness in view of one's 
mortality. This comes out in Kant's discussion of the sublime, which he located outside of art.4 9 
... that moment of erring - in a double sense - goalless searching, in directions where there are 
neither paths nor signposts; and also erring in the sense of a priori failure because the goal 
surpasses the imagination. It is only in the strength displayed by the seeker to continue to err that 
the reality and latent presence of the goal reveals itself as hidden inside ourselves. Thus errare 
humanum reveals itself in a new dimension - Schonberg's 'highest aim of the artist: to express 
himself - as identical with the highest aim of Man: to know himself.50 
As his account of sublime redemption demonstrates, Adorno himself challenges 
the identity of concept and object and yet he refuses to abandon the principle of 
4 8 Adorno cited in Dews 1987: 232-3. 
4 9 Adorno 1984: 379-80 - my italics. 
5 0 Lachenmann 1999: 27. 
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identity and to endeavour, as does Lyotard, to move beyond the terms of 
reference themselves. 
221 
Adorno's immanent critique of totality 
The polarity of subject and object can easily be taken, for its part, as an undialectical 
structure within which all dialectics take place. But both concepts are categories which 
originate in reflection, formulas for something which is not to be unified; nothing positive, 
not primary states of affairs, but negative throughout. Nonetheless, the difference of 
subject and object is not to be negated in its turn. They are neither an ultimate duality, 
nor is an ultimate unity hidden behind them. They constitute each other as much as 
through such constitution - they separate out from each other.61 
Adorno, Negative Dialectics (1966) 
Thus, whilst both Adorno and the postmodernists address the same problems in 
their work, arguing for the acknowledgement of the role of the object in cognition, 
they reach very different conclusions. For Adorno, postmodernism's attempt to 
locate pure singularity is self-defeating, already a product of identity thinking. The 
problem as he sees it is not that of an irreducible split between concepts and 
their objects, but rather the notion that concepts are primary, that mind can know 
the world in its totality: 'Aware that the conceptual totality is mere appearance, I 
have no way but to break immanently, in its own measure, through the 
appearance of total identity.'52 It is not conceptuality per se that is at fault, but the 
absence of self-reflection. The category of subjectivity is retained as a critical 
lever. Thus, Adorno seeks to remedy the hypostatization of metaphysics through 
immanent critique: T o use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy 
of constitutive subjectivity - this is what the author felt to be his task .,.' 5 3. 
5 1 Adorno 1973: 176. 
52 Ibid: 5. 
63 Ibid: xx. 
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The Contradictions of Libidinal Economy 
It is precisely not a matter of ana-lyzing (not even 'schizo-analysis'), in a discourse that 
will necessarily be one of knowledge, but rather of sufficiently refining ourselves, of 
becoming sufficiently anonymous conducting bodies, not in order to stop the effects, but 
to conduct them into new metamorphoses, in order to exhaust their metamorphic 
potential [puissance], the force [puissance] of effects that travel through us. 5 4 
Lyotard, Libidinal Economy (1974) 
In seeking to dispense altogether with transcendental bases and foundations, 
Lyotard affirms a metaphysics of libido, a new transcendental foundation - the 
'grand ephemeral skin' - thus defeating his own agenda. As we have seen, for 
Lyotard, this resists representation by concepts, which override the pure 
singularities and differences from which it is constituted. Indeed, he claims, 
concepts and identities can only be formed by means of a cooling of the intensity 
of the libidinal band. The upshot of this is a form of nihilism or amoralism. In a 
state of total affirmation, no moral or political standpoint can be adopted. If 
everything is to be affirmed, clearly nothing can be negated - thus any action or 
discourse forms an equally satisfactory conveyor of intensity. Just as language 
becomes redundant, so too does a critical engagement with reality. Art and 
politics dissolve into passivity ('Our politics is of flight, primarily, like our style', 
Lyotard has asserted 5 5). 5 6 
It is questionable just how sincere this 'politics of flight' can really claim to be. 
Ambiguity of language - the constant oscillation between playfulness and 
seriousness - is indeed a central feature of postmodern discourse. Rhetoric is 
all-important, and language becomes redundant. Since meaning has become 
suspect, all attempts to convey meaning are renounced - nothing any longer can 
5 4 Lyotard 1993: 258. 
55 Ibid.: 20. 
6 6 Deleuze and Guattari also exhibit 'a decentring of ethics in favour of aesthetics' (Best and Kellner 1991: 
107-8). 
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be attributed with significance. One could argue that this position represents an 
indulgence and a trivializing of the very real predicament of the modern subject 
lamented in Adorno's writings. 
Because Lyotard affirms a form of naturalism isolated from consciousness (much 
like Nietzsche's concept of Becoming5 7), he cannot conceive of a self whose 
function it would be to overcome repression. The only alternative as he sees it, is 
to abandon the category of subjectivity altogether. 'Don't react by falling back on 
the outmoded category of the individual subject, but think in terms of a future 
perspective with a free circulation of energy .. . , 5 8 . This contrasts with Adorno's 
stubborn preservation of the subject-object dialectic. As Dews has pointed out, 
Adorno refuses to take the self-understanding of the philosophy of consc iousness at face value: 
in accordance with the logic of disintegration, the claim to absolute identity, to the extent that it is 
realized, can only take the form of unprecedented fragmentation, and this contradiction points 
towards the possibility of another form of subjectivity, however difficult to conceptualize. By 
contrast, post-structuralist thought takes the repressive self-enclosure of c o n s c i o u s n e s s to be 
definitive of subjectivity a s such , with the consequence that 'emancipation' can only take the form 
of a breaking open of the coercive unity of the subject in order to release the diffuseness and 
heterogeneity of the repressed . 5 9 
Adorno exhibits a more complex view of subjectivity. He argues that subjectivity 
is inherently incoherent, embodying a tension between the strictures of selfhood 
and heterogeneous impulse. According to Adorno, the subject is not self-identical 
and unified, as the postmodernists would have it, but is instead split or fractured, 
a situation which, he claims, gives rise to perpetual pain and suffering. In order 
for subjective identity to be maintained, inner nature, he argues, must be 
repressed. 
5 7 Lyotard repeats Nietzsche's splitting of Knowledge and Becoming. Peter Dews makes this point (see 
Dews 1995: 25). 
5 8 Lyotard cited in Mertens 1983: 118. 
5 9 Dews 1987: 230. 
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As Adorno argues in 'Sociology and Psychology' (and in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment), the relation of the subject to its other is in fact constitutive of 
subjectivity: 
Although itself psychic in origin it is supposed to arrest the play of inner forces and check it 
against reality: this is one of the chief criteria for determining its 'health'. The concept of the ego is 
dialectical both psychic and extrapsychic, a quantum of libido and the representative of outside 
reality. 6 0 
The postmodernist dissolution of consciousness would not be seen by Adorno as 
a liberation, but, on the contrary, as a debilitating capitulation to a world of 
alienation and repression, an affirmation of the 'administered world'. To cite 
Dews once again, 
. . .Lyotard's libidinal economy, far from preserving the singularity of each moment of experience, 
a preservation which could only be achieved within a discriminating continuity of experience, ends 
by embracing the punctuality, anonymity and indifference of the commodity form. 6 1 
Deleuze and Guattari's Anti Oedipus runs up against similar problems. Like 
Lyotard, they attempt to dissolve the dialectic of the mind and objective nature, 
as the following passage from Anti Oedipus demonstrates: 
... man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other - not even in the s e n s e 
of bipolar opposites within a relation of causat ion, ideation, or expression (cause and effect, 
subject and object, etc.); rather, they are one and the s a m e essential reality, the producer-product 
... Schizophrenia is like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon or entity; 
schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines, universal primary 
production a s 'the essential reality of man and nature'. 6 2 
Adorno 1968: 86. 
Dews 1987: 231. 
Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 4-5. 
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Through such assertions Deleuze and Guattari could also be accused of 
constructing a new metaphysics.6 3 
To summarize: In the 1970s, Lyotard attempts to supercede Adorno and the 
notion of subjective identity. Deleuze and Guattari take Lyotard's project a step 
further: with the notion of schizophrenia, they celebrate the loss of the subject. 
Whilst Adorno sees subjective alienation in late capitalism as a loss, the French 
theorists view it as an opportunity for the wilful abandonment of the subject. In 
their depiction of constant flux and instability, anything can become anything 
else, and everything is irrelevant. History disappears as a force to be reckoned 
with - instead, there is only direct sensory experience. The tension between 
subject and object, individual and society, artist and objective material has 
broken down, and the subject surrenders itself to objectivity. By renouncing the 
subject, the possibility of critical resistance becomes impossible: if everything is 
to be affirmed, everything becomes an equally good (or bad) conductor of 
intensity. 
The concept of non-identity elaborated by Adorno in Negative Dialectics is not 
just a rejection, but also a re-entering into the cracks and fissures within 
knowledge in the attempt to experience the world in a non-dominated form. 
According to Adorno, it is art that points the way to this non-coercive reality. 
6 3 Best and Kellner argue, for example, that Deleuze and Guattari 'do not consider the possibility that even 
the characteristics of multiplicity and productivity of desire might also be historically conditioned, might be 
distinctly modern creations. There remains a fundamental realm of desire in their theory therefore, that is 
ontologicaf rather than cultural in nature, a position which Foucault rejects in his more rigorously historical 
framework' (Best and Kellner 1991: 106). 
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1. John Cage and Libidinal Philosophy 
Lyotard and Cage 
His vision of cycl ical time, his view of the world a s ' a monster of energy without 
beginning, without end ... a play of forces and waves of forces 'enables him to reject any 
teleology, the notion of any movement being for the sake of another, and to open up a 
'vertical' dimension of time, in which every moment contains its own justification.1 
Dews, referring to Nietzsche's notion of eternal return, Logics of Disintegration (1987) 
Throughout his writings, particularly during the period of his libidinal philosophy, 
Lyotard has endorsed the music of John Cage as an example of 'affirmative' art. 
In his essay, 'The Postmodernity of John Cage', Hermann Danuser has 
described the nature of the relationship between Cage and Lyotard as follows: 
An affinity between art and philosophy reveals itself in this, Lyotard s a y s , 'under the sign of their 
experimentation'. Of course this affinity is of a completely different kind from that which had 
occurred between serial modernism and the ideals of rational sc ience under the sign of rationality 
in the Fifties. Just a s C a g e ' s music h a s eliminated the claims to unity and identity of a musical 
work, so Lyotard's philosophy reveals itself to be freed from having to realize the claim, from 
having 'to render an object a s a concept' . 2 
According to Lyotard, Cage's work operates via the production of intense affects 
rather than symbolic representations. Indeed, the following statements from 
Cage support this idea: 
' Dews 1987:133. 
2 'Dabei zeigt sich eine Affinitat zwischen Kunst und Philosophie, wie Lyotard sagt, "im Zeichen ihres 
Experimentierens". Naturlich ist diese Affinitat eine ganz andersgeartete als die, welche im Zeichen der 
Rationalitat in den funfziger Jahren zwischen der seriellen Moderne und den Idealen einer rationalen 
Wissenschaft gegeben war. Gerade so wie Cages Musik den Elnheits- und Identitatsanspruch des 
musikalischen Werkes aufgelost hat, so zeigt sich auch die Philosophie bei Lyotard davon befreit, den 
Anspruch einlosen zu sollen, einen Gegenstand "auf den Begriff zu bringen."' (Danuser 1998: 150). 
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... living takes place each instant and that instant is always changing. The wisest thing to do is to 
open one's ears immediately and hear a sound suddenly before one's thinking has a chance to 
turn it into something logical, abstract or symbolical. 3 
'Old music has to do with concept and communication, the new with perception.' 4 
Some key features linking the philosophy of Lyotard and the music of Cage are 
summarized below: 
1. Rejection of causal time in favour of the unique moment 
Lyotard's efforts to gain access to pure unmediated objectivity find a parallel in 
Cage's elimination of the idea of musical autonomy and dissipation of the tension 
between form and content. Both Cage and Lyotard reject outright the idea of 
representation in music, claiming that any attribution of symbolic meaning to 
sounds undermines their uniqueness. Lyotard has claimed that 'Composition is a 
desensitization of material.'5 Alastair Williams has observed, 
...constellation, for Adorno and Benjamin, holds open the tension between object and concept (in 
music, between form and content), while C a g e ' s constructions tend to collapse this dialectic and 
capitulate to the object, a s if it were unmediated. 6 
Michael Nyman has written that 'the avant-garde composer wants to freeze the 
moment, to make its uniqueness un-natural, a jealously guarded possession', 7 
whilst the experimental composer wants to free the moment, to liberate it from 
any sort of symbolic or representational function. Jung's depiction of the / Ching 
concisely captures this distinction between two modes of conceiving time -
Western and Eastern: 
3 Cage cited in Nyman 1974: 1. 
4 Cage cited in Polin 1989: 226. 
5 Lyotard 1984: 92. 
6 Williams 1997: 99. 
7 Nyman 1974: 8. 
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The actual moment under actual observation appears to the ancient C h i n e s e view more of a 
chance hit than a clearly defined result of concurring c a u s a l chain p r o c e s s e s . T h e matter of 
interest s e e m s to be the configuration formed by chance events in the moment of observation, 
and not at all in the hypothetical reasons that seemingly account for the coincidence. While the 
Western mind carefully sifts, weighs, isolates, the Ch inese picture of the moment e n c o m p a s s e s 
everything down to the minutest nonsensical detail, because all of the ingredients make up the 
observed moment. 8 
As Lyotard rejects dialectics, so too does Cage repudiate any notion of dialectical 
time. Mertens has described this in terms of the idea of 'macro-time': 'The nature 
of macro-time is essentially static, and duration is an atomized conglomerate of 
moments, without any relation to past or future.'9 Such a fragmented experience 
of time is echoed in Deleuze and Guattari's model of schizophrenic experience. 
2. Perception aesthetic displaces communication 
Cage wants to avoid dictating the listening experience: his focus is on assigning 
a greater creative role to the listener than was previously the case. As Nyman 
has asserted: 
Experimental music emphas izes an unprecedented fluidity of composer/performer/listener roles, 
a s it breaks away from the standard sender/carrier/receiver information structure of other forms of 
Western mus ic . 1 0 
According to Cage, music should not attempt to convey an idea in the 
Schoenbergian sense. Moment-to-moment perception and understanding should, 
in his view, equate. As Nyman puts it, 
Jung cited in Nyman 1974: 8. 
Mertens 1983: 106. 
' Nyman 1974: 20. 
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Traditional European music is based on ... manipulation: this is the 'logic' behind the growth and 
development of, say , a sonata form first subject and explains why composers can talk of musical 
ideas. C a g e had discovered the simplest and most direct way of letting music develop according 
to the logic of sound, unhampered by any (non-sonic) pseudo logics or methodological strictures. 
If music w a s to be a language at all, it would henceforward be a language of statement. 1 1 
3. Search for pure objectivity and denial of subject 
Clytus Gottwald has said that 'According to Cage, once the subject has been 
silenced, one returns to pure being.'12 Leonard Meyer has summarized Cage's 
denial of subjective intention as follows: 
T o experience reality a s it is one must renounce all desires. Man is a part of nature. One must 
learn to exist like nature, simply existing without a purpose. 1 3 
This recalls Lyotard's renunciation of lack in favour of pure affirmation. His denial 
of the organic subject in Libidinal Economy and its replacement by a conduit for 
intense affects, the ephemeral skin, echoes Cage's attempt to achieve objectivity 
though the abandonment of control: 'Sound is sound and man is man. Let sound 
be itself, rather than a vehicle of human theory and feeling.'14 
4. Rejection of history for myth of nature 
Lyotard, Deleuze and Cage reject history in their attempts to access an 
unmediated nature: 
When C a g e s a y s : there is no si lence, he s a y s : no Other holds dominion over sound, there is no 
God, no Signifier a s principle of unification or composition. There is no filtering, no set blank 
s p a c e s , no exclusions; neither is there a work anymore ... Si lence is displaced: it is no longer the 
" Ibid: 28. 
" Clytus Gottwald in Mertens 1983: 116. 
1 3 Meyer cited in Mertens 1983:109. 
1 4 Cage cited in Mertens 1983:106. 
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composer 's , the signifier's, Jehovah 's si lence that must remain unheard, be effaced, but silence 
a s noise-sound of the involuntary body, the noise-sound of the libido wandering over bodies, 
'nature,' that must be heard . 1 5 
'Adorno as the Devil' and 'Several Silences' 
Just as Adorno once placed Schoenberg in opposition with Stravinsky in the 
Philosophy of New Music, in the essays 'Adorno as the Devil' and 'Several 
Silences' Lyotard opposes Schoenberg to Cage. Whilst, for Lyotard, the serial 
music of Schoenberg and the negative dialectics of Adorno projects desire as 
lack, suffering and alienation, he champions the music of Cage which, he claims, 
is a music of pure affirmation, dealing not with representation, but with sounds as 
pure libidinal intensities - the re-sensitization of musical material. In Cage's 
music, the 'devices' of the secondary process which filter the free flow of libidinal 
energy are renounced: 
... there is no device to receive these intensities: their singularity consists in their not being 
related by memory to units of reference (a s c a l e , rules of harmony, or their hypothetical 
equivalent in the phenomenological body): there is no region in which to measure them.. . . What 
should be said is that no unity, no comprehensive unity, no composition is made with this noise, 
this sound, this singular intensity, but rather in spite of them. To hear this event is to transform it: 
into tears, gestures, laughter, dance , words, sounds theorems, repainting your room, helping a 
friend move. I c a n testify to the fact that a black cat (Lhermite) heard Kage l 's Music for 
Renaissance Instruments: bristling of whiskers, fluttering of ears , prowling in the vicinity of the 
listening room. T h e intensity of noise-sound = an urge to produce something, circumstantiality, in 
an endless return where nothing repeats itself. 1 6 
For Cage, as for Lyotard and Deleuze, the goal is 'life as a work of art'.17 
1 5 Lyotard 1984:108. 
, 6 Ibid: 93. 
1 7 Goodchild 1996:185. 
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2. Cage, Lachenmann and musical material 
Cage and Instrumental musique concrete 
Whilst our [European] music has developed under the pressures of our tradition, towards 
the controlled, the systemat ic , organized in every detail ... so C a g e ' s development 
increasingly takes a completely different slant: the produced sound interests him less and 
l e s s , he is dependent on the playing action, less and less is rationalized, and chance , 
flexible chance , plays a large role. 1 8 Hermann Danuser, 'Rationalitat und Zufair (1991) 
... the word 'experimental' is apt, providing it is understood not a s descriptive of an act to 
be later judged in terms of s u c c e s s and failure, but simply a s of an act the outcome of 
which is unknown. What has been determined? 1 9 John Cage (1955) 
There is a clear affinity between Lachenmann's technique of instrumental 
musique concrete and the process-based approach to composition that has 
developed in the wake of John Cage's work. Lachenmann himself has indicated 
the influence of Cage, Wolff and Brown on his music: The "fearlessness" of 
these composers in dealing with unusual sounds (and equally with normal 
sounds!) definitely gave me courage in my own continuing quest', he has said. 2 0 
As with many of Cage's scores, what is predetermined in Lachenmann's action 
scores is not the end product, but the process. As Mertens writes, 
1 8 'Wahrend sich unsere neue Musik immer mehr, unter dem Druck unserer Tradition, zum Kontrollierten, 
zum Systematischen, bis ins Detail Organisierten hin entwickelt und nicht selten den Eindruck von nicht-
isolierten Geflechten elektrisch geladener Drahte macht, an denen man jeden Augenblick einen gewischt 
kriegen konnte, so zeigt Cages Entwicklung mehr und mehr eine ganz andere Richtung: Der 
hervorgebrachte Klang interessiert ihn zunehmend weniger, es kommt ihm auf die Aktion des Spielens an, 
immer weniger wird rationallsiert, under der Zufall, der gelenkte Zufall spielt eine grofle Rolle' (Danuser 
1991:99). 
1 9 Cage cited in Nyman 1974:1 (my italics). 
2 0 Lachenmann cited in Ryan 1999: 21. 
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Experimental composers do not deal with well-defined time-objects, but rather they outline a 
situation, a field in which sound may occur . What is important is not the product but the 
production process. In this context Schnebel u s e s the term Kompositionsprozesse: 'It is not the 
aural effect that is prescribed, but the process that generates it.'21 
This notion of process is crucial to the libidinal philosophies of Deleuze and 
Guattari, and of Lyotard. For Deleuze and Guattari, the work of art is a functional 
machine: a process, not an end product. Its function is to produce intense affects, 
or sensations. For Deleuze and Guattari (to adopt the words of Daniel W. Smith), 
'the aim of art is not to represent the world, but to present a sensation. ... every 
work of art is singular, and ... the conditions of sensation are at the same time 
the conditions for the production of the new.'22 In Anti Oedipus, Deleuze and 
Guattari assert that 'The unconscious poses no problem of meaning, solely 
problems of use. The question posed by desire is not 'What does it mean?' but 
rather 'How does it work?'23 
In addition to the idea of process, instrumental musique concrete is understood 
as the 'experience of energy' and the 'manifestation of energy.'24 This concern 
with the physicality of sounds is, as we have seen, also a part of Cage's 
aesthetic. Lachenmann's work for solo piano, Guero (see Part One, Section 3) 
epitomizes this concern, as does Cage's piece for voice and piano dating from 
1942, The Wonderful Widow of Eighteen Springs. Guero, as Pace has observed, 
is 'thoroughly physical and theatrical', and 'does not contain a single note played 
on the keys'. 2 5 In The Wonderful Widow of Eighteen Springs, likewise, no notes 
are performed: the vocalist is accompanied only by the knocking of the pianist's 
fingers and knuckles on the body of the piano. 
2 1 Martens 1983: 108. 
2 2 Smith 1996:41. 
2 3 Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 109. 
2 4 Lachenmann cited in Ryan 1999: 21. 
25 Ibid. 
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There is, however, a distinction between the aesthetics of Cage and 
Lachenmann, and this can be understood as being political in nature. In works 
such as Guero and Pression, the gesture of playing on the body of the instrument 
and renouncing Sprachfertigkeit (as conventional pitched sounds) - indeed the 
renunciation of conventional performance techniques altogether with instrumental 
musique concrete - can be seen as a repudiation of the entire capitalist notion of 
work as object. The influence of the highly politicized work of Nono is surely to be 
felt acutely in works such as Accanto: a flagrant gesture of disrespect towards 
existing cultural values (and, by extension, society) in many respects. Much of 
Lachenmann's music and thought is directed towards the extra-musical. In, this 
sense, he can be linked, like Lyotard and Deleuze, to the Zeitgeist of the late 
1960s, when - significantly in my view - the technique of instrumental musique 
concrete was first formulated. Yet as we have seen, with Cage, and with Lyotard 
and Deleuze, it is as if politics is irrelevant. In spite of their experimental 
approaches to music and thought, they ultimately fall back on a form of escapism 
which is a far cry from the staunchly 'realist' approach taken by Lachenmann. 
Having made links between the idea of liberated perception in Lachenmann's 
writings and Cage's notion of musical material, it will be useful to draw some 
direct comparisons between aspects of Lachenmann's music and comparable, 
examples from the American experimental tradition. 
Section 3 will focus on diverging constructions of subjectivity in La Monte 
Young's X for Henry Flint and Lachenmann's Tanzsuite, whilst Section 4 deals 
with diverging attitudes towards history in Gavin Bryars' Jesus' Blood Never 
Failed Me Yet and Lachenmann's Accanto. I hope to show that, despite the fact 
that the rhetoric of Lachenmann's writings in some ways points to the 
philosophical positions of Deleuze and Lyotard,, the music itself demonstrates a 
consistently dialectical, critical approach. 
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3. The Composing Subject: Lachenmann vs. La 
Monte Young 
Liberation through Limitation 
As we saw in Part Three, Section 5, Lachenmann terms the effect of the radical 
paring down of musical materials 'structural hallucination'. On the face of it, the 
ideas presented in bars 11 Off of the Tanzsuite mit Deutschlandlied - extended 
rhythmic repetition of the same musical object, the co-opting of the unintentional 
chance elements in the performance of this material in order to liberate 
perception - seem to suggest an affinity with Minimalist art. Indeed, in describing 
the desired effect of this extreme simplification of musical material, Lachenmann 
demonstrates a 'mystical' rhetoric reminiscent of Cage and Eastern philosophy: 
And so these s u c c e s s i v e sections from the Siciliano offer an increasing narrowing down of the 
material and at the s a m e time an increasing widening of differentiated experience. Whoever 
directs his gaze upon a single tree in a landscape comprised of many things, will perceive a 
further continuous landscape [within a single tree] and if he once more restricts his sight to the 
contemplation of a single leaf, yet again new horizons will strike him - of sight and thought - and 
an angle of vision will allow him to s e e other things in a new mysterious light. 2 6 
I propose here to compare this passage from the Siciliano to La Monte Young's X 
for Henry Flint (1960), perhaps the first and most elemental example of 
Minimalist music. 
2 6 'Und so bieten diese aufeinanderfolgenden Abschnitte des Siciliano eine zunehmende Verengung des 
Materials und zugleich eine zunehmende Erweiterung der Differenzierungs-Erfahrung. Wer in der Vielfalt 
einer Landschaft den Blick auf einen einzelnen Baum richtet, wird darin eine weitere unendliche Landschaft 
erblicken, und wenn er seinen Blick erneut verengt auf die Betrachtung eines einzigen Blattes, so werden 
ihm noch einmal neue Horizonte - des Sehens und des Denkens - aufgehen, und ein Blickwinkel wird den 
anderen in neuem geheimnisvollen Licht erscheinen lassen' (Lachenmann 1996: 134). 
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X for Henry Flint (1960) shows Young's predilection to limit the musical work to a 
single object or event (as compared with Cage's emphasis on multiplicity). X for 
Henry Flint eschews traditional classical music's discourse of contrasting 
materials in favour of the prolonged repetition of a single sound. 
The performance directions to the piece dictate that a pianist should repeat a 
single loud cluster, using the forearms, in a uniform manner and for a long time. 
Keith Potter has observed that 'the longer a note is sustained, the more its 
overtones become clear.' 2 7 Sheer familiarity with the repeated cluster on the part 
of the listener results in the gradual foregrounding of its overtones. The interest 
of the piece therefore inheres not in the perceived repetition of an identical 
object, but in the fact that repetition evinces the play of difference beneath the 
surface, the differential subsurface. Subtle, unintentional changes of balance, 
dynamic, duration or pitch content between the various iterations lend an entirely 
different perspective to the 'same' sound event. 
Like Lachenmann, Young is concerned with bringing the acoustic materiality of 
the sound in all its richness to the fore. The subtle nuances in performance 
specified by Lachenmann's pedaling instructions are certainly an aspect of 
Young's piece, too. Indeed, Cardew has commented that this chance aspect, or 
the presence of random variables in performance is in fact what the piece is 
essentially about: 'What the listener can hear and appreciate are the errors of the 
interpretation. If the pieces were performed by a machine this interest would 
disappear and with it the composition.'28 Cardew says that although uniformity is 
stipulated ('as far as possible'), it is variation that is desired. 'It is simply this: the 
variation that is desired is that which results from the human (not superhuman) 
attempt at uniformity.'29 
2 7 Potter 2000: 64. 
2 8 Cardew cited in Potter 2000:48. 
2 9 Cardew cited in Nyman 1974: 14. 
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The key difference between Young's piece and the example of structure 
hallucination from the Siciliano consists essentially in the level of choice exerted 
by the composer in determining the overall sounding result. Young's worklist for 
X for Henry Flint leaves the choice of instrumentation remarkably open. It 
specifies that 'piano(s) or gong(s) or ensembles of at least forty-five instruments 
of the same timbre, or combinations of the above, or orchestra' may perform the 
p iece. 3 0 
Lachenmann, on the other hand, specifies both pitch content and precise 
instrumentation. His repetitions are cast in a Siciliano rhythm and fully notated. 
Young's piece is not notated at all. Hence, not only does Young not specify 
instrumentation, but he also leaves open the choice of tempo, duration, and 
context - unlike Lachenmann, by whom all such parameters are determined in 
advance. The specified end point of Young's piece is decided by the performer(s) 
in advance of performing the piece. The margin of variables in Lachenmann's 
section of the Tanzsuite is, on the contrary, relatively small and restricted only to 
the performance act itself. 
Thus, Young renounces subjective choice to a high degree. There are no 
expectations raised in X for Henry Flint, as it is undialectical and holistic in 
approach. To a certain extent, Young could be seen to bypass the expressive 
subject altogether. 
Lachenmann is aiming at a similar focus for the listener's perception, yet the 
situation in which he locates it is a highly particular one. The unexpected 
focusing-in of the texture, the traditional rhythm, the amplification of the piano in 
the context of an orchestral work, above all the instruction that the piano sound 
should be erstickt (damped, strangled) contextualizes this moment of heightened 
perception. As Lachenmann himself has asserted, 
3 0 Young cited in Potter 2000: 48. 
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Naturally, the principle of such structure-hallucination is not new; it is used in many varied ways in 
minimal and conceptual art. It s e r v e s above all a s a rather magically orientated experience, and 
has a meditative function. In my piece it here forms a stage which one is steered towards and 
then it is left, a structured state of material which happens and then c h a n g e s . For it is not a 
magically attracted state of passivity but the opposite, an active act of will, which chooses the 
material and drives it forward, gives character to the expression and rules the form of my music . 3 1 
3 1 'Das Prinzip solcher Struktur-Halluzinationen ist natOrlich nicht neu, es wird in der Minimal- und 
Konzeptkunst vielfach variiert. E s dient dort allerdings einer eher magisch gerichteten Erfahrung, hat 
meditative Funktion. Hier in meinem Stuck bildet es eine Station, die angesteuert und wieder verlassen wird, 
einen strukturellen Aggregatzustand, der sich ergibt und wieder wandelt. Denn nicht magisch-faszinierte 
Willenlosigkeit, sonder im Gegenteil der Wille, der das Material bestimmt und weiter treibt, kennzeichnet den 
Ausdruck und regelt die Form meiner Musik' (Lachenmann 1996:158). 
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4. Culture, Nature and Audio Tape 
Accanto and Jesus' Blood Never Failed Me Yet 
Jesus' blood never failed me yet 
Never failed me yet 
Jesus' blood never failed me yet 
There's one thing I know 
For he loves me so .. .M 
Gavin Bryars, lyrics to Jesus' Blood Never Failed Me Yet (1975) 
Jesus' Blood (1995), like Accanto, employs a recorded tape as the basis around 
which the piece is structured and to which everything refers. In Bryars' case, the 
recording is drawn not from the classical tradition, but from the 'real world': it 
consists of the song of a London tramp. Of course, the source objects and the 
way they are treated are starkly different. Nevertheless, a comparison of the two 
pieces will help tease out some of the assumptions underlying Lachenmann's 
conception of handed-down material. 3 3 
As we have seen, Mozart's Clarinet Concerto symbolizes in Accanto a reified 
consciousness as perpetuated by the culture industry and the media. 
Lachenmann's critical approach is above all geared towards rendering visible the 
' invisible' social ized aspect of the music, to demystify the deepest 
presuppositions behind its popularity. What has taken on the appearance almost 
of 'nature' is revealed as historical, a Lukacsian 'second nature'. 
3 2 Bryars 1993. 
3 3 Bryars is, of course, British, yet his music subscribes to the American tradition and, arguably, should be 
considered a part of it. In the mid-sixties Bryars was based in New York and worked as a double bass player 
in John Cage's ensemble. 
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If the Mozart concerto in Accanto represents 'culture', the tramp's song in Jesus' 
Blood seems to represent the opposite pole: pure, spontaneous nature, 
unfettered as yet by the forces of cul ture. 3 4 However, rather than attempting to 
deconstruct illusion, Bryars constructs a web of illusion around the recorded 
song. 
Bryars and the 'Sound of Nature' 
The recording around which Jesus' Blood is based is of a London tramp singing 
a sentimental religious song to himself. Apparently inspired by the 'non-abstract 
repetition ... with emotional overtones' of Pop Art, 3 5 Bryars took the recorded 
song and produced a loop, subsequently copying the loop onto a continuous reel. 
Rhythmically and tonally erratic, the original song possesses a peculiarly human, 
'authentic' quality; an emotional integrity and directness which resonates with the 
primitive states of speech and melody favoured by Rousseau in his 'Essay on the 
Origin of Languages'. It could be seen to symbolize an idyllic, originary 'nature', 
unsoiled as yet by 'culture'. Its undeniable pathos is also the source of its 
strength. 
It could be argued that, in isolating the tramp's song and placing it within the 
context of the artwork, Bryars causes us to hear the song 'anew'- as we would 
not have done had we encountered it in its original context. Bryars intensifies the 
meaning of the song, inviting us to reflect upon the life-world to which it belongs 
(in the sense of Heidegger's theory of 'disclosure')3 6. 
3 4 The very fact that the song has been appropriated into the context of Bryars' piece in this way makes such 
an endeavour highly paradoxical and somewhat suspect. Just as Rousseau cannot express the 'originary' 
without recourse to 'derivative' writing according to Jacques Derrida, so Bryars, in the act of 
recontextualization, partly undermines his original intention. (See Derrida 1974: 229: Rousseau 'declares 
what he wishes to say, that is to say that articulation and writing are a post-originary malady of language; he 
says or describes that which he does not wish to say. articulation and therefore the space of writing operates 
at the origin of language.') 
3 5 Bryars 1993. 
3 6 See Cooper 2003:108-111 for a discussion of Heidegger's theory. 
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Bryars adds an instrumental accompaniment to the song, in a simple incremental 
fashion. This process begins with a string quintet, followed by pizzicato bass and 
guitar, then woodwind, and so on until a full orchestral texture is formed around 
the solo voice. After around twenty-five minutes of slow culmination, 
accompaniment and song are faded out. The genuine, expressive quality of the 
song is, to a great extent, kept intact. Michael Nyman writes that this is 'a simple, 
straightforward, harmonious backing to the tune'. 3 7 The discreet harmony has an 
air of neutrality, almost artlessness, allowing the melody to stand in relief. 
Ex. 37 
iff* i IJ Cf f MJuflf r 
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m 
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Gavin Bryars, Jesus'Blood Never Failed Me Yet 
3 7 Nyman 1974: 146 
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Bryars' intervention is minimal: here, he has simply mapped accompaniment onto 
melody organically. The accompaniment is the outcome of a simple process of 
realizing the harmonic implications of the tune. Its principal is one of non-
intervention, of the utilization of individual differences to creative effect - the 
outlining of a situation rather than the determination of a sound-object. No 
attempts have been made to generate harmonic interest in relation to the vocal 
line: unlike a Schubert lied, for example, there has been no endeavour to vary 
the harmonic accompaniment, to intensify the melody at a later repetition. 
The accompaniment itself is ambiguous; too understated for a classical 
accompaniment, the idiom is that of the backing to a pop song, and yet this 
clearly is not a pop song. Indeed, aside from the orchestral build-up, the real 
expressive power of this piece emanates exclusively from the old man's own 
performance. Bryars respects the song's humanity and simplicity. The 
unobstrusive harmonic language serves to heighten its aura and expressivity, 
imbuing it with an almost mythical status. Here, Bryars would appear to side with 
Rousseau in postulating and valorizing a natural, almost pre-social origin, the 
very essence, perhaps, of what it is to be human. 
There is a clear continuity between Bryars' interest in the irregular aspects of the 
tramp's performance and his involvement in the formation of the Portsmouth 
Sinfonia. 'What one hears at a Sinfonia concert', Michael Nyman has written, 'is 
familiar music, seriously dislocated'. 3 8 The philosophy behind the ensemble, 
bringing untrained musicians together to perform serious classical works, is an 
attempt to 'rearticulat[e] the classics' as Nyman puts it, or, in language more 
redolent of Rousseau, to reclaim the cultural to the 'natural', an intention also 
apparently in evidence in the 1975 version of Jesus' Blood. Through the 
deliberate admittance of what Howard Skempton has termed 'uncontrolled 
Nyman 1974: 140. 
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variables', 3 9 both the piece and the Sinfonia endeavour to regain a lost 
spontaneity and validity. Such a process is strongly redolent of Lachenmann's 
early instrumental musique concrete pieces from the late sixties. 
Whilst the recording in Jesus' Blood is heard throughout, in Accanto the very 
opposite is true. For the most part, the recorded Mozart is only allowed very brief 
fragments and snatches, chopped up through the staccato rhythms of 
Lachenmann's tape part. The string accompaniment to Jesus' Blood is largely 
intended to harmonize with the recording, to sympathize with it and to illuminate 
its original aura. The very opposite occurs in Accanto. Here, the accompaniment, 
or rather the surrounding context, distorts, fragments, obfuscates the recording, 
even ridicules it. Indeed, one could argue that for Lachenmann, the very use of a 
recording of the Mozart is a reference to the destruction of aura via mechanical 
reproduction, as Benjamin argued in his famous essay 'The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction'. Few contemporary works employ shock tactics 
as presented here in Accanto. 
(See Part 2 of this thesis, Ex. 16, Accanto, bars 192-194) 
In response to the clarinetist shouting through his instrument in bar 192, the 
composer instructs the tuba player to shout back through his instrument in strictly 
notated rhythm: 'BITTE BRAZU DAS ZITAT' ('GO ON, BRAY THE EXTRACT!') 4 0 
As in temA, although the tuba player's message is clear on the page, the 
sentence is fragmentary and distorted through the medium of the Tuba, creating 
a form of phonetic instrumental music concrete. The 's ' and T sounds of "DAS 
ZITAT" are echoed and distorted by the trombone player's 'PSTP. 
3 9 Skempton cited in Nyman 1974:140. 
4 0 The word 'brazu' does not exist in German. It is a brassy, flutter-tonqued distortion of the word 'dazu' 
(literally, to it'). My English translation is a similar corruption of 'play'. 
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The clarinet reacts to the recorded excerpt with a further shouting sound; the 
piano performs a banal reduction of the accompanimental rhythm of the Mozart. 
Such derision negates the aura of the familiar classical work, mocking it, 
undercutting its presence. Lachenmann brutally 'defamiliarizes' his source, 
extracting its aura from it. Bryars on the other hand attempts to illuminate, to 
heighten the aura of the original song and foreground the integrity of the tramp's 
song. Bryars reacts with reverence, with a minimum of subjective intervention, 
allowing the song its own space, enabling it to speak. 
Lachenmann constantly works to expose the Mozart as historically superseded, 
with its false depictions of harmony and unity. Its popularity is supported by 
listening habits which are regressive and uncritical. In the manner of Adorno, 
Lachenmann consistently alludes to the historicality of his material and seeks to 
move beyond it, to open up new perceptive worlds. Bryars, on the contrary, treats 
his material undialectically, recalling Cage's approach to material. There is no 
trace of critical evaluation or negation in Jesus' Blood: Bryars' approach to 
material is unreflective and affirmative. 
As we saw at the end of Part Four, libidinal philosophy is far from unproblematic. 
Similar issues have been located within the sphere of music by Wim Mertens in 
American Minimal Music. Mertens writes that 
... the general movement against the dialectic has led to the repudiation of the contradictions 
within the very society that s h a p e s the music that gives up its bond with society. The unity of form 
and content a s s u m e s that the contradiction between subject and object, mind and matter is 
solved. This solution, however, has an alienating effect because of the absence of synthesis in 
social reality. Music is thus no longer related to historical-dialectical reality and loses its historical 
continuity. 4 1 
4 1 Mertens 1983:117. 
247 
For Mertens, minimal music, which has its roots in Cage, is the result of 
psychological regression and escapism, the replacement of external realities by 
psychic ones. 
The so-called religious experience of repetitive music is on fact a camouflaged erotic experience. 
One can speak of a controlled pseudo-satisfaction because the abandoning of dialectical time 
does not really happen but is only imaginary. The libido, freed from the external world, turns 
towards the ego to obtain imaginary satisfaction. Freud defined this as a regression and a 'return 
to the infantile experience of hallucinatory satisfaction.42 
Mertens adds 
According to Marcuse, the breakdown of dialectics is not a solution but is a symptom of the 
disease - the desertion of history in favour of a Utopian world. This can only bring pseudo-
satisfaction and will probably serve to strengthen the historical impasse for the worse. 4 3 
Lachenmann's whole approach aims to challenge such escapism in the form of 
what Adorno would call 'immanent critique': 
Perception thus perceives itself and goes beyond this to perceive also its inability to penetrate 
both reality and its own structure. Thus it is reminded of its ability to overcome lack of freedom by 
recognition, and, in doing so, to achieve freedom. Self-experience, provoked by a creative 
medium, a creative liberation, then becomes a spiritual, i.e. 'artistic' experience, and vice-versa. 4 4 
This form of self-experience is strongly redolent of Adorno's musique informelle 
as a 'postulate of musical emancipation' 4 5 and the emancipated subjectivity 
alluded to by the rediscovery by the subject of its inner nature is an aim made 
explicit by Lachenmann in his writings. In the essay 'On Structuralism' he details 
42 Ibid.: 124. 
43 Ibid. 
4 4 Lachenmann 1995: 102. 
4 5 Adorno 1992b: 272. 
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a concept of 'self experience' through an experience of conflict with tradition. He 
writes 
It is only now that one begins to listen differently, that one is reminded of the changeability of 
listening and of aesthetic behaviour, reminded, in other words, of one's own structure, one's own 
structural changeability and a lso of the element of human invariability which m a k e s all this 
possible in the first place: the power of what one calls the human spirit. Inasmuch a s aesthetic 
and social taboos are affected, subjected to strain, broken, the experience of music becomes an 
experience of conflict, a matter of controversy, and at the s a m e time an opportunity to rediscover 
oneself . 4 6 
Such a stance is undeniably Utopian, something which goes to the heart of 
Lachenmann's calling as an artist. In the conclusion to this thesis, I propose to 
consider how Lachenmann's concept of rejection can be understood as an 
'expression of hope (Hoffnung).'*7 
4 8 Lachenmann 1995: 101. 
4 7 Lachenmann 1996: 176. 
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Conclusion 
Lachenmann's Concept of Hoffnung 
1. Exposing The Ego 
Touched by Nono 
Sometimes, in the field of human achievement, we come across fascinating phenomena, 
superb achievements which earn our admiration and astonishment, not just because they 
are examples of the supreme confidence with which a genius treats his material, but 
because they demonstrate to us what the human spirit is capable of - the potential for 
which we are aware that we share some responsibility. Thus fascination and moral 
impact are combined. But there are also - much more rarely - phenomena which go far 
beyond just provoking astonishment, phenomena which the word fascination is 
inadequate to describe, implying as it does a degree of safe, detached observation. In 
such cases astonishment is not enough to describe our reactions, for these are 
phenomena which have a disturbing effect on our very existence, which 'threaten' not just 
to touch us but to actually change us. To change us by subjecting our ability to 
experience to a hitherto unheard of challenge and transporting us into zones of 
experience of ourselves where the ego is suddenly exposed, stripped of all the standard 
categories of civilization, and forced to redefine its perception of itself, and at the same 
time is challenged to bear such exposure, suddenly perceiving dimensions of its own 
existence which our subconscious is vaguely aware of but which we tend to avoid, taking 
shelter instead in a sort of well-tempered culture even if this consists of a reified 
invocation of pseudo-magical surrogates of such experience. This sudden, shocking 
awareness differs from the artificial astonishment described above precisely because it 
transports us to realms in which the creative spirit which provided us with access in the 
first place is just as exposed and unprotected as we are ourselves.1 
Lachenmann, 'Touched by Nono', (1999) 
Lachenmann's description of his teacher Luigi Nono in the essay Touched by 
Nono', reveals much about what Lachenmann sets out to achieve in his own 
music. For instance, Nono's concept of change 'where the ego is suddenly 
exposed, stripped of all the standard categories of civilization, and forced to 
1 Lachenmann 1999: 17-18. 
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redefine its perception of itself resonates strongly with Lachenmann's own 
concept of liberated perception. 
The personality of Luigi Nono as Lachenmann presents him here - polemical, 
tortured, vituperative, constantly self-critical and equally challenging of the 
assumptions of colleagues and friends - seems almost an idealization of what 
Lachenmann considers the composer's role in contemporary society to be. 
My intention in this study has been to tease out some of the various philosophical 
and theoretical currents which pervade Lachenmann's music and writings. In the 
process an image of Lachenmann's aesthetic has formed itself, one that is in 
some respects highly ambivalent and contradictory. Lachenmann's position 
resists being squarely placed within a single tradition. Instead, he is better 
depicted in terms of a constellation of schools of thought (some of which are 
mutually contradictory), yet all of which contribute towards his complex dynamic 
of unremitting self-reflection and guarded utopianism. 
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2. Paradises in Time 
Liberated Perception vs . Libidinal Philosophy 
... in nearly all of my pieces there are situations, which are no longer structured by me 
yet whose structure, however it manifests itself ar ises out of the intensity of the situation 
and forms only a part of my composition. T h e s e are my resting p laces (Haltepunkte), 
pauses {Fermaten), and more or less complex ostinati: they draw attention to hidden or 
neglected details, which in the normal course of events put in a peripheral appearance 
just on the edge of the musical process and are usually overlooked. When however my 
pieces are entered by such situations then the results from the conscious sensitizing of 
the ear re lease a complex activity of perception a s opposed to their static appearance. 
Possibly such moments refer to the experience of C a g e ' s music but differing from his, 
they are temporary paradises in my music, 'paradises in time', which I find and then 
abandon. 2 
Lachenmann, Paradises in Time, Interview with Peter Szendy (1993) 
Lachenmann's descriptions of 'liberated perception' and 'structure hallucination' 
see the composer at his most redolent of the affirmative standpoints of Deleuze 
and Lyotard. As we have seen, these philosophers endorse the ontologizing 
stance of John Cage for whom musical material is not historically situated 
{Material) but natural and unmediated (Stoff). Indeed, Dahlhaus remarks that 
'Adorno's concept of material is a historical category, whereas Cage's idea of 
matter is a natural one'. 3 The issue has arisen, then, of a fundamental 
ambivalence in Lachenmann's thought. On the one hand, as we have seen, 
2 'Andererseits gibt es in fast alien meinen Stucken Situationen, die nicht mehr von mir selbst strukturiert 
sind, sondern deren Struktur, so wie sie sich ergibt, in einen bestimmten Moment aus der Intensitat der 
Situation heraus entsteht und nun einen Teil der Komposition bildet. Das sind meist Haltepunkte, Fermaten 
oder mehr oder weniger komplexe Ostinati: Sie lenken die Aufmerksamkeit auf verborgene oder 
vernachlassigte Einzelheiten, die normalerweise als bloBe Randerscheinungen an der Peripherie des 
musikalischen Prozesses blieben und von der Wahrnehmung Qbergangen warden. Wenn jedoch solche 
Situationen in meinen Werken eintreten, dann als Resultate einer bewuftten H6r-Sensibilisierung, wobei sie 
entgegen ihres statischen Anscheins eine komplexe Wahrnehmungs-Aktivitat ausldsen. Mdglicherweise 
beziehen sich solche Momente insgeheim auf die Erfahrung Cage, aber anders als bei ihm sind sie in 
meiner Musik vorlaufige Paradiese, "Paradiese auf Zeit", zu denen ich finde, und die ich wieder veriasse' 
(Lachenmann 1996: 209). 
3 Dahlhaus 1987: 271. 
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Lachenmann adopts a posture of negative dialectics highly reminiscent of 
Adorno. Subjective expression, the composer's relation to tradition, and the 
historical dialectic of musical material all feature as central to Lachenmann's 
philosophy. Yet, talk of 'liberated perception', the 'Horen'/'Zuhoren' dichotomy, 
'structure hallucination', and the employment of repetitive techniques similar to 
those found in the music of the American experimental tradition, seem to endorse 
a conceptual system highly at odds with Adorno's 'melancholic' stance. 
These affirmative traces in Lachenmann's language would seem to imply not the 
conscious engagement with history, but anamnesis, a sense of time which is a-
teleological and outside conventional Western diachrony and, related to this, a 
mode of experiencing music which is primarily perceptual rather than cognitive in 
nature. These ideas are undeniably present in Lachenmann's writings. 
'Structure hallucination' occurs in an environment where the process by which 
sounds are created is highly controlled and predetermined, but the moment of 
'liberated perception' relies on properties of the music that are out of the control 
of either the composer or performer - the 'hidden and neglected details' to which 
Lachenmann refers. This is what makes a comparison between instrumental 
musique concrete and John Cage's music, or the 'windows' of stasis in Accanto 
and Tanzsuite with La Monte Young's X for Henry Flint, pertinent. 
Yet it is Lachenmann's framing of these moments within larger 'sound structures' 
and his constant recourse to the wider context of Western contemporary classical 
tradition that finally could be said to differentiate him from his American peers. 
'Horen' - as the striving towards the not-yet-conceptualized - should in fact be 
understood as referring not to a permanent condition but, rather, as a transitory 
state, arising from a tension between the conventional and the new. 
Lachenmann's 'paradises in time', are precisely what the composer suggests; 
temporary points of stasis, moments of arrival within a general context of 
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dialectical time. In practice, Lachenmann's preparedness to accept conflict 
between existing structures of experience and what Adorno has termed the 
'instant of awareness' is more redolent of Adorno's 'fractured subject' than of the 
'denial of the subject' associated with postmodernist theory. 
Affirmation in the Negation 
The affirmative strand in Lachenmann's work should ultimately, I would argue, 
be understood in terms of Adorno's dialectical concept of Utopia. For Adomo, art 
as an image of reconciliation is predicated upon the presence of irreconcilable 
opposites. Affirmation is understood not as separate from, but as a moment 
within the negation. Adorno in his Aesthetic Theory illuminates this paradoxical 
notion: 
... pure negativity of content always has an admixture of affirmation. The brilliance radiated today 
by all anti-affirmative works is the appearance of an ineffable affirmation, the dawn of a non-
existent that pretends it has being. Its claim to being passes away with the instant of aesthetic 
illusion. But what has no being nonetheless represents a promise, if it has the ability to appear. 
This relation between the existent and non-existent is the Utopian figure of art. While art is driven 
into a position of absolute negativity, it is never absolutely negative precisely because of that 
negativity. It always has an affirmative residue.4 
For Adorno, this 'affirmative residue' is present 'in even the most negative of 
modern works as the possibility of change, of "the new", in relation to "the 
immutable", the pre-given.'5 As Alastair Williams has argued, 
The Utopian dimension in Adorno's aesthetics of music becomes understood in a more 
transformative than absolute sense: the social content of music can constitute a form of 
4 Adorno 1984: 332. 
5 Paddison 1993: 76. 
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resistance to dominant and deceptive ideologies, and may anticipate social structures in which 
individual fulfillment is congruent with the everyday organization of life.6 
This 'relation between the existent and the non-existent' in Lachenmann's work 
has been widely misrepresented and even ignored: the spirit of provocation in his 
concept of rejection and his unerring tendency towards self-critique has 
frequently earned him the label of musica negativa. Consider, for example, the 
indignant reactions of Hans Werner Henze 7 and the English composer George 
Benjamin, who in a public talk tried to depict Lachenmann as 'old guard ayant 
garde.'8 Lachenmann has of course passionately refuted this criticism.9 Even in 
the most destructive, 'speechless' moments of his music, there is to be 
experienced what he calls Hoffnung. As Lachenmann has asserted, 
When the masks of fluency fall, the alienation unmasks itself, but recognition helps deal with this, 
and in this sense I myself have never understood this work, just like my other works, to be 
anything other than an expression of rtope.10 
Mimesis is understood by Adorno as the 'non-conceptual affinity of a subjective 
creation with its objective and unposited other'11 and Lachenmann's own Utopian 
gestures can be interpreted in this light. Lachenmann, like Cage, attempts to 
embrace objectivity, but, crucially, maintains a tension between subject and 
object, tradition and the new, something that is relinquished by Cage. 
The affirmative moment is experienced in Lachenmann's music as sensuous 
immediacy - that which is dependent on, and yet escapes domination by rational 
structures. Adorno often alluded to art's promesse de bonheur or riddle 
6 Williams 1997:147 (my italics). 
7 Cited in Lachenmann 1996: 331-333. 
8 Cited in Hockings 1995: 13. 
9 See for example the 1983 essay, 'Offener Brief an Hans Werner Henze', in Lachenmann 1996: 331-333. 
1 0 'Wo die sprachfertigen Masken fallen, entlarvt sich die Entfrendung. Aber Erkennen hilft bewaltigen. Und 
in diesem Sinn habe ich selbst dieses Werk, sowie meine anderen Werke, nie anders verstanden denn als 
Ausdruckvon Hoffnungf (Lachenmann 1996:176). 
" Adorno 1984: 80. 
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character, due to the irreconcilable presence of both mimetic and rational 
components ('What mimetic behaviour responds to is the telos of cognition, 
which it simultaneously hinders through its categories'12). Through reaching out 
to the non-identical, art provides an image of nature, and thus of reconciliation: 
The dignity of nature lies in [its] quality of not-yet, which by its expression repels 
all attempts at intentional humanization.'13 
Thus for Adorno it is through the rupturing of preexisting forms and handed-down 
materials that art attains a Utopian flavour (as opposed to, in Lachenmann's 
words, collapsing the dialectic, 'depending on ... old categories of listening' or 
'settling in a virgin territory of unknown sounds'). Adorno is suspicious of all 
attempts to portray a harmonious state of affairs in a way that resembles 
Lachenmann's contempt for 'false fluency'. 
It is ... the task of a true theory not to conceal and 'mediate' reality's ruptures by means of 
harmonious thought-forms, but precisely to expose them and through knowledge of them to 
contribute to overcoming them.1 4 
In Touched by Nono', Lachenmann highlights the difference between Cage's 
and Nono's respective conceptions of musical material: 
Nono's works mean more to me because - unlike Cage (and this is the difference between the 
'seeker' and the 'redeemed') he at no point forgets the historicity of the material but rather 
preserves it with such radical action.1 5 
By uncritically affirming unmediated sensory experience, Cage renders the 
challenge of history redundant. It is precisely Helmut Lachenmann's 
preparedness to preserve musical tradition through radical action and his 
12Adorno 1984: 80. 
"Ibid.: 109. 
1 4 Adorno cited in Buck-Morss 1977: 130. 
1 5 Lachenmann 1999: 29. 
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dialectical engagement with what he calls 'the complex activity of perception'16 
that endows his music with the potential 'not just to touch us, but to actually 
change us. ' 1 7 
1 6 Lachenmann 1996: 209 
1 7 Lachenmann 1999: 17-18 
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